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Abstract 
Decisive advances in semantics have taken place in the past two decades as a 
consequence of studying quantificational and referential mechanisms associated with 
anaphora and, in particular, with unbound and so-called "donkey" anaphora. In this 
context, S. Neale's proposal represents a remarkable philosophical and semantic 
refinement of the E-Type theory advanced by G. Evans several years ago. According to 
the Evans-Neale view, donkey pronouns represent or go proxy for definite descriptions. 
This view also implies, in accordance with P. Geach's analysis, that donkey sentences 
always possess a univocal meaning provided by their literal truth-conditions. The main 
concern of this thesis is to explore and evaluate the semantic and pragmatic consequences 
that follow ftom,, on the one hand,, assuming an E-type theory and, on the other hand, 
abandoning Geachs analysis in terms of univocal truth-conditions. We argue that, in that 
scenario, a treatment of donkey sentences in terms of nonspecificity becomes inevitable. 
In particular (on empirical and theoretical grounds) we claim that treatments based on 
ambiguity are bound to fail. In order to support our claims about nonspecificity three 
main lines of arguinent are developed. The first line concerns the nature of the 
nonspecificity involved in donkey sentences. We claim that donkey pronouns can be 
referentially interpreted and, under that interpretation, they generate, in a similar way as 
definite descriptions do, referential nonspecificity. Resolution of that nonspecificity 
presupposes, we argue, the application of several pragmatic mechanisms and distinctions 
based on P. Grice's views and other theorists. The second avenue of argument concerns 
the representation of nonspecific donkey sentences. We show that nonspecificity 
associated with donkey sentences can be represented by using mainly functional or 
parametric devices. As a consequence, we examine in detail the tenets supporting a 
functional conception of donkey anaphora. In this conception, pronouns denote choice 
functions satisfying a certain condition. Finally, the third line of argument has to do with 
the interpretation of the values of those functions. We suggest that these values can be 
interpreted and represented, from a cognitive and pragmatic point of view, as genuine 
nonspecific referents that speakers and hearers are committed to when processing 
discourse containing different referring expressions. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES 
1.1 Scope and Aim 
Anaphoric reference is perhaps one of the most pervasive feature of discourse in natural 
language and thereby deserves to be studied in its own right. A pronoun is said to refer 
anaphorically if it is used to refer to that which other expression-the 'antecedent 
phraseý-was used to refer to. The salient problem about anaphora, when the antecedent 
phrase is a quantified one, is how we are to explain the connection between the pronoun 
and the antecedent. Accordingly, most studies of anaphora have concentrated on 
explaining the nature of that connection. From a general point of view, the purpose of 
those studies has been to establish whether the anaphoric connection can be explained 
only in logical terms. It is very tempting for logicians and philosophers to think about 
anaphora as a phenomenon under the full control of logic, i. e. as exclusively determined 
by the form of the sentence or sentences that the pronoun is embedded in. Thus, the 
relation pronoun-antecedent would be submitted to the same logical principles and laws 
governing the construction of any quantified sentence. This treatment puts the axis of the 
anaphoric relation in the quantified antecedent rather than in the pronoun. Let us call this 
view, the quantift"cational tradition of anaphora in discourse. The quantificational 
tradition, originally defended by Quine (1960) and Geach (1962), has become the most 
influential one in the semantic field for the last three decades. The following remark by 
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Geach suggests the apparent dangers deriving from this tradition. 
The light this [the quantificational view] throws on the syntax 
of language will be seen more and more clearly by anyone 
who works out examples. For lack of this light, the medievals 
who discussed relativa -pronouns with antecedents-were 
groping in the dark despite all their ingenuity. Let us consider 
how such puzzles as theirs arise. 
[(5)] Socrates owned a dog, and it bit Socrates. 
A medieval would treat this as a conjunctive proposition, 
and enquire after the reference (suppositio) of the pronoun 
"it"; I have seen modem discussions that made the same 
mistake. For mistake it is. (Geach 1972, p. 118) 
Indeed, Geach's observation highlights the central significance that logicians and 
semanticists have attributed to the capacity in a theory of natural language to explain 
anaphora in discourse. The quantificational view can, in particular, be seen as 
implementing three general assumptions about the semantics of natural language 
anaphora: First, under normal circumstances of utterance, it allows us to assign truth- 
conditions univocally to the sentence or sentences bearing non-deictic anaphora. Second, 
this assignment needs not rely, in principle, on contextual or pragmatic factors. Third, 
pronouns always take univocal semantic values-basically individual objects-and these 
are determined by their antecedent in a way to be specified. 
The first general aim of this dissertation is to show the inadequacy of the quantificational 
tradition, and to argue in favour of a different tradition, called the descHplive tradition. 
This is carried out in chapters one and three. The seeds of the descriptive tradition are to 
be found in Evans (1977), Parsons (1978) and Cooper (1979). They focused on a 
restricted kind of anaphoric phenomenon, the study of which will also restrict the focus 
and the scope of our own research. The handling of this kind of anaphora called, after 
work by Geach himself, 'donkey anaphora, 'has persistently troubled theorists working on 
the quantificational view. This is because 'donkey pronouns' cannot be intuitively 
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connected to their quantified antecedent via the logical form of the sentence they occur 
in. In the descriptive view, this problem simply does not arise since donkey pronouns are 
treated as going proxy for (presumably Russellian) definite descriptions whose content 
is mostly recovered from the antecedent. The axis of the anaphoric relation is, according 
to this view, the pronoun and not the quantified antecedent, as the quantificational 
tradition takes it. Evans states this contrast between the descriptive view and the 
quantificational view as follows: 
[ 
... 
]philosophers have often suggested treating this or that 
pronoun in what amounts to a [descriptive] way. In so doing 
they have drawn upon themselves the vituperation of 
Professor Geach, who believes that any such proposal can 
be shown to involve a definite mistake. For example, Geach 
maintains that any analysis of the sentence 
[(13)] Socrates owns a dog and it bit Socrates 
as a conjunction of two propositions with a truth value 
would be 'inept'. Elsewhere the proposal is described as 
'quite absurd, 'a prejudice or a blunder. It is therefore with 
some trepidation that I confess to thinking that a conjunction 
of two propositions is precisely what [(13)] amounts to. 
(Evans 1977, in Evans 1985, p. 112) 
Several alternatives to deal with the problem of donkey anaphora within the boundaries 
of the quantificational tradition have been proposed. They can be divided into two types 
of solutions: the non-standard and the representational solutions. The non-standard 
solution, formulated by Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990,199 1), departs from the standard 
semantic and logical framework on which the quantificational tradition was established 
by Frege (1952,1967) and later by Tarski (1956). In other words, the non-standard view 
introduces some important modifications in order to capture the anaphoric phenomena 
in question. In contrast, the representational solution, initiated by Kamp (1984) and Heim 
(1982), abandons the notion of logical form in the quantificational tradition and replaces 
it with a cognitively-motivated notion of discourse representation structure. Context- 
sensitivity considerations become, as a result, crucial in this solution. We shall argue that 
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if the descriptive view is adequately extended and modified along the lines suggested by 
Cooper (1979), Evans (1985), and mainly Neale (1989,1990), we need not abandon the 
standard logical framework. According to this view, the change takes place at the 
pragmatic level rather than at the level of logic. Furthermore, we will argue in chapter six 
that the modified descriptive approach can accommodate contextual information and 
freely incorporate, in its more elaborated form, representational structures in the Kamp- 
Heim sense. 
The second general goal of our dissertation will be to suggest that donkey anaphora is a 
prominent example of linguistic non-univocality. This is carried out in chapters two and 
four. In other words, we hope to show that the explanatory success of any account of 
donkey (and unbound) anaphora depends on assuming that interpretation of donkey 
sentences is always underspecified by their conventional or grammatical meaning. This 
goal imposes, in its turn, two specific objectives. The first objective has to do with the 
truth-conditions normally associated with donkey sentences. As we saw, quantificational 
theorists assume (and so do also some members of the descriptive tradition) that the 
whole enterprise of producing a semantics for donkey sentences consists in fitting,, in a 
given model, univocal and transparent truth-conditions-that apparently fix the content 
of such sentences-with semantic structures. On empirical and theoretical grounds, we 
will argue that this assumption is highly questionable. We suggest that the truth- 
conditions that we normally assign to donkey sentences exclusively on the basis of their 
syntactic or conventional features do not exhaust the meaning of those sentences. Such 
truth-conditions express just the external or literal meaning of donkey sentences. 
However, the utterance of these sentences are also amenable to express-when context- 
sensitive information is incorporated through special expressions or parameters and 
certain utterance circumstances obtain-other propositions or meanings and hence 
donkey sentences can be associated, in such utterance circumstances, with other truth- 
conditions. That is to say, the truth-conditions resulting of what is actually said in the 
utterance context plus the external or conventional meaning of the donkey sentence. 
Thus, instead of having a univocal and unique set of truth-conditions, we have more than 
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one set of potential truth-conditions, whose disambiguation by hearers Will be explained 
in terms of pragmatic and cognitive mechanisms. We take this lack of rigid and 
structurally-motivated truth-conditions as the methodological basis on which semantics 
of donkey sentences must be constructed. 
If the non-univocality hypothesis is accepted all along, however, we have the problem of 
semantically clarifying the source of that crucial linguistic aspect. Solving this problem 
is the second objective deriving of this hypothesis. Two natural solutions suggest 
themselves. On the one hand,, non-univocality of donkey sentences can be seen as a 
manifestation of genuine semantic ambiguity. Thus, if such sentences are assigned more 
than one set of truth-conditions, they Will be associated with more than one structure 
generated at the relevant linguistic level. On the other hand, non-univocality of donkey 
sentences can also be seen as an expression of nonspecificity or indeterminacy. In this 
case, only one representation at the linguistic level will be needed to be associated with 
all the (preferred or non-preferred) interpretations or readings of these sentences. Under 
this sole representation, the different interpretations of donkey sentences cannot be 
conceived as completely separated from each other, at least regarding their logical form. 
Presumably, some factor in that form will be held responsible for the distinctive 
generation of each interpretation. 
This dissertation aims at answering this dilemma created by the non-univocality of 
donkey sentences. We will argue that these sentences are semantically nonspecific in 
nature and show that only a nonspecificity hypothesis explains adequately why the 
conventional or grammatical meaning normally associated with those sentences 
underspecifies their final interpretation. We will also argue, in opposition to the second 
assumption supporting the quantificational view, that context and, in particular, 
background information shared by speakers and hearers, plays a central role in the 
determination of each interpretation of donkey sentences. In particular, we claim that 
disambiguation or resolution of the non-univocality of those sentences proceeds in a 
similar way to resolution of the non-univocality of sentences containing definite 
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descriptions, in close accordance with arguments provided by Recanati (1993) and other 
theorists working on referring expressions along P. Grice's pragmatic lines. Thus, we see 
non-univocality of donkey sentences as a phenomenon emerging ftom the referential 
nonspecificity of the interpretation of the pronouns and being resolved according to 
general Gricean constraints. Also, we integrate our view of the nonspecificity deriving 
from donkey pronouns into a general view of semantic nonspecificity of the sentences, 
developed from M. Pinkal (1995)'s research. 
In accordance with our statements above, and given that in the descriptive view the focus 
of the anaphoric relation is the pronoun, it follows that the focus of the postulated 
nonspecificity will likewise he in the pronoun. Thus, a third goal of our dissertation will 
be to select an appropriate treatment that shows quite generally how pronouns themselves 
are the source of that nonspecificity. This concept is expanded upon in chapter five. We 
believe that some approaches to donkey anaphora originating from a well-establi shed 
paradigm in quantifier theory-Generalized Quantifier theory-provide the required 
treatment. In order to fulfil this goal, we will adapt one of the approaches proposed by 
Lappin and Francez (1994). According to this treatment, donkey pronouns are represented 
at the semantic level as functions that satisfy certain conditions and are partially spectfied 
through contextual knowledge. We will argue that such a functional conception of 
donkey pronouns makes it clear how the set of potential interpretations of a donkey 
sentence can be specified out of a unique representation. Furthermore, as we shall see, 
Lappin and Francez's functional treatment is basically constructed on the same 
foundations as Neale's descriptive theory. This is, therefore, another reason for preferring 
their treatment. 
Finally, the fourth goal of our thesis may well appear more controversial. It concerns the 
interpretation (and the representation) of the values of donkey functions. We propose to 
interpret, at the semantic level, the values denoted by such functions as nonspecific or, 
in general, as nonspecific referents (in fact, we will talk about nonspecific individuals 
and sets or compounds of nonspecific individuals, by analogy with the values of Lappin 
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and Francez! s functions). This is carried out in chapter five and chapter six. Some might, 
with reason, want to suggest that our proposal faces insurmountable ontological 
difficulties. In our view, however, no special ontological implication should be conferred 
to our interpretation because our notion of nonspecific reference and nonspecific referent 
is a reflection of a similar notion coined in recent pragmatic and cognitive theories 
dealing with referring and indexical expressions. In such theories, nonspecific or 
unspecified reference associated with a referring expression is reference whose 
interpretation on the hearer side cannot be made completely explicit because it depends 
mostly on what the speaker has in mind about an object but does not intend to explicitly 
communicate. Thus, if we think of nonspecific reference as the result of subtle referring 
mechanisms and constructions assumed by speakers and hearers when processing 
discourse, then our interpretation (and representation) of the values of the donkey 
functions only needs a philosophical rationale showing that speakers and hearers are 
systematically committed to this kind of reference in verbal communication involving 
anaphoric processes. This justification is, as we shall show in chapters two and four, 
mostly provided by accounts dealing with direct reference phenomena and defended by 
theorists working on pragmatics and cognition, like Bach, Evans, Recanati, Stainaker, 
and others. 
The rest of this chapter introduces some essential semantic background and motivates 
some relevant issues to be discussed later in the dissertation. 
1.2 Tarskian Semantics and Natural Language Syntax 
In this section we will describe, in a simplified way, some general views about syntax and 
semantics that will serve as a general basis for our research in the forthcoming chapters. 
The following questions can be considered the most general ones to be answered for any 
semantics. 
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(i) What is the nature of the structures to be interpreted? 
(ii) What is the nature of the semantic values computed in the course of interpretation? 
(iii) What are the principles according to which interpretations of the structures 
determine the computed semantic values ? 
Many linguists and semanticists working in the Chomskyan paradigm felt long ago that 
a systematic answer can be given to these questions. This answer, according to them, 
should be the result of spelling out how syntax interacts with truth-theoretic constraints. 
In particular, Higginbotham (1983,1985,1986), May (1977,1985), Neale (1990,1993), 
Larson and Segal (1995), among others, have advocated the need for the construction of 
a truth-conditional semantics within a Chomskyan framework, where interpretation is 
always sensitive to two crucial principles of any extensional semantics: the Referentiality 
and Compositionality Principles. ' The first says, according to the Fregean tradition, that 
the values of sentence expressions are always their denotations or references. The second 
indicates that we have to construct the meaning of complex expressions by means of the 
following constraint: the values of complex expressions are always a function of the 
denotations of their component expressions. ' 
According to the most recent Views defended by Chomsky and his followers (now termed 
Principles and Parameters Theory), interpretation mechanisms are instances of the 
general language faculty-a modular system of the mind/brain-constrained by the 
principles of Universal Grammar (UG). UG contains, in its turn, a set of modules 
determining syntactic or formal structures and properties, which are generated according 
to modular principles and theories, for instance, the binding theory, X theory, theta 
theory, bounding theory and so on. ' These modules and their principles systematically 
1 The use of the phrase"being sensitive" instead of "being constrained" is meant to indicate that the theorists 
in question do not take the autonomy of these semantic principles to be absolute. 
2 In the Fregean framework, this principle is a consequence of the so-called Context Principle: only in the 
context of a sentence the words do have any meaning (see Frege (1953) and Durnmett (198 1)). 
' See Chomsky (1981,1986) 
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reduce the problem of interpreting sentences bearing characteristic configurations--e. g. 
infinitive and nominal constructions, quantifier structures, anaphoric relations-to a 
syntactic problem: what sorts of syntactic structures qualify as admissible structures in 
UG? The syntactic theory that, Within the UG paradigm, tackles this question is the so- 
called Goverment and Binding (GB) theory (or theories). For most GB linguists, the main 
goal of the GB theory was to introduce, only on the basis of syntactic criteria, something 
like the quantifier-variable structure of the first-order calculus (FOC henceforth) in the 
explanation of problems in syntactic form. These are problems related, for instance, to 
the explanation of the so-called wh-phrases and to the clarification of certain 
dependencies among quantified noun phrases (QNP henceforth)-in particular, anaphoric 
dependencies. By doing so, GB theories have also showed how scope relations between 
QNPs are crucial for detennining syntactic structures of quantified sentences, which 
determine, in their turn,. unambiguous representations at the level of interpretation. GB 
linguists were interested particularly in the movements QNPs are (or may be) subject to, 
given certain scope assignments at the surface level. 'A general movement rule of QNPs 
that represents scope syntactically was then proposed, the so-called Quantifier Raising 
(QR) rule. It can be implemented in different, compatible ways. The most common is that 
which represents QNPs by adjoining them to that site in the sentence where they are 
supposed to determine scope. In this way, in being represented, QNPs are forced out of 
their original position in the sentence and'raised'to other position. A simple example, 
which comprises a surface sentence (4), its FOC structure (5) and the structures (6) and 
(7) that the QR rule generates for the sentence in terms of constituents, ' is given below. 
(4) all logicians smoke. 
(5) (Vx) (logician x- smoke x 
(6) [s [Np all logicians 12 [VIP smoke 
(7) [s INpall logicians 12 [s e2 [ smoke 
' Later on in this section a definition of the notion of logical scope will be given. 
5 'Constituent'iS a standard linguistic expression used in constituent analysis, which specifies the structure 
of sentences in terms of phrase-markers or linguistic units like NP, VP, PP etc. and distinguishes between 
immediate and non-immediate constituents. 
16 
In (6) and (7), the QR rule creates what is called an S node with scope over, or 
technically speaking, 'Immediately dominating, the original quantified sentence with 
constituents NP and VP,. i. e. the original S node. Thus, the raised quantified NP is an 
immediate constituent of the new S node and a 'sister' to the original S node. The 
expression e, in (7) is a trace (technically, an empty category) left by the raised 
quantifier. It can then be seen as a variable 'bound by' that quantifier, playing the same 
role as the bound variable associated with the predicate smoke of the FOC structure (5) 
(for details of binding see chapter three). Thus, sentence (7) represents the grammatical 
structure of (4) on the basis of reflecting its relevant syntactic properties. 
Three clarifications are needed here. Ftrstý although intuitively connected to (5), structure 
(7) is a syntactic and not a logical representation of sentence (4). Structure (7) renders 
explicit such properties as constituency, movement, dominance, and empty category, 
which are well-established properties of the description of natural language grammar, and 
with no use in logical languages like FOC. So, structure (7) does not belong to a logical 
or semantic-in the referential sense of the word-level of representation. On the 
contrary, as suggested by linguists working on early Chomskyan theory, (7) belongs to 
an independent, abstract and syntactically-motivated level of representation of natural 
language, called Logical Form (LF). ' LF has been subsequently developed in the 1980s, 
in the framework of GB theories, by Chomsky, Higginbotham, May, Reinhart, and 
others. ' 
The second clarification is that in classical LF theory there are at least two different 
levels of syntactic representation together with LF, namely, Deep Structure (DS) and 
' See, for example, Mc Cawley (1968), Harman (1972), Lakoff (I 972)ý 
7 The notion of LF is used loosely here. Sometimes it Will refer generically to the syntactic level itselý and 
at other times it Will refer to the particular structures generated at that level. Since such loose use is common 
in linguistics and in semantics (similarly to the use of the notion of Deep Structure in early Chomskyan 
theory) this should not affect our exposition. 
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Surface Structure (SS) levels'. DS level, which represents the first derivational level in 
a grammar, instantiates-in terms of constituents-structural properties of sentences 
directly projected from their lexical constitution. Structures of DS level (or DSs) are, in 
their turn,, mapped onto structures of SS level (or SSs) by moving constituents in 
accordance with general rules of movement. "' The last clarification is that SSs are mapped 
onto the LF level by using other (covert) movements, for example, the QR rule. 
Two consequences follow from the previous clarifications. The first is that the LF level 
and the representations generated in it 'mediate' between SSs and the semantic 
interpretation of SSs. However, it is evident, according to LF theorists, that once the 
relevant syntactic information is encoded in LF structures, SSs are completely 
dispensable in the process of interpretation; only Us are the object of direct 
interpretation (May 1985, Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990). " 
The second consequence is more general. It is that, to the degree that LF structures are 
only motivated by syntactic criteria, they are syntactic in nature. The question is, then, 
how are these syntactic structures to be truth-theoretically interpreted? On a more explicit 
level, How can it be shown that LF structures are systematically connected with truth- 
theoretic structures? The answer to this question will also indicate the route to an answer 
to questions (i)-(iii). In short, the connection lies in the way that quantification and its 
' The last development of the Chomskyan paradigm, the so-called Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995), 
dispenses With both DS and SS altogether. 
'In fact, there is one general rule determining acceptable movements in GB theories, the so-called'move 
-1 rule (see chapter three for a definition). Nevertheless, an additional level of representation should be 
considered when it comes to mapping SSs: the Phonological Form (PF) level. In this latter case the mapping 
from SSs proceeds according to 'overt' movements. Our description of these notions are certainly over- 
simplified. 
The purported 'dispensability' of the SS level and its structures is denied by theorists who reject the LF- 
picture. See Will ianis (1977,1986), Lappin (199 1) and May (199 1) for discussion. On the other hand, there 
are more issues involved in the relation LF-SS than those concerning semantic interpretation. For example, 
as pointed out by Neale (1993), mappings between SSs and LF-structures depend on the grammaticality of 
the SSs. In other words, if a surface level sentence is in principle ungrammatical by normal standards, it is 
not possible to construct a mapping between it and a well-formed LF-structure. 
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associated mechanisms operate in natural language. That is, on how quantification 
mechanisms constrain the semantic representation of natural language sentences. Thus, 
the crucial notions establishing the above connection are those of quantifier and logical 
scope. A truth-theoretic semantics-that is, one that is governed by the Referentiality and 
Compositionality Principles-for a quantificational language L must provide a definition 
of truth for L. In doing so, the referential semantics must specify the formal structure of 
any sentence S of L-the logical form or If " of S-in terms of quantifiers and scope. '2 
In what follows,, we will briefly show how this can be done. 
Also, in order to provide Ifs for English, the truth-theoretic semantics will, in some cases, 
need to replace the FOC structures with more riched ones so as to capture 
quantificationally more complex constructions. Such new structures will enable us to 
deal, for example, with sentences containing quantifiers like most orfew, which are not 
first-order definable. " As a result, in those structures the determiner (an expression like 
11 Sometimes we will use the label If to describe both the level of representation and particular structures at 
this level, in a similar way to our use of the label LF. 
12 See Neale (1993). This formulation is over-simplified. As we shall see, truth-definitions, along Tarskian 
lines, are systematically related to axioms and valid biconditionals (T formulae) possibly formulated in terms 
of a satisfaction relation and sequences. The best exposition of this approach is in Larson and Segal (1995). 
13 See Rescher (1962), Kaplan (1966), Wiggins (1980), Barwise and Cooper (198 1). As most seems the most 
representative case of non-first-order definable quantifiers we shall concentrate on it in this note. On the one 
hand, from an informal viewpoint, the following example provides an intuitive basis for the irreducibility of 
most to first-order devices. 
(1) Most tennis players are right-handed. 
If we are to treat (i) as a combination of a quantifier, say K and the complex propositional function 'x is a 
tennis player and x is right-handed' then we Will get the wrong predictions since (11) below does not states the 
same as (1). 
(Ii) (Mx)[ tennis player x& right-handed x 
Because the range of the quantifier M in (ii) is not explicitly restricted to a certain particular universe or 
domain of individuals, (n) determines an interpretation according to which most individuals (In any universe) 
are tennis players and right-handed. 
On the other hand, although it is not the purpose of the thesis to discuss formal facts about non-first-order- 
definability of some natural language quantifiers, we will give at least an idea of such facts With respect to 
most. 
First fact: Irreducibility. As H. Kamp (1996, p. 6) notices, although it is common to define most by means 
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'every, ' 'some, ' 'most, ' or 'many) combines with a formula (or predicate) to form a 
restricted quantifier phrase. It is desirable therefore having a semantics for English that 
allows us to treat all English quantifiers as restricted quantifiers. "Definitions introducing 
these quantifiers will be provided later on. 
As Tarski taught us, in order to obtain a characterization of the truth predicate for a 
language L, we need to have a theory that gives us T-schernas like in (8). 
(8)'S' is true in v if and only if p (T) 
In (8), 'S' is a structural description of a sentence of L (the object language), v is a 
of some of the two conditions below, just the second, finitary, condition is in agreement with our intuitions 
about the meaning of most and allows us to prove the irreducibility of the latter to first-order operators. 
(MOST) "Most Xs are B's" is true iff IAnBI>I A-B I 
(MOST') If A is finite, then "Most Xs are Bs" is true iff IAnBI>I A-B 
More technically, the second condition allows us to prove that reducibility of most to first-order operators 
is not possible within the theory of finite models (for some details on models see below in this section). As 
Kamp formulates it (Kamp, op. cit., p. 6), this means it is possible to prove the following fitct (where the 
function F enables us to specify a binary operator 0 between sets, i. e. a binary generaliZed quantifier): "There 
is no combination of (i) a function F from finite sets U to sets of subsets of U and (11) a first order formula 
4D(P, Q; x), built up from the predicate constants PQ, variables and logical constants, in which at most x 
occurs free, such that for every finite first order model M=<UI >: 
I I(P) nI(Q) I> I A(P)-I(Q) I iff I uc-U: Mk-- 4)(PQ; x)[u]j c-F(TJ) "(the proof of this fact is far from trivial, see 
Kamp (op. cit., pp. 6-13); and Westerstahl (1989, pp. 24-32)). 
Second fact: Non-axiomatizability. This fact establishes that first-order logic plus most leads to non- 
momatizability. Very roughly, let L(Mo) be an extension of the first-order language, created by adding the 
(generalized) quantifier Mo, which can be interpreted as our most. It is possible thus to prove the following 
strong result: if we have a language L(Mo), then the set of logical truths of L(Mo) is not recursively 
enumerable. For the proof of this fact see Kamp (op. cit pp. 14-5). Kamp ernphasises that the proof in question 
hinges on the assumption that the semantics for Mo satisfies the condition (MOST) above for infinite sets. 
Finally, the same result of non-enumerability applies also to logical consequence. 
" Restficted quantifiers are inteirtranslatable with so-called binary quandjiers, i. e. very roughly, determiners 
that combinemth a pair of formulae (or predicates) to form a formula. Binary quantifiers behave like two- 
place operators expressing relations between two universals, concepts, or properties-this accords with the 
way Aristotle treated quantifiers in his syllogistic. In fact, Frege ([19821, reprinted in his (1952)) was the first 
aware that all of the usual quantifiers (including first-order ones) in natural language stand for binary 
quantifiers. Nonetheless, he also discovered that first-order binary quantifiers (like 'all', 'no', 'some) could be 
defined by means of unrestricted or unary ones and senterittal connectives. As Westerstahl says, "[Tlhts was 
no trivial discovery at the time, and Frege must have been struck by the power and simplicity of the unary 
universal quantifier. In his logical language he always chose it as the sole primitive quantifier" (Westerstahl 
(1989, p. 12)). 
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situation or a specification of the relevant facts and p describes (in a metalanguage) the 
conditions that have to obtain for S to be true in v. As is also known, (8), according to 
Tarski, does not constitute a definition of truth but at most a theorem entailed for all 
acceptable definition of truth. " It specifies a material adequacy condition that any of 
the truth definitions must meet. So, we should expect, with respect to a sentence like (4) 
above, that a characterization of the truth predicate for English provides us with the T- 
schema in (9) below. With (9), we obtain a direct interpretation of the sentence 'all 
logicians smoke' in terms of its truth-conditions. 
(9)'all logicians smoke'Is true in v iff all logicians smoke. 
in formal terms, the best way to approach the interpretation of sentences like (4) requires 
to consider a formalized fragment of English containing Ifs like (5) above. Presumably, 
the most striking feature of this fragment is the systematic introduction of variables and 
quantifiers. The result will be an indirect but completely formal and compositional 
interpretation of the sentences in question. 
In order to generate formal relative-to-a-situation interpretations of formulae in a 
language L is advisable to provide a model of such formulae. In Cann (1993) models are 
informally introduced as follows: 
There are two parts to the interpretation procedure. In the 
first place, interpretation takes place, not in a vacuum, but with 
respect to a representation of a state-of-affairs. Such a 
representation is called a model and models have two Parts: 
an ontology and a denotation assignment function. [ ... 
] 
The ontology of the model provides the basis for interpretation 
in that it defines what exists and so what can be talked about. 
[ 
... 
I The association of constants with entities in the model is 
done by the denotation assignment function. [... T]he denotation 
is the relation between the expression and things that exist in the 
" See Tarski (1956), and Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990). 
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world. Since the world for our purposes is given by the model 
of the world or situation, what is denoted by an expression in 
[L] is something in the model (Cann, 1993, pp. 39-40) 
The denotation assignt-nent function and the denotations above can be understood simply 
as the interpretation function and the semantic values of the model, respectively. So, a 
model M for L is an ordered pair <D, F>, where D is a nonempty set, the set of 
individuals or objects that constitute the domain or universe of M, and F is an 
interpretation function, which assigns a semantic value to each nonlogical constant of L 
(i. e. to each individual constant and predicate expression). Usually, F assigns individuals 
to individual constants and sets of n-tuples of individuals to n-place predicate 
expressions. In this way, models are mathematically abstract structures based on the set 
theory apparatus that we use as auxiliary devices in providing interpretations about things 
in the world that constitute semantic values of expressions of our object language. 
Let us assume a model M i=<D 1, F ý> in which D, is the set: (Russell, Frege, Moore); and 
in which F, assigns an element of D, to each individual constant of L. This element is the 
denotation or extension assigned by F, to the constant. In turn, F, will assign sets of 
individuals and sets of ordered pairs of individuals of D, to one-place and two-place 
predicates, respectively. Such assignments can now be represented as follows: 
(10) FI(a)=Russell; F, (b)--Frege; F, (c)--Wittgenstein 
(11) FI(F)= the set of the logicians; FI(G)=the set of the Germans; FI(H)=the set 
of the persons who disagree with somebody. 
According to our world knowledge, (11) is extensionally equivalent to (I F) below [where 
the two-places predicate 'H denotes a set of ordered pairs of D, such that the first 
member of the pair disagrees with the second member]. 
(11. ) F j(F)--- f Russell, Frege); F I(G)-- f Frege 1; F j(H)= I <Russell, Frege>, <Wittgenstein, 
Russell>). 
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It is common practice in model theory to represent the semantic values of an expression 
a with respect to a model M by means of [a]. Armed with this notation we can translate 
the assignments made by F, in (10) and (I V) as follows: 
(10') [a]m'= Russell; [blm'= Frege; [elm'= Moore 
[PI" = fRussellFrege); [G]" = fFrege); JBI I'= {<Russell, Frege>, <Wittgenstein, 
RusselN 
- 
it is easy to see that under the model M, the sentence TH is true, given that the individual 
denoted by'bbelongs to the set which is the extension of'F, whereas the sentence'Ga' 
is false because Russell does not belong to the extension of V. Also, the sentence 'Hab' 
is true because the ordered pair <Russell, Frege> belongs to the set that is the extension 
of 'H, whereas the sentence 'Hbcl is false because the pair <Frege, Wittgenstein> does not 
belong to the extension of 'IF. 
Since the syntax of the sufficiently rich language L generates an infinite number of 
sentences, the theory of truth for it must incorporate a mechanism for generating all of 
the correspondingly infinite number of T-schemas. This means that specification of the 
truth-conditions for each sentence of L must be compositional, i. e., "by looking at the 
way it is built in terms of smaller units" (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990, p. 66). In 
other words5 we have to construct the semantics of L by looking at the semantic value of 
such smaller units and supplying an algorithm for combining them. 
Tarski (1956) provides the framework for this sort of semantics. He uses the notions of 
satisfacdon and sequence in order to generate the respective truth schemas and, in doing 
so, he defines the truth for a formal quantified language (QL). 16 The most important 
advantage of introducing satisfaction lies in the possibility of compositionally defining 
truth in L, taking into account open sentences as building blocks of the truth definition 
16 In fact, Tarski considered a much simpler language-the language of classes theory-than the one we are 
going to consider here, which presupposes non-first-order definable, restricted, quantifiers. 
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process. This feature is crucial given that in a quantificational language most compound 
sentences are built up from simpler open ones. Since the latter contain unbound or free 
ocurrences of variables, like in '(Dx, ' or 'Txlx2', and free variables do not denote 
individuals or objects, open sentences are not true or false tout court. Satisfaction 
incorporates these sentences in the process of characterizing truth for QL by implementig 
the idea of truth relative to an assigninent of values to variables. Thus, in that process, 
open sentences are considered true-of orfalse-of-i. e., satisfied or not by-individuals 
or sets of n-tuples of individuals. Furthermore, another advantage of introducing 
satisfaction is that it will enable us to handle sentences quantificationally more complex 
than sentence (4), e. g. sentences with more than one quantifier and/or with many-place 
predicates. " 
In a complete model-theoretic semantics for QL, satisfaction requires that a function g, 
called value assignittentfunction, be singled out, which assigns to each variable of QL 
an individual or element of D. 8 However, since our dissertation is going to presuppose 
just a minimum of model-theoretic notions, a simplified Tarskian characterization of 
truth (given only in terms of satisfaction and sequences) will be offered here. We will 
dispense with most relative-to-a-model devices, with the exception of the interpretive 
function ý a]. 
In order to carry out the goal of characterizing compositionally truth in terms of 
satisfaction and sequences, we need to add recursive definitions of satisfaction for each 
relevant particle, e. g. singular terms, quantifiers, connectives, etc. To do this, we need to 
specify the syntax of QL and the definition of formula of QL. 
17 Nested quantifiers like the universal one in (i) below represent a characteristic problem for non-Tarskian 
semantics (see Engel 1989). For a formal explanation see Larson and Segal (1995, pp. 237-8). 
(1) (ý] x)( Rx & (Vy) -Cxy ) 
18 Thus, in giving the semantics of the quantifiers, this function "Will enable us to keep the facts fixed when 
we consider different assignments to variables" (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990, p. 100). Usually the 
symbol [a]"points out the semantic value of the expression a with respect to the model M and the function 
g. Furthermore, g does not need to be a biunivocal function. 
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V.. 
Syntax of QL 
A. Vocabulary 
1. Individual Constants: 'a',, 'b',. V, ... 2. Individual Variables: 'X I% 
IX213, IX31, 
3. Predicative expressions: 'P, 'G, 'IT, 
4. Connectives: '-,, '&'. 
5. Quantifiers: '-A', 'Y. 
B-Definition offormula 
1. A n-place predicative expression followed by n individual constants or variables is an 
atomic formula. 
2. IfA'is a formula'-Ais a formula. 
3. If 'A' and 'B' are formulae, 'A & B' is a formula. 
4. If 'A' is a formula andVk' a variable, then'AvkA'andVvkA' are formulae. 
The definitions above illustrate how quantification, scope and other related notions 
become a key part of the truth definition of natural language sentences. In particular, part 
B allows us to clarify several important facts. First, according to BI and B4, we can 
define the concept of a sentence in QL. An open sentence will be a formula (atomic or 
quantified), where at least one variable occurs free or unbound by quantifiers. A closed 
sentence will be the formula (atomic or quantified) where no variable occurs free or 
unbound by quantifiers. Secondly, a variable u is free in a formula (D if and only if it falls 
outside the scope of any quantifier expression. Finally, the scope of a quantifier 
expression, in the Tarskian theory, is the smallest formula containing the quantifier, i. e. 
the quantifier plus the formula that it combines in order to form a well-formed formula. 
Sequences are crucial to the definition of truth by satisfaction. A sequence differs from 
a set just in the order of the objects. Consequently, a sequence is a series of ordered n- 
tuples of individuals or list that satisfies a formula (an open sentence or predicate). Also, 
a sequence can be a possibly infinite list of objects. The requirement that sequences be 
ordered n-tuples of individuals is to ensure the one-to-one correspondence between 
members of the sequences and the variables of the formulae, the variables being ordered 
or nurnbered as well. The reason to assume a possibly infifnite series of objects has to do 
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with the possibly infinite domain or universe. 
Recursive definition of truth in QL 
A. Axioms ofreference 
1. jal = Russell 
2. [b] = Frege 
---------------- 
1. [P] = the set of the logicians (in symbols, fx: x is logicianj) 
2. [G] = the set of the smokers (in symbols, jx: x smokes)) 
3. [K] = the set of ordered pairs of individuals such that the first disagrees with the 
second (in symbols, I<x, y> :x disagrees with yj) 
--------------- 
The underlying idea of satisfaction of an open sentence (D by a sequence s in the Tarskian 
approach is that an object in the k-th position of the sequence-i. e. the object Sk -is 
paired up with the variableXk in the sentence. This idea and the previous definitions 
imply the following general definition of reference with respect to a sequence (Rej). 
(12) ReA 'Xk,, S )= Sk [xk=(the name) of the k-th variable, and sc--the k-th element in s] 
Schema (12) shows that the reference of a variableXkwith respect to a sequence s 
depends upon the choice of the sequence. For example, if s= <Russell, Madrid, Frege> 
then reA'x3', s) = Frege. If s= <London, Russell, Russell>, then reA'X3'. s) = Russell. 
Given that both variables and constants can be treated as terms of the form ap one can 
recursively characterize truth in terms of satisfaction and sequences for QL in the 
following way: 
B. Recursive definitions 
1. A sequence s satisfies '4D aI... a. '(where'(D'is a n-Place predicate followed by n 
variables or individual constants) iff ReA'a 1', s) , ... , 
ReA'oc. ', s) are (D. " 
19 Sentences without variables can be considered as true if they are satisfied by the null sequence e. So, for 
instance, o satisfies Fa iff Fa. 
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2. A sequence s satisfies '-A' iff s does not satisfyA'. 
3. A sequence s satisfiesA &H Iff s satisfiesA'and s satisfies'B. 
4. '(Ivk)(D' is satisfied by s iff (D is satisfied by some sequence s' that differs from 
s at most in the k-th position. 
5. '(Vvk) 0' is satisfied by s iff (D is satisfied by every sequence s' that differs from 
s at most in the k-th position. 21 
6. A sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence (a sentence is false iff it is 
satisfied by no sequence). 
It is easy to see that B. 6 entails the following consequence (we presuppose a 
metalanguage, for QL containing variables ranging over sentences and predicates of QL): 
(13) 'S' is true in QL iff every sequence satisfies p( 'S' is false if no 
sequence satisfies it)" 
As expected, these definitions allow us to prove a theorem of the form in sentence (14) 
below given the quantified sentence 'all logicians smoke' (we presuppose the usual 
definition of the conditional): 
(14)'(Vx) (logician x- smoke x)'is true iff all logicians smoke. 
And obviously, from (14) we can obtain the absolute-i. e. not relative-to-models-T- 
schema of sentence (4) specified in (15) below, what shows that the definition of truth 
in B. 6 for QL meets Tarski's material adequacy condition. 
(15)'all logicians smoke'iff all logicians smoke. 
We now introduce Tarskian definitions for natural language restricted quantifiers (in this 
case we will talk about deterndners instead of FOC quantifiers). These definitions 
stipulate that if (D and T are wffs, u is a variable, and Qa natural language determiner, 
then'[ Qu: 0 ]T'is a well formed fon-nula (wff). So, (16) and (17) will be the expected 
new definitions for natural language restricted quantifiers (RQ henceforth). 
' See Guttenplan (1986) and Haack (1978) for explanation of definitions BA and B. 5. 
" See Tennant (1978), Baldwin (1975), Gutenplan (1986) and Haack (1978) for more detail. 
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(16)'[allXk: 0] T' is satisfied by s iff T is satisfied by every sequence s' that both 
satisfies (D and differs from s at most in the k-th position. 
(17)'[some xk: 0] T' is satisfied by s iff T is satisfied by at least one sequence s' that 
both satisfies (D and differs from s at most in the k-th position. 
(18)' [Most Xk: 01 T' is satisfied by s iff T is satisfied by most sequences s' that both 
satisfy 4) and differ from s at most in the k-th position. 
Definitions (16)-(18) apply directly to RQ formulae of the form '[Qx: Fxj (Gx)' rather 
than to the familiar FOC formulae exemplified by (5) above. Chapter three will discuss 
at lenght RQ formulae. 
We can now see that the definitions above (or other alternative ones) flow from the 
semantic demands that the satisfaction theory is supposed to meet. That is, they result 
from the demands imposed by the Tarskian theory in the course of providing a principled 
and systematic account of the truth-conditions of sentences in a quantified language. The 
definitions do not depend, as it were, on any syntactic or grammatical approach to the 
quantificational language. However, despite this theoretical independence, Tarkian 
satisfaction axioms (and the semantic notions that they irnplement) can apply to syntactic 
structures, in particular, to LF structures. More precisely, as Larson and Segal put it, 
Tarskian axioms "apply to LF representations , in which quantified NPs appear in adjoined 
positions and bind a trace [t] in their sister S" (Larson and Segal 1995, p. 247). This is 
confirmed if we observe the diagram in (19) below, which specifies the correspondence 
between syntactic and semantical structures 22 . In the upper part of that diagram, the 
sentence whose truth-conditions are to be determined (S), is the highest branching node 
immediately dominating both the NPi node and its sister S*. In turn, the S* node contains 
a trace, ti , that relates to (or is 
bounded by) the NPi node. The question is thus: Why 
should Tarskian notions, which belong to the lower part of the diagram, apply to the 
structures in the upper part? 















A general response to the above question has already been suggested here: the 
correspondence between the two types of structures results from the way in which both 
LF theory and Tarkian semantics describe the quantificational mechanisms underlying 
natural languages. On the basis of the diagram (19), let us now substantiate this response. 
Tarskian axioms are in correspondence with LF structures because the first induce a 
structural division in the quantificational semantics that closely parallels to the structural 
division provided by the LF syntax. According to definitions (16)-(18), the 
quantificational. constituents of a sentence-i. e. its QNPs--can be divided into three parts: 
a quantifier, a restriction and a scope. The quantifier, which corresponds to the 
determiner in the upper side of (19) , is that part of the sentence stating 
how many 
sequences satisfy the formula in the restriction. The restriction, which corresponds to the 
N restriction in the upper side of (19), " is the formula stating which individuals appear 
in the k-th position of a sequence (men, logicians etc. ). And finally, the scope, which 
corresponds to the S* node with the trace tj in the upper side of (19), specifies that the 
k-th individuals of the sequence satisfy another formula (smoke, agree, etc. ). In other 
words, it specifies what is true of those individuals. 
' Later in the thesis a distinction will be made between the head of the NP (the Nominal restriction) and the 
N' restriction; see chapter six, section 6.1. 
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Larson and Segal fonnulate the following conclusion about the correspondence between 
the two mentioned structures. 
With quantification, we see a clear convergence of syntactic 
and semantic results[ ... 
S]yntactic representations with quantifier 
raising have been advanced by syntacticians on grounds 
independent of quantifier semantics. Correlatively, 
[ 
... 
] reflections on the semantics of quantification arose 
without consideration of the form of quantifed sentences. 
That the two should come together neatly is surely more than 
an accident. (Larson and Segal 1995, p. 248) 
The correspondence in question is shown not only at the level of structures but at the 
level of principles too. In particular, three important and well known syntactic principles 
of GB theories can interact with the Tarskian theory' The first principle is the definition 
of a structural relation obtaining at LF-the c-command relation. The definition is as 
follows. 
(CC) A phrase X c-commands a phrase Y iff neither of X or Y dominates the other and 
the first (branching) node dominating X, dominates Y. 
The c-command relation allows us to formulate two general constraints, on the well- 
formedness of structures which result either from binding syntactic parameters Within 
such structures or from scopal interactions between different QNPs. These constraints are 
the proper binding constraint (BC) and the general scope principle (GSP). 
(BC) A referentially variable expression x can be interpreted as a variable bound by a 
quantified expression Q only if Q c-commands x at LF. 
(GSP) An expression a is interpreted as having scope over an expression P just in case 
' According to Larson and Segal (1995, p. 248), (CC), (BC) and (GSP) operate as axioms or assumptions 
in GB theories. Prof I Higginbotham (p. c. ) disagrees with this conclusion; these tenets can, according to him, 
be effectively derived from more general principles at the LF level. See Higginbotham (1988). 
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a c-commands 
As we shall see later in this essay the principles and definitions above Will play a 
fundamental role in the explanation given by LF theories of anaphoric phenomena. 
We are now in a position to describe the answer given by LF theorists to questions 
(i)-(iii) raised at the beginning of this section- Concerning question (i) they claim that the 
structures to be interpreted are the linguistic representations specified by the LF 
structures provided by the syntactic modules. According to these theorists , interpretation 
takes place when those structures are systematically mapped into If structures. S. Neale, 
for example, emphasises his commitment to this view in the following terms: 
I suggest, then, that an independently motivated syntactical 
theory that delivers an S-Structure representation and an LF 
representation for each sentence [S] of a fragment of a given 
language ought to be of considerable interest to philosophers 
and linguists who take the logical form [If] of a sentence S belonging 
to a language L to be the structure imposed upon S in the course 
of providing a systematic and principled semantics for L. 
Arguably, we can make serious progress by exploring the view 
that a fully worked out theory of LF will be a fully worked out 
theory of logical form [if]. 
Concerning question (ii) LF theorists claim that semantic values should be conceived as 
extensions and that the meaning of a sentence (or its SS) must be associated with these 
extensions, in particular,, with its satisfaction conditions. Finally, concerning question (iii) 
LF theorists claim that Referentiality and Compositionality are the semantic principles 
organizing the interpretation of LF structures. Nevertheless, these theorists mantain that 
such principles need to interact with (or perhaps to be constrained by)" the general UG 
25 All these formulations are taken from Larson and Segal (1995) chapter seven; in particular see pp. 249-50 
for a clear explanation of (CC) and (BC) in terms of sequence variants. In chapter four, section 4.4, and 
chapter six, section 6.3, of this essay, we will talk more loosely about a'Scope Constraint, ' thereby referring 
to Heim's specification of (GSP) that prohibits intersentential anaphoric connections. 
' Such a radical view of semantic principles, for example, of the principle of Compositionality, is advocated 
by Larson and Segal (1995). These authors hold that Compositionality is mostly determined by the Autonomy 
ofSyntax principle, persistently defended by Chomsky. According to them, Compositional ity (or any other 
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principles organizing the syntactic modules 
To be sure, the above answers raise new questions. Two of them, for example, have to 
do with the alleged capacity of semantic values to exhaust the interpretations and 
meanings of sentences (especially of sentences embedded in discourse) and, conversely, 
the absence, in the above principles, of any allusion to context-sensitive mechanisms. 
These and other more specific questions will be considered in the next chapter. Before 
proceeding to these questions, we must say something about which semantic background 
we are going to prefer in order to interpret more complex sentences than the ones so far 
examined, in particular, sequences of sentences containing anaphoric pronouns. 
1.3 Representations and Discourse: Some Basic Issues 
Tarskian semantics has a wide spectrum of application. It can however not handle 
examples such as the following: 
(20) Every teacher in the school presumesshe will get the prize this year. 
(2 1) Mary wants to marry a young man. He must be a millionaire. 
The pronouns, in the examples above, can receive more than one interpretation and, 
therefore,. the sentences containing them cannot posses univocal truth-conditions. In each 
case, the non-univocality of interpretation depends on lexical factors such as the presence 
of the attitudinal verbs prevume and want or the modal auxiliary verbs will and must. 
Structural factors--e. g. assignments of scope-can also be isolated in (20) and (21). 
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that in the interpretation of all these cases three non- 
linguistic factors play a central role. They are (a) factors concerning the utterance 
context; (b) factors concerning the cognitive situations of the hearers who process (and 
disambiguate) the uttered sentences; and (c) factors underdetermining the processing of 
semantic principle for that matter) has therefore 'strict local' application. That is, it does not introduce any 
structure of its own in the smaller units of meaning. 
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sequences of sentences anaphorically related each other, i. e. anaphoric discourse. 
Without considering these factors, determining the meaning of sentences (20) and 
(2 1 ý-as well as sentences of greater complexity-could hardly be achieved. 
The study of such factors have evidently not been overlooked by Tarskian theorists. For 
instance, work by Kaplan (1977,1978,1979) and Burge (1974). has resulted in classical 
approaches to demonstratives, deictic pronouns and, in general, indexicality, within a 
Tarskian framework. However, given the present purposes of the dissertation we will 
consider another line of research here. Our reasons for such a choice are two. First, the 
classical approaches above do not treat cognitive processes of speakers and hearers 
connected to reference mechanisms systematically. Second, Tarskian approaches to 
indexicality focus only on sentences that are regarded as the unit of meaning. 
Nevertheless, since anaphoric processes can occur within and outside sentential 
boundaries, a wider conception of meaning taking into account complex sequences of 
sentences or discourses is required. 
Semantic theories developed independently by H. Kamp and 1. Heim in the early 80s, 
have emphasised the relevance of the above considerations for any semantics of 
discourse. These theorists emphasise the importance of seeing semantic structures as 
reflecting both formal constraints which mental representations are subject to and the 
interaction of these representations with contextual factors. In this sense, their theories 
-in particular Kamp's-may be related to the mentalistic and cognitive hypothesis put 
forward by Fodor under the name of Representational Language of Thought, or 
Mentalese. " 
Kamp claims that semantic structures must represent structural features of the relations 
that hold among different cognitive states (for instance, beliefs) of speakers or hearers 
See Fodor (1975,1987) 
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participating in real communication. '8 These structural features are expressed in 
inferential relations , implicatures, presuppositional restrictions, etc. Moreover, given that 
semantic representations must capture those structural features from the flow of verbal 
communication, the unit of meaning for Kamp cannot be sentences, as in standard 
Tarskian semantics, but rather continuous sequences of sentences or discourses. 
Consequently, the theory is referred to as the Discourse Representation Theory (DRT). 
The first general claim of DRT is that structures available for interpretation must 
systematically reflect elements deriving from cognitive sources provided by the speaker. 
DRT is clearly committed to truth-values as the semantic values of sentences and 
discourses. " The second important claim in DRT is that truth-values do not exhaust the 
linguistic meaning of discourses, nor, therefore, of the sentences involved in them. The 
following example characteristically employed by Heim (1982) illustrates this point. 
First,, consider the truth-conditions of discourses (23) and (24) below. 
(23) 1 dropped ten marbles and found them all except for one. It is probably under the 
sofa. 
(24) ?I dropped ten marbles and found only nine of them. It is probably under the sofa. 
Evidently the difference between (23) and (24) comes from the felicity of the anaphoric 
link in (23)-which is due to the presence of the antecedent one in the first sentence-and 
the infelicity of (24)-which is due to the absence of any available antecedent in the first 
sentence for the pronoun it in the second sentence. The question then is whether 
knowledge of truth-conditions of (23) and (24) can provide us with the explanation of 
that difference. Putting aside syntactic considerations, the sensible answer to this question 
above seems to be no because the truth-conditions of both sentences are clearly 
equivalent. That is, considerations about truth-conditions alone cannot constrain the 
28 See Kamp (1984,1985) and Kamp and Reyle (1993). Although Kamp's account follows cognitive lines, 
his views cannot be taken as supporting, as far as we can see, 'conceptualist' claims. However, see Asher 
(1993) for a strongly conceptualist View Within a similar semantic framework. 
29 See Heim (1982), Kamp (1984), Kamp and Reyle (1993) and Asher (1993). 
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interpretations of the anaphoric linkage in (23) and in (24) and thereby explain 
differences in felicity in these sentences. It is also clear that the first sentence in discourse 
(24)-and its truth-conditions-can play a felicitous role in another discourse, for 
example, (25). 
(25) 1 dropped ten marbles and found only nine of them. The missing marble probably 
is under the sofa. 
This shows that other factors should be taken into account if the meaning of discourses 
as in (23) and (25) is to be represented in a systematic way. These factors, whatever they 
may be, should explain why and how speakers prefer to utter (23) or (25) instead of (24). 
Presumably, salience of the relevant objects in the environment of the speaker will count 
as one of such factors. However, others will need to be introduced as well. '0 For example, 
considerations about 'wording' seem to be needed. " These considerations deal with 
properties of the discourses-for instance, the presence or absence of definite or 
indefinite NPs-and their relation to the knowledge that hearers or recipients can infer 
from the utterance of the discourses-for instance, the familiarity or the novelty of the 
NPs for speakers. Clearly, such properties and relations are reflected neither in the 
semantic values provided by the Ifs nor in the syntactic outputs provided by Us of the 
sentences in question. Thus, DRT assumes that the interpretation of a given discourse 
should clarify how contextual and cognitive factors determine the semantic 
representation of the discourse. These brief remarks about DRT, which we will revisit in 
chapter six, suggest how important the development of a solid view of the contribution 
30 In fact, examples (23) and (24) are used by Heim in order to defeat salience arguments put forward by 
Grice, Kripke and Lewis. S. Neale (1990, pp. 209-10) attempts to deny the effectiveness of the examples by 
means of an, in our opinion, unconvincing distinction between syntactic and semantic felicity. As he 
recognizes, there will be cases-for example, discourse (24) under determinate salience circumstances-which 
are considered semantically but not syntactically felicitous and which no one would accept as expressing 
anaphoric linkage. 
" See Heim (1982, pp. 21-2) 
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of context is to the speaker/hearer meaning. The following chapter will examine this 
crucial issue with respect to referential expressions and the sentences containing them. 
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CHAPTER H 
REFERENTIAL NONSPECIFICITY AND SEMANTIC NONSPECIFICITY 
Our goal in this chapter is to yield a set of arguments and definitions about nonspecificity 
supporting the background of our account of anaphora in the following chapters. The 
resulting background has both pragmatic and semantic roots. The pragmatic roots are 
based on an enriched Gricean view about meaning and reference. The semantic roots are 
based, mostly, on a general theory about non-univocality of meaning expounded by 
Pinkal. We willll argue that this background provides a natural solution to the problem 
of disambiguation of referring expressions, and the sentences containing them. The 
solution relies on appealing, in accordance with some Gricean theorists, to the notion of 
nonspecificity or indeterminacy and rejecting thereby the assumption of a literal 
ambiguity of the expressions. This manoeuvre gives rise to two levels of analysis in terms 
of nonspecificity: (a) the level dealing with the problem of referring expressions, i. e., the 
level of referential nonspecificity and (b) the level dealing with sentences containing 
referring expressions, i. e., the level of semantic or sentential nonspecificity. 
2.1 Context, Types of Propositions and Referential Nonspecificity 
The semantic account delineated in chapter one gives rise to a truth-theoretically 
interpreted system that is compositional in nature and predicts the meaning of a 
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compound expression in terms of some function over the meanings assigned to its parts. 
Such meanings are defined relative to a clear-cut truth concept specified by the Tarskian 
recursive definitions B(l)-(6) in section 1.2. Also, we found there adequate motivation 
for having a syntactic counterpart of that system in the natural languages in so far as the 
syntax of such languages generates (via GB mechanisms) syntactic strings or Us, which 
are directly interpreted by the structures assigned to them according to the Tarskian 
constraints (Ifs). This direct correspondence has at least four interesting features , in 
addition to the ones considered at the end of section 1.2. First, the direct (and biunivocal) 
mapping allows us to define some important formal properties such as logical 
consequence and logical truth within a natural language. In fact, this objective has been 
the driving force behind most current work on truth-theoretic or model-theoretic 
semantics. ' Secondly, in natural language semantics as defined above, interpretation is 
.) 
it does not depend on the environment in which the not context-sensitive. That is, 
utterance of a sentence occurs. This characteristic is above all, a consequence of the 
strict application of the Compositionality Principle. 2 Thirdly, the mapping is exhaustive, 
that is, there is no place for an intermediate level of representation. If this was not the 
case,, the whole approach to natural language as sets of strings or formulae over which 
inference is directly definable should be given up or seriously modified. Thus, in this 
classical conception of the syntax-semantics interface, use of representations to talk about 
meanings of natural language sentences is just for convenience or simplicity as always 
we can dispense with them. Finally, dispensability of representations means that there is 
no need to appeal to psychological properties when approaching interpretation of natural 
languages sentences. In this view we can ignore cognitive and attitudinal properties and 
mechanisms that we spontaneously associate with hearers/speakers processing utterances 
of natural language sentences during verbal communication. ' We shall call these four 
'Montague (1974), Davidson (1984) 
See Partee (1984), (1996) and Kempson (1996) 
' We assume here the traditional distinction between a sentence and its utterance. That is to say, as most 
authors, we associate truth-values with particular dated utterances rather than with sentences, which are 
abstract entities defined within a theory of grammar. 
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aspects, the orthodox conditions of the senwntics-syntax interface. 
From a linguistic point of view, this thesis is focused on a kind of anaphora whose 
interpretation, as we are going to show in the next chapters, cannot be supported only by 
the classical account about what the syntax-semantics interface is. Consequently, we will 
explore those non-classical views of the interface that supplement or simply deny some 
or all of the orthodox conditions. In particular, we will examine the views related to the 
last three conditions, i. e. the ones having to do with context, representations and 
psychological properties. Since most semantic theories esentially committed to 
representations depend largely on theories about context-dependence and on theories 
dealing with cognitive aspects, we will deal firstly with the second and fourth condition 
and, after doing so, we are going to consider the third one. This decision implies that our 
examination must begin with some elements of pragmatics. 
2.1.1 Some definitions and three Problems 
Stainaker's commonly used definition of pragmatics suggests that pragmatics is the study 
of all linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are performed by language-users. ' 
Thus, this study will include both speech acts and speech products, such as assertions, 
commands,, counterfactuals , inferences, answers, etc., as well as 
features of the speech 
acts such as indexicality or deixis, presuppositions, etc. 'Contexthere can be understood 
as encoding all the aspects that are physically, cognitively and linguistically relevant to 
the production and interpretation of actual utterances. Linguistic aspects encoded in 
sentences that are typically context-sensitive are, for instance, use of expressions like T, 
'here'and'now'. They are commonly referred to ascontextual coordinates'. ' We can call 
the definition above, the contertualist definition. Despite some problems with the 
' StaInaker (1972, p. 3 83 ) 
5 See Levinson (1983); notice that we are not commited here to the view that context is whatever, excluding 
semantics and grammar, contributes to interpretation of utterances. 
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contextualist definition, ' most theorists feel some degree of sympathy to it and we do so 
too. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the definition is incomplete. In other words, 
although it takes issue with the second orthodox condition, it remains rather silent about 
the fourth one, i. e. about psychological properties. We believe, as many theorist do, 'that 
Grice (1989) was right in insisting that meaning properties are to be analysed ultimately 
in terms of psychological properties. Recanati clarifies this point by saying that 
"[s]entence meaning is to be analysed in terms of utterance meaning, utterance meaning 
in terms of communicative behaviour, and communicative behaviour, in terms of 
intentions and psychological states" (Recanati 1993, p. 20). Associated with such states, 
we would add cognitive properties and principles determining the conveyed information, 
for instance, computational mechanisms involved in inference, principles to retrieve and 
process information, and mechanisms by which referential information is presented to 
hearers and speakers, i. e., mechanisms involved in so-called'modes of presentation'of 
the reference. Thus, pragmatics in our view crucially involves a psychological level of 
explanation. Kempson (1996) states clearly this viewpoint in the following terms: 
Pragmatics, ... , 
is the study of interpretation from the perspective 
of psychology, the study of the general cognitive principles involved 
in the retrieval of information from an uttered sequence of words. Its 
goal is to explain how from an uttered sequence of words, a hearer 
can suceed in retrieving some interpretation intended by the speaker, 
and then from that construal derive yet further information constituting 
the full import of the utterance. (Kempson 1996, p. 562) 
We can call Kempson's definition, the psychological definition. In agreement with other 
theorists (Kasher 1990, Sperber and Wilson 1986), we think that compatibility of the 
psychological and contextualist definitions is a natural consequence. Retrieval, 
processing and derivation of information from utterances is always context-sensitive , in 
the sense that utterances systematically depend on environment factors. Hence such 
psychological mechanisms are essential to context-dependent interpretations. 
' See Stainaker (1972), and Levinson (1983). 
' Recanati (1993), Neale (1990), among others 
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Furthermore, every linguistic act has psychological reality) in the sense that its 
interpretation (and rationalization) depends on the cognitive and attitudinal properties 
and mechanisms that we have to presuppose in hearers and speakers in order to make 
sense of verbal communication'. In the extreme, given this compatibility, context might 
be redefined simply as a psychological construct, i. e., the subset of hearer's assumptions 
about the world9. We will assume the compatibility between the psychological and 
contextualist definition as relatively uncontroversial in pragmatics. 
The preceeding definitions suggest the main concerns and problems of pragmatics. We 
will explore three of these problems here. The first one has to do with the role played by 
context in the interpretation; the second one has to do with the way in which meanings 
are pragmatically captured. The last problem is related to disambiguation of context- 
dependent expressions. Since context aspects cannot be accounted for by reference to the 
truth-conditions of the sentences uttered, it seems that pragmatic explanations take place 
just when such aspects determine more than one interpretation of a sentence. In this case, 
we can say that the truth-conditions associated with the literal meaning of the sentences 
uttered underdetermine their interpretation. Obviously, when context aspects of the 
utterance do not play a significant role in the interpretation of the sentence we can say 
that the sentence is context-independent and, accordingly, its interpretation is univocal, 
i. e., the meaning of the sentence corresponds just to its truth-conditions. This fact poses 
the natural question of how we should account for the contribution of context in 
determining the meaning of the utterance of a sentence, when the sentence gives rise to 
non-univocal interpretations. Several answers are available. For instance, one alternative 
is to appeal to something like an ambiguity analysis, positing several different 
interpretations in terms of different structure assignments for each syntactic string, having 
no role assigned to the context other than that of disambiguation. 'o Another radical 
' Grice (1975), Sperber and Wilson (I 987a, I 987b) 
' Sperber and Wilson (1986, p. 15) 
" This the view assumed by Katz and Fodor (1963), and Katz (1973) 
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alternative consists in seeing context as omnipresent in every sentence. Thus, the 
meaning of every sentence is always specified only against a set of assumptions about the 
contexts in which the sentence could be uttered. This view can be labelled the 'no-null' 
context view. " Finally, intermediate alternatives are also possible. In such alternatives 
context plays a determinant role in the process of specifying the meaning of utterances 
but grammar features and knowledge of truth-conditions constrain to a certain extent the 
range of possible interpretations. As it will be clear in the following chapters, we will 
favour an intermediate stance. 
Our intermediate position in the dispute about the nature of context-dependence is rather 
subservient to the answer that we are going to give to other more crucial question, at least 
for our purposes in the thesis. The contextualist and psychologist definitions imply, 
unlike semantics,, that the goal of pragmatics is not to provide an assignment of form or 
structure to strings but explain how recovery of information from the uttered sequence 
of words takes place. Consequently, a major problem in pragmatics is not what form the 
recovered information might take, but how it is recovered. In Kempson's words the 
question that has to be asked is "how does the hearer choose which interpretation to 
select, given the range of representations she might in principle construct? " (Kempson 
1996, p. 563). This question involves an equally important, but sometimes overlooked, 
problem, i. e., the question of whether the sole routes for recovering the information and 
determining the interpretation of an utterance of an expression are either via the linguistic 
meaning of the expression or via what is contextually communicated beyond the literal 
meaning of the expression. In what follows, I will briefly examine (1) the classical 
answer to the former question, i. e. Grice's answer or'Grice's story, and (2) the positive 
answer that follows from the Gricean account to the latter question. 
As demonstrated in several works (Grice 1975,1989, among others), Grice implements 
a systematic account about how hearers determine the interpretation intended by the 
" See Searle (1979) 
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speaker. Just in order to fix ideas before going to Grice's account, let us distinguish 
between the linguistic meaning of an expression, and the semantical value of a particular 
dated utterance of the expression. So, the semantical value of the utterance of a sentence 
is a truth value. The semantical value of the utterance of a referring expression, e. g. a 
proper name, is the referent of the expression. A characteristic of indixical expressions, 
i. e. expressions used for pointing like T, 'this', 'here', etc., is that their semantical value 
depends systematically upon the context of utterance. The distinction between linguistic 
meaning and semantical value allows us to explain the contribution that referring 
expressions make to the meaning of sentences containing them. For instance, if I utter the 
sentence 'I am British' right now, I am the referent of the utterance of T. This will 
determine the semantical value of the whole sentence. If others utter the same sentence 
right now, the referents of the utterance of T will vary and different semantical values 
could be assigned to the sentence. Thus, distinct utterances of T may receive distinct 
individuals as their respective semantic values. However, it is rather obvious that such 
changes of reference will not alter the linguistic meaning of the expression(-type) T from 
speaker to speaker, and, accordingly, the linguistic meaning of the sentence containing 
it. As Neale rightly stresses, " [t]o know the linguistic meaning of the word T is to know 
something constant across utterances, roughly that the referent is the individual using the 
word. Similarly for'you': the referent is the addressee (or addressees)" (Neale 1990, p. 
68). Similar considerations will apply to demonstrative noun phrases and deictic 
expressions. Remarks of this kind gave rise long ago to the idea of identifying linguistic 
meaning of expressions with particular sorts of referential rules or functions that 
systematically take into account the context of utterance. " The linguistic meaning of an 
indexical expression will be a function from contexts to semantical values. The linguistic 
meaning of a sentence will be a function from contexts to propositions, i. e., a rule that 
determines,, for every context, what is said by uttering the sentence in that context. What 
is said constitutes the proposition expressed by the utterance of the sentence. 
Accordingly, the proposition expressed coincides with the semantical value of the 
12 Strawson (1950), Montague (1968), Lewis (1970), Kaplan (1977). 
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utterance of the sentence. Finally, if we interpret definite descriptions along Russellian 
lines, i. e., as quantifiers and not as referring expressions, utterances of such descriptions 
will not take an object as their sernantical value. The sernantical value of an utterance of 
the sentence 'the F is G' will be a descriptive proposition to the effect that "there is one 
and only one thing that is F and that one thing is G. There is no object for which the 
grammatical subjectthe P stands that is a genuine constituent of that proposition" (Neale 
op. cit , p. 72). Thus, the sernantiCal value of the utterance of a definite description, under 
the Russellian reading, is an object-independent proposition expressed. 
2.1.2 Grice's Stor y 
In what follows we will expound schematically Grice's theory in three stages. In the first 
stage, we state the general basis of the theory; in the second stage, we examine the most 
relevant consequences (for our purposes here) drawn firom the general basis for the notion 
of meaning; and, in the third stage, we discuss the consequences of Grice's account for 
disambiguation of utterances. 
1. The general basis of the Gricean account is constituted by several Maxims of 
Conversation and an Implicature Theory. Maxims of Conversation that govern the 
selection of inferences in verbal communication, are in their turn governed by a general 
principle, the Cooperative Principle. The Cooperative Principle states that each 
participant engaged in conversation will attempt to contribute appropiately to the current 
exchange of talk at the required time and according to the accepted purpose of that 
exchange. This means that the main characteristic of conversation, according to Grice, 
is being a cooperative and purposeful enterprise. Under this general principle, Grice 
subsumes four Maxims, which dictate that speakers/hearers should conform to standards 
of truthfulness, informativeness,, relevance and clarity. These Maxims are Maxims of 
Quantity, Quality, Relevance and Manner, respectively. The other contribution to 
pragmatics of Grice's theory is the idea that some occasions of apparent flagrant violation 
of the Maxims constitute the basis whereby genuine pragmatical inferences, called 
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'conversational implicatures', are derived. For example, answering'An apple is an apple' 
when, in the middle of their lunch hour, a man asks another how he likes the apple he is 
eating, seems a flagrant violation of, at least, the Quality Maxim. Pointless sentences like 
the one above are called tautologies and have no interest but for logicians. However, if 
they are used in actual conversation, it is clear the speaker intends to communicate 
through them more than is said. When the hearer receives the answer 'An apple is an 
apple', he first has to assume that the speaker is being cooperative and intends to 
communicate something. Accordingly, that something must be more than only what the 
words literally mean. This is an additional conveyed meaning; in Grice's terminology, the 
conversational implicature that the speaker is intending in the talk exchange. In the 
sentence above, the speaker expects that the hearer will be able to work out or dedve,, on 
the basis of what is already assumed in the utterance context, the implicature intended 
in the context, for instance, that the speaker thinks all apples are the same or that he has 
no opinion about apples. Depending on other context factors, additional implicatures 
might be inferred. 
Furthermore, Grice took special care to specify and distinguish several sorts of 
implicature. The example of conversational implicature given above corresponds to a 
particularized conversational implicature, i. e. an unstated meaning that essentially 
requires of the context to be inferred. However, maybe the most important sort of 
implicature for philosophers of language is what Grice termed generalized conversational 
implicature. The main characteristic of the latter kind of implicature is that the derivation 
of its unstated meaning does not depend on special or local knowledge of context factors. 
For instance, one can note that in general whenever someone says 'I walked into a house' 
she shall be taken to implicate 'The house was not my house'. It is difficult to diminish 
the importance of this kind of implicature when one realizes that it allows us to explain 
why, given the utterance of a particular expression, we always infer an unstated meaning 
and why we do so quite independently of the utterance context. For instance, we might 
explain why whenever a speaker utters something like'some Fs are Gs'hearers end up 
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inferring (but not logically implying) something like'some Fs are not Gs'. "In conclusion, 
we can say that a speaker conversationally implicates (whether via particularized or 
generalized implicatures) that which must be assumed to believe in order to preserve the 
assumption that she is adhering to the Cooperative Principle and Maxims. 
2. We turn now to some consequences that Grice's theory of conversation has for a theory 
of meaning. They can be summarised in the following statement: there are speech acts, 
in particular, conversational implicatures" that belong to what an utterance 
communicates in a relevant way,, determining thus propositions other than the proposition 
strictly and literally expressed by the utterance. That is to say, a speaker may express a 
particular proposition by using an utterance of a sentence whereas at the same time 
communicating something beyond the proposition expressed. Thus, we can intuitively 
distinguish between the proposition expressed on an utterance ocassion and the 
proposition (or propositions) conveyed by the utterance, i. e., the proposition (or 
propositions) meant. In our example of apples above there is no systematic way of 
correlating the proposition(s) meant (for instance, 'all apples are the same' or 'I have no 
opinion about apples') with the proposition expressed by means of the utterance of the 
sentence. The latter proposition is determined by the linguistic meaning of 'An apple is 
an apple', which is based on the meaning of its parts and their syntactical arrangements,, 
together with the context factors accompanying the utterance. In contrast, it is clear that 
the proposition meant by the speaker's utterance communicates something entirely 
different. 
By using the terminology fixed above, we distinguish three different notions in talking 
about the meaning of a sentence S as uttered by a speaker on a given utterance u: (i) the 
" See Neale (op. cit., pp. 81-2). 
" in Gias theory one can also find conventional implicatures. They arise regardless of context and depend 
to a great extent on linguistic conventions. For instance, the difference between T and Q and T but Q, 
consists in the contrast introduced by'but' in the second compound sentence. So 'constrast' is a conventional 
implicature of'but. Also, unlike conversational implicatures, conventional implicatures are not derived from 
Maxims, see Levinson (1983). 
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linguistic or literal meaning of the sentence S; (ii) the semantical value of S relative to 
the context of utterance,, i. e. the proposition expressed by the utterance u of S by the 
speaker; and (iii) what the speaker meant by uttering S, i. e. the proposition(s) meant by 
u. " With this distinction, it becomes straightforward that the level of what is said, i. e., 
the level of the proposition expressed, provides the (literal) truth-conditions of the 
utterance. Such truth-conditions are therefore the result of the linguistic and conventional 
meaning of the sentence plus the context of utterance. Given that in many cases 
(presumably, the simplest ones) the proposition expressed will coincide with the 
proposition meant, one can ask the question of whether it is possible, within the present 
framework, to characterize when a proposition is meant. The answer to this question is 
important by at least two reasons: first, it will provide a characterization of meaning in 
terms of communication proper; and, second, that characterization will also provide us 
with an initial answer to Kempson's question above about the selection of interpretations 
for a given utterance. 
The following definition taken from Grice (1957,1975) offers a characterization of the 
expession 'a speaker s means that p by uttering S': 
(1) By uttering S, s means thatp if and only if for some recipient H, s utters S intending: 
(i) H to entertain the thought that p, and 
(11) H to simply recognize that s intends (i) 
(1), with some simplifications, defines what Grice calls non-natural meaning or 
speaker-meaning. The success of communicating a proposition by a speaker lies In the 
recognition (on the hearer side) of a complex intention, the intention of entertaining that 
proposition. Such a success in the communicative intention will therefore detertnine 
which interpretation (which proposition meant) of the available range of interpretations 
will be selected, beyond the literal meaning of the utterance. For the time being, we will 
not be concerned with intentions. Nonetheless, the final part of the Gricean story, i. e. 
Grice's explanation of disambiguation, Will be vital for our concerns in this dissertation. 
" See Neale (1990), Recanati (1993). 
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I As Grice suggests, 16 since the proposition meant includes a pragmatic, non- 
conventional element, i. e., a conversational Implicature, the fact that a given expression 
may receive different interpretations-for Grice, 'senses' or 'meanings-in differents 
contexts does not imply that it is semantically ambiguous. Earlier we call the general 
phenomenon of receiving different interpretations, the non-univocality of an expression; 
thus, we can consider Grice's talk about different senses., meanings or interpretations as 
directly dealing with that general phenomenon. It is a common practice to account for 
intuitive differences in meaning or non-univocality at the semantic level, by positing two 
or more different literal meanings, that is, by positing a semantic ambiguity. However, 
with Grice's theory, it is also possible to account for the same differences at the pragmatic 
level by positing a conversational implicature that , in some contexts,, interacts with what 
is literally said. Grice was particularly concerned with explaining alleged ambiguities of 
some logical connectives by applying his account of generalized conversational 
implicature. A case in point is the exclusive and inclusive readings of the particle 'oe. 
Grice argues that instead of claiming that'of is in two ways ambiguous, we may consider 
it as unambiguously inclusive and account for the exclusive reading by saying that in 
some contexts the utterance of the sentence 'P or Q conversationally implicates that V 
and 'Q' cannot both be true. Grices draws an immediate methodological moral of his 
explanation of these alleged ambiguities: if a putative ambiguity (a non-univocality of 
interpretation 
, in our terms) can 
be accounted for either at the semantic level, by 
assuming two different literal meanings or senses, or at the pragmatic level, by assuming 
a conversational implicature, the pragmatic option is to be preferred. This moral follows 
from suscribing to what Grice calls Modified Occam Is Razor: Senses are not to be 
multiplied beyond necessity. Recanati (1993) justifies the plausibility of this principle 
as follows. 
This is a principle of theoretical parsimony, like Occam's Razor. 
Pragmatic explanations, when available, are to be preferred because 
they are economical, in the sense that the principles and assumptions 
" GrIce (1989 pp. 47-48) 
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they appeal to are very general and independently motivated. By 
contrast, positing a semantic ambiguity is an ad hoc, costly move 
-a move which the possibility of a pragmatic analysis makes entirely 
superfluous (Recanati 1993, p. 234) 
And as Neale (1990) remarks, preferring pragmatic explanations over semantic 
ambiguities brings as a bonus an increase in generality. Or, conversely, the loss of 
generality by positing several literally distinct readings can be considerable. So, it seems 
that we have to concede to Grice that "where semantical and pragmatic accounts handle 
the same range of data, the pragmatic account is preferable" (Neale op. cit., p. 8 1) 
2.1.3 Grices sto! y and the problem ofdisambýguatlon: -the referential challenge 
Grice's story provides us direct answers to the three problems stated earlier. 
(1) Theproblem ofcontext-dependence: Context is decisive in interpreting utterances but 
it is not everything. Although linguistic meaning conventionally determines what is 
literally said and therefore the truth-conditions of the utterances, linguistic conventions 
and linguistic usage may, at least in part, participate of what is communicated, i. e. they 
may participate of (and contribute to) the proposition meant. The best examples of that 
possibility is the presence of generalized conversational implicatures and conventional 
implicatures in communication. This shows that Grice's account leads to something like 
an intermediate stance in the debate about context-dependence. 
(11) The problem of speaker meaning: Grice's whole theory of conveyed meaning (or 
speaker-meaning) yields an impressive solution to this question. This theory shows how 
capture the meaning or interpretation intended by a speaker in conversation and appeals 
explicitly to mechanisms and principles that guarantee the inference and prediction of 
that intended meaning. Also, and equally important, the theory has an undeniable 
psychological basis provided by its crucial use of the intentions of the speaker to explain 
communicative success. Thus, in principle, Grice yields a cogent answer to our worries 
about psychological features in pragmatic explanations. 
(111) The problem of disambiguation: Grice's recommendation when faced with non- 
univocal interpretations of utterances and where semantic and pragmatic explanations of 
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disambiguation are at odds is that we must apply the Modified Occam's Razor. In such 
a case, the pragmatic option is the favourite one. But in turn this methodological moral 
implies that we have two exhaustive alternatives: genuine ambiguity or implicature. If we 
favour genuine ambiguity, disambiguation will take place at the level of linguistic 
meaning as the singled out interpretations will correspond to different literal meanings. 
If we favour implicature, disambiguation will occur at the level of the proposition meant 
or conveyed (whatever the implicature involved) and, consequently, no assumption about 
distinctive literal meanings is needed. 
To be sure, this story has much to commend it on all counts and its contributions to the 
renewal of pragmatics are unquestionable. Despite that, over the last two decades several 
potential shortcomings and limitations of Grice's theory have been acknowledged. " 
Subsequent improvements to Grice's theory have been offered, Sperber and Wilson's 
theory (1986) being the best well-known. Sperber and Wilson stress the cognitive angle 
within a theory of communicative intentions. Unlike Grice, they propose that not all 
maxims are at the same level. They convincingly argue that relevance is the core of a 
theory of communication in so far as communicating is just communicating relevant 
information. Accordingly, they approach relevance in the following comparative way: the 
greater the contextual effects (the inferences resulting from interaction between old and 
new information) yielded with the least possible processing effort, the greater the 
relevance. " Here, relevance is defined as achieving an optimal balance between the 
cognitive effort involved in processing and richness of contextual or inferential effects. 
Implicatures (and disambiguation) can be characterized as contextual effects, provided 
optimal relevance exists. The Principle of Relevance stipulates what choice of 
interpretation or meaning from a set of potential intended interpretations will be the 
correct. Such a choice will be the result of applying a constraint according to which the 
least effort of the hearer is needed in order to infer an interpretation that the speaker 
17 For a review of criticisms, see Hom (1988) 
" Sperber and Wilson (1986, p. 125) 
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could have intended. Although the constraint of relevance guarantees the correct 
interpretation, it is worth emphasising that, according to Sperber and Wilson, its goal is 
to restrict cognitive representations that are "mental objects that never surface to 
consciousnes" (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, p. 193). Such representations become mentally 
represented as "a result of an automatic and unconscious process of linguistic decoding" 
(Sperber and Wilson, op. cit., p. 193). Consequently, when, by means of the smallest 
search in the cognitive space, one representation is made explicit, we say that it had a 
contextual effect, i. e. its corresponding interpretation has been obtained. We are not 
interested to say anything more substantive about Sperber and Wilson's theory here. 
However,, we think that combination of the implicature theory and the relevance theory 
provides the best cognitive background behind pragmatic explanations of linguistic 
phenomena. From here forward, each time we refer to these explanations, we shall 
presuppose such a cognitive background. 
Exploring further other potential defects of Grice's approach is obviously beyond the 
goals of this thesis. However, given that our concerns here are closely related to non- 
univocality issues, we will carefully examine the solution that Grice offers for the 
disambiguation problem. We believe that although Grice's story is initially atractive there 
is another richer story to be considered. In particular, this new story shows that it is a 
mistake to argue that there are only two possible levels in which disambiguation takes 
place. 
Before examining the arguments against Grice's classical theory let us first check an 
striking example of how successful the application of that theory can be. The example 
is related to the problem of the definite description usage, which involves important 
consequences for elucidating the anaphora phenomena to be discussed in the next 
chapters. S. Neale (1990) has provided what is perhaps the most complete and cogent 
solution to the problem of the definite description usage based on a Gricean background. 
This solution gives a sound reason to focus on it. In addition to that reason, many things 
that Neale says about definite descriptions bear explicitly on issues about anaphora. 
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Therefore, it is important to evaluate his solution in order to clarify our own arguments. 
Neale's goal is to rebut the so-called 'referential challenge' posited by some theorists to 
Russell's account of definite descriptions, i. e., expressions of the son'the P. According 
to Donnellan (1966), several philosophers have inclined to distinguish between two uses 
of definite descriptions, the attributive and referential. For instance, in a sentence like 
'Smith's murderer is insane', Donnellan observed two possible interpretations: the one in 
which we make a descriptive reference to whoever was the (unique) murderer of Smith, 
and the other in which we make an objectual reference to a certain individual, say, Jones, 
who is known to have murdered Smith. Thus,, on the attributive interpretation, what is 
said is true if and only if there is one and only one person who murdered Smith and he 
or she is insane. On the referential interpretation, the utterance is true if and only if Jones 
is insane. As Recanati (1993) remarks about this interpretation, Jones's being the 
murderer of Smith is no more part of the truth-condition of what is said, than my being 
the speaker is part of the truth-condition of what I say when I utter the sentence 'I am 
insane'. " It is clear that Russell's quantificational analysis of definite descriptions yields 
an accurate account of the proposition expressed on the attributive reading. However, in 
the referential case, the descriptive phrase "functions like a referring expression not a 
quantifier phrase, and the proposition expressed is not faithfully captured by Russell's 
quantificational. analysis" (Neale op. cit. p. 64). Therefore, the proposition expressed is 
object-dependent. On this view, the only defense is that there is a semantically distinct 
referential reading of definite descriptions. Consequently, this implies the defense of the 
view that "descriptions are semantically ambiguous between Russellian and "referential" 
interpretations, i. e., [that] the definite article is lexically ambiguous" (Neale, op. cit., p. 
65). 
As Neale recalls, as early as 1969, Grice suggested that there is no systematic ambiguity 
of meaning involved in the use of definite descriptions. One, according to Grice, just 
" Recanati (1993, p, 23 8) 
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needs to invoke an independently motivated distinction between what a speaker says and 
what he or she means, i. e,, between the proposition expressed and the proposition meant. " 
Thus, in Grice's view, the Russellian account delivers the correct analysis of descriptions. 
Neale implements more clearly this view claiming that the Russellian is right to endorse 
the following schema: 
(Des) If a speaker S uses a definite description 'the P referentially in an utterance u of 'the 
F is G, 'the F still functions as a quantifier and the proposition expressed by u is 
the object-independent proposition given by [the x: Fx](Gx) 
The Russellian-Gricean sees referential usage "as an important fact about 
comnwnication to be explained by general pragmatic principles [and] not something of 
semantical import" (Neale op. cit., p. 85). In particular, (Des) entails that the same 
proposition is expressed on both readings, i. e. the general proposition that there is an x 
such that x is uniquely F and is G. Consequently, disambiguation of readings occurs at 
the level of the propositions meant. As a matter of illustration, let us consider the 
sentence in (2) below. 
(2) The Editor of Linguistics and Philosophy is coming to London next Saturday 
On the one hand, if the utterance context determines that the description is used by both 
a speaker and a hearer to refer to, say, Harry Smith, then, by using (1) above, we obtain 
the following explanation of that referential usage: the speaker utters (2) intending the 
hearer (i) to actively entertain the (object-dependent) proposition that Harry Smith is 
coming to London next Saturday, and (ii) to recognize that the speaker intends the hearer 
to actively entertain that proposition. This way,, Neale adds, "[flhere would appear to be 
no barrier, then to saying that (part of) what [the speaker] mean[s] by [her] utterance of 
[(2)] is that Harry Smith is coming to [London] next Saturday; the object-dependent 
proposition that Harry Smith is coming to [London] next Saturday is (one of) the 
proposition(s) meant" (Neale op. cit., pp. 85-6). On the other hand, if the utterance 
' Grice 0 969, P. 143) 
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context makes it clear that the description is attributively used, i. e., neither the speaker 
nor the hearer have any relevant context-dependent information about a singular object 
satisfying the description, then the proposition expressed is the general proposition to the 
effect that whoever is uniquely F is G. The general proposition literally expressed is 
relevant independently of any contextually implied singular proposition, and this is what 
is communicated by the utterance. In conclusion, referential readings do not give rise to 
any literal or lexical ambiguity. They are just cases in which the speaker communicates 
not only the general (or object-independent) proposition which is literally expressed, but 
also the singular (or object-dependent) proposition which is contextually implicated and 
which gives the utterance its point. Neale's final conclusion clearly states how the 
Russellian overcomes the referential challenge: 
We have reached the situation, then, in which we appear to have 
a perfectly good explanation of referential uses of definite descriptions 
that does not appeal to any sort of semantical ambiguity. The Russellian 
and the ambiguity theorist agree that when a description is used referentially, 
(one of ) the proposition(s) meant is obj ect-dependent; they just 
provide different explanations of this fact. The referentialist complicates 
the semantics of 'the'; the Russellian appeals to antecedently motivated 
principles governing the nature of rational discourse and ordinary inference. 
[ 
... 
] But general methodological considerations lend support to the 
Russellian. Modified Occam's Razor enjoins us not to multiply senses 
beyond necessity, i. e., to opt for a theory that (ceteris paribus) does 
not have to appeal to a semantical ambiguity. (Neale, op. cit.,, p. 90) 
It is worth noticing that Neale's conclusion is endorsed by many theorists (working from 
often divergent perspectives) and that it has gained increasing support over the last few 
years. There are at least two relevant reasons for that favourable opinion. The first reason 
is that the phenomenon of referential usage is not something peculiar only to the definite 
article. Given appropriate contexts, we can get similar usages for the indefinite article V 
as well. " Even more, as Sainsbury (1979) has rightly emphasised, it is not difficult to 
show that sentences containing all kinds of quantifiers (for instance, 'everyone', 'some', 
21 See Neale (op. cit, p. 87) 
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'many', among others) may be used to convey object-dependent propositions. This 
considerably weakens the case for genuine ambiguity in the definite article and leads, by 
contrast, to keep the semantics of all quantifiers as simple as possible. In addition, it 
yields further motivation to prefer a pragmatic treatment of most cases of non-univocality 
in discourse. 
The second equally important reason is the fact that Russell's quantificational analysis 
of descriptions, as carefully showed by Neale, has wide and successful applications 
beyond sentences containing simple descriptions. For instance, it might deal with 
sentences containing descriptions with relative clauses, relativized descriptions, and 
descriptions embedded in genitive structures. More important for our purpose, the 
Russellian theory, in Neale's hands, can be applied to pronouns bound and unbound by 
descriptions thus contributing decisively to the construction of a general theory of 
anaphora. " We shall say a lot more about Neale's theory of anaphora in the following 
chapters though, the aforementioned applications yield enough motivation for us to feel 
sympathy for Neale's conclusions aboutthe P. However, we believe that there are good 
reasons to feel otherwise regarding some premises of Neale's argument. In particular, we 
think that the use of the implicature theory to explain disambiguation does not fit in with 
a pervasive feature of non-univocality that is directly involved in the discussion relative 
to the referential challenge, i. e. the underspeciflication or, expressed with the term that 
mostly we are going to use from now on, the nonspecificity of meaning. 'We believe that 
nonspecificity or underspecification is not only a context-dependent issue, subject to an 
analysis exclusively in terms of what is communicated or, in other words, in terms of 
conversational implicatures. In our opinion, non-trivial (non-lexical) cases of 
underspecification involving quantifiers and relations between quantified phrases require 
Neale (op. cit., pp. 46-7) 
2-'We are going to use'nonspecificity, 'underspecification', 'underdeterm i nation and 'indeterminacy' to mean 
the same. Nevertheless, from a semantic point of View, we distinguish them clearly from vagueness and, of 
course, ambiguity; see the section 2.2. Also, for some problems With indeterminacy and underdeterm i nation 
see note 27 in this section. 
55 
a different analysis, wherein the source for disambiguation is crucially provided by the 
interaction between the level of linguistic meaning (with its corresponding truth- 
conditions) and the level of what is said. Consequently, Russell's conception of definite 
descriptions defended by Neale will also have to be adapted to such an analysis if we 
want to preserve all of its advantages. Thus, we are going to look at an alternative 
solution to the referential challenge that meets the following desiderata: (a) to provide 
for the problem of the referential challenge an adequate pragmatic rather than semantic 
solution, (b) to explain disambiguation in terms of nonspecificity or underspecification 
without relying on conversational implicatures, and (c) to preserve , in explaining 
disambiguation, the additional major characteristics of the Gricean account. 
2.1.4 A new pfggmatic stoly ofdisambiguation 
Several authors (Bach (1987), Atlas (1989) and Recanati (1989,1993)) have been 
concerned with offering a different solution to the referential challenge. In our opinion, 
Recanati's solution is the only one thoroughly committed to satisfy the desirata, above and 
therefore we shall examine it in detail. At the end of our examination, it shall appear 
necessary to complete Recanati's new story by distinguishing between nonspecificity of 
referential-attributive uses and nonspecificity of the reference itself In order to 
substantiate the latter notion, we shall introduce some ideas taken from Bach (1987) and 
bearing on the relationship between speaker/hearer reference and nonspecificity. 
In order to clarify Recanati's position about the problem with the implicature analysis let 
us quote the following long paragraph. 
The Gricean picture [ ... 
] has been enormously influential and 
rightly so; but it raises a problem which has been recognized only 
recently. The problem is connected with the notion that sentence 
meaning conventionally determines what is said. Grice is aware that 
what is said depends not only on the conventional meaning of the words 
but also on the context of utterance. What is said by uttering'I 
have not had breakfast today'depends on who is speaking 
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and when. That is why there is a difference between the conventional 
meaning of words and what is said by uttering the words. The 
conventional meaning of the words only determines, or helps to 
determine, what is said, according to Grice. But what does it 
mean? (Recanati 1993, pp. 234-5) 
As we saw earlier, the common answer to the last question is that the linguistic meaning 
of a sentence is a function from contexts to propositions. Similar definitions will apply 
to referring expressions like T and 'you'. Under this account, context decisively 
contributes something to determine meaning. Nevertheless, as Recanati remarks, 
"recourse to the context of utterance is guided and controlled by the conventional 
meaning of the words" (Recanati op. cit., p. 235). So the meaning ofT(the person who 
is speaking) provides us with an identifying clue taken from the context of utterance and 
leads us to fully identify what is said. In other words, once the context is specified, what 
is said can be automatically decoded. 
Recanati reacts to this view by showing that even if we supply all the relevant contextual 
information (identification of the speaker, hearer(s), time etc. ) "the conventional meaning 
of the words falls short of supplying enough information to exploit this knowledge of the 
context so as to secure understanding of what is said" (Recanati, op. cit., Ibid). A simple 
example given by Recanati is the sentenceHe has bought John's book'. Recanati contends 
that, apart from gender information, the meaning of 'he' provides no criterion enabling 
one to identify the reference. Consequently, the meaning of the sentence in question, to 
a great extent underdetermines what is said. Also, according to Recanati, this 
underdetermination is not limited to the reference of referring expressions in the sentence 
in question. In his words, 
[t]o understand what is said by Tie has bought John's book', 
one must identify the referent of 'he', of 'John' and 
(perhaps) of John's book. But one must also identify the 
relation that is supposed to hold between John and the book. 
According to Kay and Zimmer [(1976)] [ ... J, 
'genitive 
locutions present the hearer with two nouns and a 
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metalinguistic instruction that there is a relation between 
these two nouns that the hearer must supply'. 'John's book' 
therefore means something like 'the book that bears the 
relation x to John. To understand what is said by means of a 
sentence in which the expression 'John's boole occurs, this 
meaning must be contextually enriched by instantiating the 
variableY" (Recanati op. cit., pp. 235-6). 
Furthermore,, the descriptive sense of the expression 'John's book' is also context- 
dependent and there is no rule taking us from the context to the relevant semantic value. 
Recanati concludes that context-dependence is generally 'free' rather than 'controlled', in 
the sense that "the linguistic meaning of a context-sensitive expression constrains its 
possible semantic values but does not consist in a 'rule' or 'function' taking us from 
context to semantic value " (Recanati op. cit., p. 236). 
Recanati's objection above, far from posing a threat to Grice's theory, can be implemented 
within the latter thus obtaining an enriched theory of speaker meaning. The enriched 
theory points towards the necessity of a pragmatic explanation of the step from sentence 
meaning to what is said. Recanati shows in detail how the Gricean implicature apparatus 
yields the desired explanation. " Nevertheless, once the Gricean theory is enriched and 
we try to explain ptimafacie ambiguities, the option between the semantic ambiguity 
theory and the pragmatic implicature theory that Grice's classical theory assumed 
becomes questionable. As we saw, these two alternatives corresponded to two basic 
levels of meaning distinguished in the classical Gricean story: sentence meaning, which 
determines what is literally said, and the utterance's overall meaning, which determines 
what is communicated (including what is said and the implicatures). According to 
Recanati,, if we distinguish three levels of meaning rather than two-sentence meaning, 
what is said, and what is communicatedl it follows that there would be three ways of 
accounting forpfimafacie ambiguities. 
Besides the semantic approach, which locates the ambiguity 
24 Recanati (op. cit., p. 236) 
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at the first level., that of the sentence meaning, there are two 
pragmatic approaches corresponding to the second and third levels 
of meaning [ ... ]. The classical Gricean approach considers that is the same on all readings of the 'ambiguous' utterance, the 
difference between the readings being due to a conversational 
implicature which, in some contexts, combines with what is 
literally said. The other pragmatic approach considers that the 
difference is a difference in what is said, even though the 
sentence itself is not ambiguous; this is possible owing to 
semantic underdetermination of what is said (Recanati 
op. cit., p. 237) 
Of course, Recanati's point is not that Modified Occam's Razor supports the 
conversational implicature approach as against the other pragmatic approach but rather 
that a pragmatic approach is to be preferred, cetefis paribus, to a semantic approach. " 
The above argument bears immediately on the problem of the referential challenge. The 
pragmatic answer that Recanati is going to give to that challenge is termed by him the 
indeterminacy theory (Recanati 1989,1993). If we initially translate 'indeterminacy' as 
'nonspecificity', " then Recanati's theory seems to imply that the problem of non- 
univocality posited by the two potential readings of the definite article is not a problem 
of ambiguity but of nonspecificity or underspecification. And, consequently, 
'disambiguation' of nonspecific expressions is a problem of pragmatics and not 
semantics. We are just going to touch on Recanati's solution as our interest is put on the 
methodological conclusions rather than on the argument itself Recanati's solution is 
motivated by a distinction to be drawn at the level of what is said between the proposition 
" Recanati (op. cit., Ibid. ) 
" We say 'initially' in this context as, in strict sense, indeterminacy cannot be equated with 
underdeterm 1 nation and, therefore, with underspecification. In our opinion, underdetermination is an issue 
relative to context information alone whereas indeterminacy is a more general notion embracing, for example, 
indexicality, and vagueness. So, perhaps it would be better to equate indeterminacy with general non- 
univocality. Nevertheless, in the context of Recanati's theory, it seems clear that indeterminacy is used to 
mean something like nonspecificity or underdetermination only. 
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expressed and the external proposition. " The external proposition associated with the 
utterance of a sentence consists in indications "under which any utterance of this 
sentence would express a true proposition [ ... 
]. These conditions are invariant under 
contextual change, while the proposition expressed by the utterance, and therefore its 
truth-conditions, generally depend on the context" (Recanati op. cit., p. 289). Let us 
consider that a token T of the sentence'l am Chilean' has been actually produced. Since 
we know the (linguistic) meaning of the sentence, we automatically know what can be 
called the external truth-conditions of T (even, Recanati stresses, if we do not know 
what the context of utterance looks like). A token T of the sentence 'I am Chilead 
expresses a true proposition if and only if someone utters T and he or she is Chilean (at 
the time of utterance). The right-hand conditions of the biconditional correspond thus to 
the external proposition. One realizes that those conditions differ from the ones of the 
proposition expressed if one abstracts from the context and relies only on the linguistic 
meaning of T. Therefore, it is impossible to say which proposition is expressed because 
indeed without a context no proposition can be expressed. Once the context is taken into 
account, it turns out that T expresses the proposition that, for example, Isabel Allende 
(the supposed utterer of T) is Chilean. In terms of possible worlds,, that proposition can 
be then described as the set of worlds in which Isabel Allende is Chilean. By contrast, the 
external proposition of T tells us that it expresses a true proposition if and only if there 
is an x who utters T and who is Chilean (at the time of utterance). No utterance context 
knowledge needs to be invoked to establish that proposition. This explanation has the 
following methodological limitation: the external proposition embraces all conditions 
under which the utterance of a sentence expresses a true proposition, but it is impotent 
to tell us which of these conditions are contextual conditions, and which are truth- 
conditions proper. 
According to Recanati, given the difference between proposition expressed and external 
proposition, the question 'What is the meaning of 'The F is G7 loses much of its 
27 Stainaker uses the expression 'diagonal proposition' instead of 'external proposition'; see 
Stainaker (1978). 
See also Perry (1988) for something similar to the notion of 'external truth-conditions'. 
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philosophical perplexity. The implicature theorist is right in insisting that the 
(conventional) meaning of this sentence involves the general proposition that there is a 
unique F and that it is G. However, contrary to what the implicature theorist claims, it 
can be shown that this proposition is not the proposition expressed but only the external 
proposition. Given that at the first level of what is said the utterance of the sentence 'The 
F is G' externally expresses the general proposition in question, it is not difficult to 
explain why, at the second level, this sentence can express either a general or a singular 
proposition. Due to the methodological limitation already indicated, the external 
proposition of the utterance of 'The F is G tells us that such an utterance expresses a true 
proposition if and only if there is an x such that it is uniquely F and x is G. Nonetheless, 
the external proposition cannot tell us whether the condition that there be an x such that 
x is uniquely F is a contextual condition or a truth-condition proper. Here is Recanati's 
complete explanation of how then, under these conditions, disambiguation is possible. 
It follows that there are two posible interpretations, according 
to the context: in one type of context, the condition that there be 
an x such that x is uniquely F will be interpreted as a contextual 
condition, and the proposition expressed will be a singular proposition, 
true if and only if a (the object which satisfies the contextual condition) 
is G. In another type of context, the condition that there be an x 
such that x is uniquely F will be considered as a full-blooded 
truth-condition, and the utterance will express the general proposition 
that there is an x such that x is uniquely F and x is G. 
(Recanati op. cit., p. 29 1)28 
Even though we cannot give all the details here, indeed it would be unfair to accuse 
Recanatt's disambiguation treatment of reducing the analysis of referentially used 
descriptions to an analysis of indexicals and demonstratives. " in such a case, no relevant 
difference could be drawn between, for instance, sentences like 'The present speaker is 
Chilean' (where the description is referentially used) and 'I am Chilean. However, as 
" For more detail on this argument, see Recanati (1989). 
29 Neale (1990, pp. ] 10-113) makes wrongly this charge. Neale's account of Recanati's theory completely 
ignores within the latter the crucial distinction between the proposition expressed and the external 
proposition. 
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Recanati carefully shows, this is not the case. Recanati's theory enables us to 
straighforwardly explain why "the indeterminacy which characterizes description- 
sentences and makes them capable of two readings does not transfer to sentences in 
which a referential term occurs instead of a description" (Recanati op. cit., p. 292). 'o 
We believe that the Gricean enriched story constructed by Recanati meets completely the 
desiderata indicated earlier. First, we now have a convincing pragmatic explanation, 
embracing all the relevant data. Hence, a pragmatic explanation to be preferred over any 
semantic competitor, in accordance with Modified Occam's Razor. Second, Recanati's 
solution explains disambiguation in terms of the relation between the level of linguistic 
meaning and the level of the proposition expressed. In such an analysis, external truth- 
conditions play a crucial role determining the meaning of the sentence (its external 
proposition) for any possible situation or world and beyond the particular context of 
uterance. Due to their externality, such truth-conditions keep the sentence indeterminate. 
What disambiguates the sentence is the provision of an actual context of utterance at the 
level of what is said. However, at that level, the proposition expressed is ftee, that is, it 
is not totally controlled by the linguistic meaning of the utterance, in the sense that the 
latter does not take us from a context to a proposition. It just underdetermines what is 
said. Third, the enriched theory retains, with some modifications, several important tenets 
of Grice's theory, for instance, the three levels of meaning, the idea that conversational 
implicatures are part of what is not literally expressed etc. Finally, even though Recanati 
rejects some principles and processes underlying Grice's account of the pragmatics of 
what is said, he takes special care to replace those principles with other cognitively- 
orientated ones. 31 
' In his (1993), Recanati has implemented a new solution for the disambiguation problem, which he calls the 
Synecdoche Theory. Although this is a non-Russellian theory, it preserves most advantages of the 
Indeterminacy Theory-in particular, the idea that the problem of non-univocality of readings of the definite 
article is, in fiLct, a problem of nonspecificity and not of semantic ambiguity-and also allows us to deal with 
a recalcitrant difficulty of descriptions, the 'functional' uses of descriptions, 
i. e., uses like the one in the 
sentence 'The president changes every four years'). 
31ReCanat' op. C' Ix. I it., chapter 14 and Append' 
62 
Recanati's theory seems attractive enough as a basis to explain in terms of nonspecificity 
the non-univocality generated by descriptions in different contexts, and-if Neale and 
others are right on usage of quantifiers, the non-univocality of quantifiers and quantified 
phrases in discourse. Also, since our explanations of the anaphonc phenomena to be 
examined in the following chapters will involve interpreting such phenomena in terms 
of nonspecificity, it must be clear that we are going to take quite seriously Grice's 
enriched story as a background for our explanations. This implies that in our analyses of 
non-univocal interpretations of anaphoric sentences, disambiguation will mostly be based 
on the level of what is said rather than on the level of what is communicated. Also, our 
analyses will presuppose the concepts of external proposition and external truth- 
conditions, as expressing the conventional meaning of a sentence. Therefore, the 
interpretations or specifications that we are going to obtain for the anaphoric sentences 
will be the result of interaction between literal truth-conditions and contextual conditionsl 
in a close parallel with the disambiguation of prima facie attributive-referential 
ambiguities. 
2.1.5 Com pletin the new stoty: noMpeciLici(y ofreference 
Nonspecificity or underspecification is a phenomenon that has just recently gained 
recognition among pragmatists and semanticists. Semanticists have been seriously 
concerned with the problem of representing quantificationally underspecified sentences. " 
Pragmatists have, in their turn, focused on several issues, being perhaps the problem of 
the disambiguation of reference the most discussed one. Recent discussions about the 
nature of the uses of all kinds of referring expressions , invoke notions such as 
underspecification, nonspecificity or underdetermination (Sperber and Wilson (1986), 
Bach (1987), Atlas (1989), Recanati (1993)) in order to provide empirically adequate 
explanations. Most theories dealing with reference of the speaker accept that non- 
univocality of a referential expression is a manifestation of nonspecificity or 
underspecification. Nevertheless , insofar as these authors 
have refined their views, they 
32 See van Deernter and Peters (1996) 
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have realized that recognition by the hearer of the intended meaning by the speaker is 
sometimes less transparent than expected, despite obtaining commUnIcative success. The 
sentences below (sentence (2) was already discussed) can illustrate the point. 
(2) He has bought John's book. 
(3) He saw the man who Jones was after. 
As we have seen, the literal meaning of the referring expressions contained in the 
sentences (2)-(3) underdetermine their interpretation. Thereby, according to Recanati, it 
is evident that just at the level of what is said the hearer can recognize and capture the 
intended meaning by the speaker. That is, recognition of meaning is possible if and only 
if, in the case of (2), the hearer has identified the referents of 'he', 'John, 'John's books' 
and, according to Recanati,, the relation that is supposed to hold between John and the 
book. In the case of (3), if and only if the hearer has identified the referents of 'he', 'Jones', 
'the man who Jones was aftee, and, presumably, the relation holding behind'Jones was 
after [the manf. Once the hearer obtains the required identifications, the referents 
intended by the speaker are recognized and the meaning of the utterances inferred. This 
suggests that, on the hearer side, successive recognition of the meaning of a utterance is 
an exhaustive, although often imperfect, process, at least as far as referential expressions 
are concerned. 
Nevertheless., we believe that there at least two reasons to think that the story is, on this 
point, more complex than this. In the first place and as a matter of intuitions, a hearer 
can recognize the propositions expressed in (2)-(3) in quite poor utterance contexts, 
wherein the background information allows her to only identify the referents of the 
referring expressions. Hence, it is not entirely exact to say, as Recanati does, that a 
complete identification of the relations holding in'John's book'and'Jones was after [the 
manf is needed in order to secure understanding of what is said by uttering (2)-(3). It is 
perfectly possible, for instance, to understand what is said in (2) in a situation where both 
the hearer and the speaker do know the referents of 'he', 'John', and have just seen the 
referent of 'he' carrying one particular book, what prompts the speaker to utter (2) 
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(presumably pointing to the book). In addition, let us suppose that, due to the particular 
contextual circumstances, the only information that the hearer has about 'John's book' is 
that neither the book was written by John nor it was sought by John. As far as we can say, 
this information continues to underdetermine, on the hearer side,, the kind of relation 
holding between John and the book. Indeed, it does necessarily not entail any particular 
reading, for instance, that the referent of 'he' bought the book from John, the original 
owner. Nevertheless, it seems quite difficult to contend that this residual 
underdetermination prevents the hearer from delivering context-dependent truth- 
conditions of the utterance, relevant enough in the context of utterance. Such contextually 
relevant truth-conditions will be those that do not violate any truth-condition that the 
speaker could entertain in the conaxt of utterance and belong to the proposition 
expressed. Equally important it is that, as hearer's conditions lack enough contextual 
enrichment of one of the expressions of speaker's utterance, such conditions will be less 
specific than, and dependent on, speaker's conditions. However, the hearer's truth- 
conditions will be consistent with the pressumption that the speaker is observing the 
Gricean maxims of conversation. 
Secondly, there seems to be a gap between using a definite description referentially and 
the actual way that the speaker is thinking of the referent. As Bach (1987,1994) argues, 
if the speaker is using 'the F referentially, presumably "he must be thinking of the 
referent in some other way that just as the F. He could be thinking of it under some other 
description, in some non-descriptive way, or, mixing the two, under an indexical 
description" (Bach 1987, p. 118). If we abbreviate this other way of thinking of the F with 
the singular term d, then d is a term of unspecified type entertained by the speaker that 
translates something like'what I [the speaker] have in mind (about the F)'. "Thus, it turns 
out that the speaker believes that d is the F and, as Bach suggests, ordinarily, "it will be 
mutually believed by speaker and audience that d is the P (Bach, op. cit. lbid, note 9). 34 
'3See Bach (op. cit. p. 301). 
" As Bach remarks, it is also possible that the speaker might believe only that the hearer believes that d is the 
F or even that the hearer believes that the speaker believes that d is the F. 
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Nevertheless, the important issue here is that the speaker need not be expressing the 
belief that d is the F whenever he uses it referentially. Otherwise, the process of inferring 
the intended meaning would, on the hearer side, become something like a mind-reading 
process. In Bach's words 
[ ... Tlhat requires intending the hearer to think of the referent 
as d and the speaker may have no such intention. In using'the F 
referentially, he is making an objectual reference. His referential 
intention is to be expressing a belief about the object that he 
presumably takes to be the F. but it does not specify how the 
hearer is to think of that object. It is satisfied if the hearer does 
think of that object in some way or another (perhaps under 
some other description), taking that object to be the one the 
speaker is expressing a belief about (Bach, op. cit., p. 118-) 
This leaves open the possibility that whenever referential uses do not express the belief 
of the speaker that d is the F, i. e. speaker's intending the hearer to think of the referent 
as d, the reference recognized by the hearer remains unspecified or nonspecific. In such 
a case,, the thinking of the hearer depends just on what the speaker iewpresses and intends 
him to think. However, the way in which the speaker is actually thinking of the F as d is 
not accessible to the hearer. Bach states the point as follows. 
This leaves open the possibility that the hearer is thinking 
of the object in no other way than as the one the speaker 
is twpressing a belief about. That is a case of what I call 
UNSPECIRED reference, in which the object the hearer 
the hearer actually thinks of depends on the object the 
speaker is thinking of and intends him to be thinking of. 
(Bach op. cit., p. 118, note 10) 
Bach's suggestion about the presence of unspecified or nonspecific reference in the 
process of disambiguation of definite descriptions is , in part, a psychological claim. 
Interesting as it may be, the claim can however be challenged by semanticists. 
Semanticists could contrast Bach's assertion about nonspecific referents with the 
necessity of having identity criteria to identify the referents of our expressions. That is, 
criteria according to which an object can be individuated if and only is they tell us what 
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must be the case for something to be the same thing as that object. " Nevertheless, 
increasing evidence coming from psychological and cognitive research points out that 
identity criteria are not always operative in actual cognitive situations. For instance, 
Dretske has argued that one can refer to an object, or think of an object, without knowing 
what sort of object it is. Here is part of his argumentation. 
Perceptual beliefs of a certain sort-what philosophers call de re 
beliefs (e. g. that is moving)-are often as silent as gauges about 
what it is they represent, about what topic it is on which they comment, 
about their reference. Clyde can see a black horse in the distance, 
thereby getting the information about a black horse (say, that is 
near the bam), without getting the information that it is a black 
horse-without in other words, seeing what it is. Just as a gauge 
represents the gas level in my tank without representing it as the 
amount of gas in my tank, Clyde can have a belief about (a 
representation qj) my horse without believing that it is (without 
representing it as) my (or even a) horse. (Dretske, 1988, p. 73 )36 
We believe Dretske's example and other similar ones often occur in perception situations 
and thereby confer psychological reality to the phenomenon of referential nonspecificity. 
Consequently, the psychological presence of unspecified or nonspecific reference shows, 
in our opinion, that disambiguation of referring expressions and, in particular, of definite 
descriptions, is a more complex process than on first thought. For the determination of 
referential usage of descriptions will, in many cases, not imply an exhaustive 
specification of the intended referents. Thus, if speakers and hearers to entertain (in 
successful communication situations) thoughts about such referents and there is indirect 
psychological evidence supporting such thoughts, a promising line of research dealing 
with unspecified or nonspecific referents can be envisaged. One crucial contribution to 
the development of this line of research is to show systematic applications of the notion 
of unspecified or nonspecific reference both in pragmatics and semantics. We are going 
" See Geach (1957) 
t on accord' The mode of presentation involved in Drestke's example is crucial in human cogm I ing to some 
psychologists; see Kahneman and Treisman (1994), and Treisman (1992), apud 
Recanati, (1993, pp. 170- 
172). 
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to face the problem of the applications very directly in this thesis. In order to deal with 
this problem we should be able to show how incorporation of nonspecific referents takes 
place in our semantic representations. This will be done for the particular area of 
pronominal anaphora in chapters five and six. 
To sum up, we have seen that the enriched story delineated by Recanatt allows us to 
explain quite plausibly disambiguation of definite description uses. It takes place at the 
level of what is said and is a consequence of specifying the underdetermined content of 
the conventional meaning of description utterances. Such a specification is carried out 
in accordance with Gricean enriched pragmatic-cognitive background. Thus 
disambiguation is only possible if we accept a distinction, according to the enriched story, 
between the external proposition (the external truth-conditions) and the proposition 
expressed. Finally, and more important for our purpose, disambiguation of referential 
usages at the level of what is said does not imply complete or exhaustive specification 
of the reference. In some cases at least, there are good philosophical and cognitive 
reasons to assume something like unspecified or nonspecific referents as a proper notion 
in pragmatics and semantics. This notion, as we hope to show, has useful applications in 
different cases of referential nonspecificity. 
We have dealt in this section with several arguments about referential nonspecificity, 
which will be a core notion in our dissertation. Referential nonspecificity is concerned 
with just referring expressions, i. e. non-sentential expressions, not with the sentences 
containing them. Indeed nonspecificity of non-sentential expressions has a direct impact 
on nonspecificity of the sentences containing them, since if the non-sentential expressions 
are nonspecific, so the sentences containing them will be. Sentential nonspecificity is 
what is usually termed senwndc nonspecificity by linguists. The goal of the next section 
will thus be explain in some detail that notion. 
2.2 Semantic Nonspeciflicity: Some Definitions and Properties 
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First we give the general definition of semantic nonspecificity that we shall use in this 
dissertation. It is derived from work by Pinkal (1995), which to a certain extent draws 
from work by Fine (1975) regarding vagueness and degrees of truth. At this stage, it is 
important to keep in mind that more than offering a definidon of nonspecificity, we shall 
try to offer an idealized criterion, based on Pinkal's work, to distinguish nonspecific 
sentences from ambiguous and vague ones only. This clarification has, at least, the 
following consequences: 
(a) we are not claiming that, by using the criterion, a line can be drawn in single case 
between nonspecific sentences and non-univocal sentences. Thus, on the one hand, the 
criterion is not a yes-or-no test but at best a methodological idealization, and, on the other 
hand, in accordance with Pinkal, we accept that in everyday language we find enough 
merged cases of ambiguity, vagueness and nonspecificity as to make any such a test 
inoperative in practice. 
(b) We are not either implying that the criterion allows us to establish if a sentence is 
completely univocal, that is to say, completely specific. In that case, the criterion should 
presuppose something like an absolute or essential notion of nonspecificity. Talk about 
essentialism when examining nonspecificity, ambiguity or other similar semantic 
properties is, in our opinion, misleading and hopeless. Hence we believe that both 
nonspecificity and specificity-whatever they do mean-are relative or degree issues and, 
therefore,, we incline to talk about the relative specification of a (less specific) sentence 
or predicate, instead of talking about making a sentence or predicate absolutely specific. 
(c) finally, because of the application of the criterion, it is possible that other 'normal' (or 
univocal) sentences could be counted as nonspecific. We believe that this consequence 
should not affect our whole approach. Indeed, the crucial question of whether the whole 
everyday language or discourse is, to an important extent, nonspecific or underspecified 
in nature is out of the reach of this dissertation. A positive answer to that question,, 
though, would make our view about anaphora even more plausible. 
Before offering the aforementioned criterion we have to clarify some points regarding 
Pinkal's theory. Firstly, the focus of the theory is put on the notions of ambiguity and 
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vagueness rather than on nonspecifity. However, it permits us to deal with nonspecificity 
due to the systematic connection that it establishes among three notions: indefiniteness, 
Precisification, and specification. In general, Pinkal claims that a sentence is 
semantically indefinite if and only if, 
in certain situations, despite sufficient knowledge of the 
relevant facts, neither "true" nor "false" can be clearly 
assigned as its truth value (Pinkal 1995, p. 15) 
A typical example of that kind of sentence is 'Carlos Gardel was Argentinean, which, 
formulated as a question, would receive mostly an answer yes, sometimes a no answer, 
while some would probably avoid ayes or no answer. Also, the variety of answers could 
be traced to a variety of assumptions about events in the world by depending on the 
interpretation of the verbal phrase 'was Argentinean'. Presumably, for many of those 
answers, additional data will not clear things up further (for instance5 if the dispute is not 
focused precisely on Gardel's birthplace) in the sense that some will keep their yes 
answer,, others their no answer and finally some, while accepting that both kinds of 
answers are equally good, will keep dubious. As a result, one feels inclined to say that in 
general the sentence has no definite truth value. Pinkal adds that everyone will agree that 
such a sentence may receive a definite truth value in a precise context (for instance, if the 
dispute is precisely about Gardel's birthplace). Thus, this licences the following 
Precisification Principle: 
(PrecWfwadon Principle) A sentence is of indejInite truth value in a situation or conawt 
C if and only if it can be precisiftled alternatively to "true" or to "false" 
in such a context 
In other words, a linguistic expression is semantically indefinite if it has something like 
a 'potential' for being made precise with respect to a truth value in distinct contexts or 
situations. Furthemore, in accordance with compositionality, an expression (for example, 
a predicate) will be semantically indefinite "if it is responsible for the semantic 
indefiniteness of sentences in which it occurs as a subexpression" (Pinkal op-cit., p. 40). 
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So, the sentenceThe Santa Maria is a fast ship'containing the degree adjectivefast can 
be rendered precise either with respect to a context in whichfast is interpreted asfastfor 
a modern ship, in which case the sentence is false; or with respect to a situation in which 
fast is interpreted asfastfor a ship ofher age, in which case the sentence can be true or 
false, depending of the kind of comparison. " In summary, indefinite sentences have a 
'potential for precisification'to either truth value. Also, in the case of words, for example, 
predicates, such a potential will apply to domains of inviduals. In particular, according 
to Pinkal, since the denotations of the sentences containing predications are truth values, 
the meaning of predicates reduces to "a function from contexts to functions from objects 
to truth values" (Pinkal 1995, p. 41). Context-specific functions from objects to truth 
values subdivide the domain of individuals into two subsets, the positive and negative 
domain, if the predicates are precise. However, when predicates are the source of 
indefiniteness, they induce a partitioning into three subsets, namely, the positive, 
negative, and indefinite domains. Thus, they are alternatively precisified when we find 
out, so to speak, that the denotations, associated with their indefinite domains belong to 
the positive or negative domain of another (thereby more precise) predicate. " 
Now, ambiguity and vagueness are closely related phenomena, precisely because "both 
allow unproblematically precisifications" (Pinkal, op. cit., p. 72), and thereby both are 
indefinite. However, these phenomena can be differentiated-although not once and for 
all-if an additional criterion is introduced. Pinkal offers the following rationale for his 
criterion: 
There is apparently no quantitative criterion that can clearly 
" The example is from Poesio (1996) 
The technical definition given by Pinkal is as follows: 
Let di and d2 be possible denotations, of predicate expressions: dI is more precise than d2 if and 
only if (i) the positive (or negative) domain of dI includes the positive (or negative) domain d2, 
and (11) at least one object from the indefinite domain of d2 belongs to the positive or negative 
domain of dI (Pinkal op. cit., p. 55) 
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distinguish the effects of vagueness and ambiguity from each 
other. We may speak of ambiguity when we can detect any 
contours in the indefinite domain at all; when certain 
precisifications stand out in the continuum as standard 
precisifications [ ... ] conventionalized as "readings". We may 
speak of ambiguity in such cases, but we do not have to: 
whether an expression is ambiguous or only vague is a 
question that cannot be cleared up once and for all. 
Indefiniteness is perceived as ambiguity when alternative 
precisifications are predominant, as vagueness when an 
unstructured continuum presents itself (Pinkal 1995, pp. 75- 
6) 
Thus,, the criterion below, based on the continuity vs. discreteness contrast, should be 
applied taking into account the essential relativity to the context of communication. 
Amb-Vag: If the precisification spectrum of an expression is perceived as discrete, we 
may call it ambiguous; if it is perceived as continuous, we may call it vague. 
By contrast, nonspecific sentences and expressions need not any precisification, 
according to the definition above. In particular, nonspecific predicates are always 
(relatively) specified-not precisified-from a positive domain to another positive one, 
which shows that they cannot give rise to indefiniteness. " Pinkal makes the point clear 
enough as follows: 
The notion of precisification must not be confused with that 
of specification. The precisification relation betwen 
predicates is based on the indefinite domain. But it is the 
positive domain that is crucial to the relation of specification 
(Pinkal, op. cit., p. 57). 
Pinkal introduces then the specification relation between predicates by means of the 
following principle. 
" See Poesio (1996, pp. 159-201); the distinction between indefiniteness-in the sense of vagueness-and 
generality or nonspecificity can be traced back to Black (1937). In addition, the first treatment of ambiguity 
and vagueness in terms of precisifications was proposed early on in Fine (1975). Finally, for a penetrating 
philosophical examination of vagueness and cognate matters see Williamson (1994). 
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[(Sp Pred)] A predicate F (in context c) is more specific than a predicate G if and only 
if the positive domain of F (in c) is included in the positive domain of G 
(in c). 
Finally, he makes the following warning about the recurrent confusion about 
precisification and specification. 
The complex predicatefastfor a sailing ship is in many 
contexts more precise thanfast, However, sailing ship is not 
more precise than ship or vessel [ .... 
] The sense of an 
expression appears to be more precise whenever the context 
in which is uttered is more specific. This parallelism may be 
responsible for the fact that "precisification" and 
"specification" are often not distinguished. But the main 
reason for the confusion of these two concepts in semantic 
literature (and of the corresponding pairs of concepts 
"precise"P'specific" and Nague"P'general") probably lies in 
the fact that generality [or nonspecificity] and indefiniteness 
can lead to the same pragmatic defect of utterances: to a lack 
of informativeness (Pinkal, op. cit., pp. 57-8)'o 
We can now show the result of assuming Pinkal's indications above by using concrete 
examples. The standard example of nonspecificity "My sister is the Ruritarian secretary 
of state" (see Zwicky and Sadock 1975), if true, will be true only if no potential 
specification in a given context of the (indexical) term my sister (for instance, age, 
academic career, political background etc. ) changes its truth, i. e. if it does not render the 
sentence in question false. Concerning nonspecific predicates we have a similar situation. 
For instance, a sentence like "John is between 1.60m and 1.70m in height", if true, will 
be true only if no potential specification of the predicate is between 1.60m and 1.70m in 
height (for instance, is 1.65m. in height) changes its truth, i. e. if it does not render the 
sentence in question false. Intermediate possibilities can be imagined as well. With 
respect to falsity, the inverse variety can be found: the sentence "Wilfredo is between 
1.90 and 2.00m. in height, " if false, will be false only if none specification in the range 
'0 Pinkal points out that, in fact, there appears to be a certain tradition concerning such a confusion coming 
from Russell(] 923) in philosophy, and Lakoff (1970) and Kempson (1977) in linguistics. 
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between 1.90 and 2.00m. changes its falsity, i. e. if it does not render the sentence in 
question true. As a result of the examples above, it seems clear that, in accordance with 
compositionality, specification of a nonspecific expression will allow us to complete the 
specification of the sentences containing it, but the latter specification will not imply any 
effect on their truth-value. 
In addition, Pinkal's theory suggests how we can account for the differences and relations 
among ambiguity, vagueness and nonspecificity in terms of the range of readings and the 
borders of the application domain associated with each of them. On the one hand, 
ambiguous sentences (or their lexical items) can hardly determine a'common'range of 
readings that entitles us to decide whether the sentence in question is true or false. 
Usually the readings generated by ambiguous sentences are semantically (and logically) 
unrelated. On the other hand, we know that additional precisifications of a vague 
sentence will generate alternative truth-value assignments for the same sentence. 
However, , unlike ambiguous sentences, vague sentences (as well as nonspecific ones) 
denote a common range of readings. This entails, according to Pinkal, that the range of 
precisification of vague sentences possesses internal continuity. " As expected, the 
difference between nonspecific and vague sentences comes into focus when both are 
compared with respect to the sharpness of borders of their domain of application. Vague 
predicates, and hence vague sentences, do not seem to have clear limits at all, but rather 
a fuzzy zone between the positive and the negative domain of application-consider 
simply the predicate is of average height. ' Nonspecific predicates, on the contrary, 
denote in most cases domains with sharp boundaries--consider the predicate is between 
1.60m. and 1.70m. in height-and, consequently, sharper ranges of readings . 
4'Finally, as 
41 Anyhow, it is not entirely clear whether internal continuity is a necessary condition of vagueness; see 
Pinkal (1995, p. 75). 
'2 See Sainsbury (199 1) for a discussion of vagueness and boundaries. 
' See PMkal (1995, pp. 57,74); these distinctions are also implicit in Williamson (1994). Kooij (197 1, pp. 
117-21) contains a more linguistic discusssion of the distinction between ambiguity, vagueness, and 
nonspecificity. It is worth noting here that Kooij in his early work already refuses to represent the meaning 
of a nonspecific word by means of a disjunction of senses of the form 'S Iv S2 v ... v 
Sk'. He states two 
reasons for that refusal. First, the disjunctive view of nonspecificity reduces nonspecificity to some sort of 
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suggested by Pinkal, lack of boundaries may lead us to assume that vague sentences 
support many (perhaps an infinite number of) precisifications in the range of readings. 
By contrast, nonspecific sentences seem to support only a few of them. 
In conclusion, we can formulate the following criterion of nonspecificity for sentences. 
A nonspecific sentence S is a sentence that satisfies the following conditions: 
(i) when S is uttered in a context C., it is definitely true or false for the interpreters in C 
within a range R of situations s,, ... i-Sk; 
00given any potential specification in R, S 
preserves the original truth-value (true or false) assigned to it (and therefore is made 
specifically tTue or false of one of the situations s in R); " (i ii) there is no serious problem 
for interpreters to determine the (conventional) boundaries of R in the spectrum. 
Thus, condition (1) allows us to distinguish nonspecificity from mere vagueness because 
vague sentences-such as'W. Quine is bald or'That is not a heapý-in (normal) utterance 
circumstances are not definitely true or false and because such a lack of definiteness is 
always due to the difficulty of drawing clear boundaries for the range of situations or 
readings. Condition (ii) allows us to distinguish nonspecificity from ambiguity because 
(structurally) ambiguous sentences,, such as 'the shooting of the hunters was terrible', may 
ambiguity, i. e. to a sequence of discrete and unrelated senses. Second, such a view turns hyponymy or 
superordination of meanings into a redundant relation because superordinate or generic words (such as 
coloured or animal ) must be defined, not in terms of their sense relations with the subordinate words, but 
rather in terms of the subordinate words themselves, which leads to descriptive absurdities. Together with 
these reasons can be added that the disjunctive view offers no help in dealing with ambiguity, as indicated 
by Poesio (1996), van Deemter (1996) and Atlas (1988), among others. Finally, it should be noticed that 
traditional views (inspired by Mill's distinction between denotation and connotation of a term) that take 
nonspecificity to be generic in nature, i. e. as realizing the idea of a 'genus-species' relationship tend to 
endorse the disjunctive view. The reason is that in such a case the meaning of the nonspecific word (the 
genus) is given by its connotation (its species), thus generating disjunctive meanings out of the latter. Hence 
generic views of nonspecificity are directly subject to the previous criticisms. 
' For discussion on this criterion see Pinkal (1995, p. 75). 
The criterion of nonspecificity above is a sentential, not lexical, one. Nevertheless, there is an obvious way 
to connect the two criteria: a lexical nonspecific item (a nonspecific term or predicate) Is one which is 
satisfied for a certain precise range of objects-the positive domain or the extension of the term-, and such 
that any additional specification of it (for instance, applying it to a certain subset of objects in the range) 
preserves the original satisfaction. 
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change their original truth-value given a certain specification (or precisification) in a 
certain context (see QT in section 4.2). Also, conditions (i)-(iii) assume that speakers or 
interpreters obey in general cooperative conversational maxims when uttering 
nonspecific sentences. Therefore, the application of the Amb-Vag criterion in typical 
cases of nonspecificity will be completely irrelevant. 
Now in order to apply the conditions above we examine some typical examples of 
nonspecific sentences. 
(4) An ape escaped from the Zoo. 
(5) Being a parent can be hard work. 
(6) Mary went to the University. 
(7) Mary is between 1.70 m. and 1.80m. in height. 
(8) The King will attend. (Bach 1987) 
(9) 1 love you too. (Bach 1982) 
(10) [The philosophy lecturers in my college] , consider that they, are underpaid. 
Sentence (4),, if true in a given context, will remain true under any potential specification 
of the term ape-orangu-tan, gorilla, chimpanzee, etc. Sentence (5), if true in a given 
context, will remain true under any potential specification ofparent-for instance, male 
parents, female parents, British parents, tall parents, etc . 
4'The same applies to sentences 
(6)-(8). Sentence (9) is interesting because its nonspecificity is not just the result of the 
indexicality of the personal pronouns and linguistic information provided by the adverbial 
particle too. The intended meaning of (9) is systematically context-dependent and, in 
particular, depends on mutual knowledge shared by speaker and hearer about the 
utterance circumstances of the sentence I love yotf. The result is a wide range of readings 
' It is worth emphasising that although the criterion above does allow errors of specification in the range of 
readings on interpreters' part, such errors Will not affect the property of preserving the original truth value of 
nonspecific sentences. If, for example, an interpreter wrongly specifies an ape by means of an orangu-tan 
instead of a gorilla, the first specification makes equally true sentence (4). Errors of specification are context- 
dependency issues and therefore they are not related to the semantical constraints on nonspecific sentences. 
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and thus of potential specifications. " Sentence (10) shows that anaphoric pronouns can 
be subject to the same nonspecificity affecting personal pronouns. Since the 
interpretation, in that sentence, of the plural description 'the philosophy lecturers in my 
college' depends on the specification of my college, the anaphoric pronoun they will 
inherit the nonspecificity of its antecedent. Finally, the explanations above clarify a 
characteristic clearly associated with nonspecific sentences: their context-sensitivity. That 
sensitivity seems to always be located in some constituent of the sentence that operates 
as a parameter of specification, for instance, in the case of some of the sentences (4)-(10) 
above, the noun phrases (my sister), pronouns (they), adverbs (too) or parametric 
predicates (is over fifty, or is between Im. and 6m. ). It is interaction between the 
contextual information associated with these parameters and another (linguistic or 
extralinguistic) information that provides the relevant specifications of such sentences. 
In (9), it is the contextual information associated with the utterance of too that deten-nines 
the range of specifications. For example, if we know that the utterance of that adverb has 
not been prompted by the previous utterance of 'I love you', then we have to discard direct 
reciprocity. In other words, we have to discard that reading which says that just as the 
hearer loves the speaker, so the latter loves the former. This decision not only sharpens 
the borders of the range of readings but also clarifies the role played by the adverb in the 
semantic structure associated with the sentence (9). 
We can now examine a particular kind of nonspecific sentence bearing closely on the 
issues to be discussed in the following chapters. These sentences contain plurals, i. e. they 
are sentences containing plural NPs in both subject and object positions. Sentences of this 
sort are (11)-(12) below, where the speakers exploit different contexts to say things about 
more than one individual, namely, about a set, group or collection of individuals. 
(11) Two men sang two songs. 
47There are at least three remaining readings of (4): (a) that the speaker loves the hearer and someone else 
too; (b) that like someone else, the speaker too loves the hearer, or (c) that the speaker has love as well as 




(12) The philosophers travelled to Stuttgart. 
Before explaining these and other cases it is necessary to indicate that the general claim 
about the nonspecificity of plural sentences, and the plural NPs in them, has not passed 
unchallenged. As one might expect, the objections have come from theorists endorsing 
an ambiguity view of sentences like (11) and (12). 4' Despite the controversy created by 
these objections, we think that the prospects for an ambiguity theory of all plural 
sentences and,, thereby, of all plural NPs in them, are not compelling. Given that a 
detailed discussion of plural sentences would fall beyond the scope of the present 
investigation, the previous conclusion relies on the arguments and results that the 
41 nonspecificity vs. ambiguity controversy about plurals has provoked in recent literature. 
Consequently, in our opinion, an analysis of most Plural sentences in terms of 
nonspecificity, based on the methodological groundwork delineated in this section, 
continues to be preferable. This methodological framework dictates that sentences such 
as (11) and (12), if true in a context C, remain true under any potential specification of 
their range of readings in C. On the other hand, (11) and (12), if false in a situation or 
context C, do not become true under any specification of their range of readings in C. 
This conclusion requires ftirther substantiation. It must be shown in particular how plural 
sentences generally match the main features of nonspecificity isolated in the beginning 
of this section, namely, contextual parameterization, continuity, and sharpness of the 
range of readings. 
Sentences containing plural NPs are usually open to two well-known interpretations: 
distributive interpretations, in which the VP of the sentence says something about each 
of the entities taken in by the NP (in subject or object position) with which the VP 
combines,, and collective interpretations, in which the VP of the sentence says something 
' Gillon (1984,1987) formulate the most well-known theory of ambiguity of plurals. Also see Schein (1993). 
The criticism of Gillon's semantics was initiated by Lasersohn (1989). Gillon replied in Gillon (1990). The 
criticism was continued by van der Does (1992,1993a), Verkuyl (1993), Lasersohn (1995) and Verkuyl and 
van der Does (1996). See also for further discussion Lonning (199 1) and Schwarzschild (199 1). 
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about the entities as a whole (a group or collection) taken in by the NP with which the VP 
combines. For example, the preferred interpretation of sentences (13)-(14) below is the 
distributive interpretation whereas the preferred interpretation of sentences (15)-(16) is 
the collective interpretation. 
(13) Every boy ate two burgers. 
(14) Some musicians played a solo. 
(15) Four musicians played a quartet. 
(16) John and Ivonne are a happy couple. 
Nevertheless, plural sentences often give rise to non-univocality with respect to one 
reading or another. For example, consider (17)-(19) below. 
(17) Two men lifted one table. 
(18) The two senators travelled to the convention. 
(19) John and Ivonne earned exactly f2OOO this month. 
Sentence (17) can be interpreted collectively as saying that the two men as a group lifted 
the table,, or distributively as saying that each man lifted one table. On the distributive 
reading, sentence (18) implies that the senators have travelled separately to the 
convention, whereas on the collective reading, it implies that the senators have travelled 
together. On the distributive reading, sentence (19) implies that John and Ivonne earned 
f2000 each; read collectively it implies that they earned as a group f2000. In these cases 
the range of readings is restricted to either complete distributivity (which can be 
expressed by the adverb separately) or complete collectivity (which can be expressed by 
the adverb together). This might suggest simple ambiguity of the sentences. Nevertheless, 
one striking aspect of plural sentences is the number of intermediate possibilities of 
interpretation that they offer (whatever the internal factor involved). " Thus, these 
I There are at least three possible internal sources which may explain the emergence of the whole range of 
plural readings: the NPs (whether in subject or object position), the VPs, or quantifier scope. The first source 
has been explored and defended, among others, by Lakoff (1972), Kroch (1974) and Gillon (1987,1990, 
1992). The second source has been explored and defended, among others, by Hoeksema (1983), Scha (198 1), 
Link (1983,1987), Lonning (1987), Landman (1989), Lasersohn (1988,1989) and Schwarzschild (199 1, 
1992). The third possible source has been defended by Mc Cawley (1968), Kroch (1974) and Higginbotham 
and Schein (1989). A fourth possibility, which sees the construal of readings as the consequence of 
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possibilities extend the range of readings between completely distributive and completely 
collective readings. Consider, for example, the following sentences: 
(20) Three men lifted three tables. 
(2 1) The three senators travelled to three conventions. 
(22) John and Ivonne ate three large pizzas. 
(23) The musicians wrote three operas. 
Some semanticists take it that (20) may generate at least four readings. " Besides the 
standard collective (the group of three men lifted a total of three tables) and the standard 
distributive reading (each man lifted three, perhaps differeq, tables), it also allows a 
semidistributive (the three tables were each lifted by perhaps different groups of three 
men) 52 and a cumulative reading (three men each lifted the same set of three tables). " 
Sentences (21) and (22) are amenable to the same analysis, with the semidistributive 
reading presumably corresponding to the marked or non-preferred case. Sentence (23) 
cannot clearly exclude any reading. Finally, since each reading can be associated with a 
different set of truth-conditions, semanticists usually formulate structures (whether in 
terms of logical scope mechanisms, set-theory, lattice-theory or other formal languages) 
to formally capture those conditions. " 
It is worth, at this stage, asking the question of whether the aforementioned readings, or 
a greater (though fixed) number of them, exhaust the meaning of plural sentences like 
(20)-(23). Some theorists have given a positive answer to that question whereas others 
remain sceptical. We have two good reasons to agree with the second theorists. The first 
reason has to do with the assumption, taken for granted by the first theorists, that the 
interpreting the combination of NPs and VPs, has been suggested by Roberts (1987). 
5' Scha (198 1), Link (1983), Lonning (1987), van der Does (1992,1993a), Verkuyl and van der Does (1996), 
Kempson and Cormack (198 1 a). 
" Schein (1993) 
" Cumulative readings were firstly noted and distinguished in Scha (198 1). 
" Gillon's semantics of plurals is a case in point. He suggests dealing with the multiple readings of plural 
sentences by introducing a new set-theoretical apparatus in terms of 
"minimal covers". 
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potential readings of plural sentences can be specified by means of logical devices that 
are not sensitive to information other than the one coming from the literal or grammatical 
meaning of the sentences. Usually, this information is encapsulated in (implicit or 
explicit) parameters of different type, according to the nature of the sentence. In the case 
at issue the parameters should incorporate non-grammatical information affecting the 
processing of the pluralities. The second reason to disagree with those theorists that 
accept (logical) exhaustiveness of readings is that they seem to have a misleading or 
limited idea about what specification means, even those that expressly support an 
analysis of plural sentences in terms of nonspecificity. All these theorists, it seems to us, 
think about specification in absolute terms. Therefore, they think that deployment of all 
(logically possible) readings of plural sentences is all we need to represent the complete 
meaning of the latter. We believe that this conclusion is hopeless. 
To appreciate the cogency of the above reasons, let us formulate a possible logical form 
of the collective reading of sentence (20) inspired by a nonspecificity analysis of plural 
sentences given by Kempson and Cormack (1981 a). To logically represent the reading 
in question we will introduce restricted quantifiers ranging over sets. We will henceforth 
call that notation remicted set notation. This notation involves restricted quantifiers with 
set variables in their restriction. " Set variables in the restriction can therefore stand for 
arguments of predicates (or properties), for example, the predicates is three, is large or 
is more than ha6(of Restricted quantifiers will correspond to second-order formulae. By 
contrast,, the scope of those quantifiers will correspond to (unrestricted) first-order set- 
theoretic formulae determining scope interactions as usual. Thus, Kempson and Cormack 
contentiously postulate, by appealing to some arguments that we are going to examine 
in chapter five, that (24) below is the most non-specific (the 'weakest') logical form of 
(20) (X corresponds to the set of men, 'S' to the set of tables and U to the predicate lift; 
for more detail see chapter five, section 5.1). 
(24) [[-: ýX: IXI ý: 3] [AS- JSJý: 3] [(ýIx)xeXI [(Els)sGS]] (Lxs) 
55 Restricted sets are used, with differences in the notation, by McCawley(l 993) and Schein (1993). 
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The inforinal paraphrase of (24) will read as: there are at least three men for at least one 
of whom it is true that he lifted a table and there are at least three tables for at least one 
of which it is true that a man lifted it. " Intuitively, it can be recognised that (24) Is 
completely nonspecific concerning the normal or literal meaning associated with (20) (for 
detailed discussion see chapter five). That is to say, the truth-conditions represented by 
(24) cannot reflect the conventional meaning or, by using the terminology of the previous 
section, the external truth-conditions associated with (20). In other words, hardly any 
hearer after utterance of (20) will infer that the intended meaning of the speaker is 
represented by the truth-conditions of (20). Controversial as (24) may be as a nonspecific 
reading of (20), Kempson and Cormack argue that they are able, by means of certain 
procedures, to derive a version of the collective reading of (20) (that Kempson and 
Cormack call incomplete group interpretation; see section 5.1). The structure so 
obtained from (24) is as follows: 
(25) [ý]X: IXI >3] [9S: ISI >3]([(Vx)xcX] ([(As)sESj(Lxs)) & [(Vs)scS] 
([(ý]x)xGXI(Lxs))) 
According to Kempson and Cormack, (25) should read as: there is a set of three men and 
a set of three tables such that for all members of the set of men there is a member of the 
set of tables that they lifted and for all members of the set of tables there is a member of 
the set of men that lifted them. " Thus structure (25), for Kempson and Cormack, 
expresses the collective reading-in the sense of an incomplete group reading-of (20), 
i. e. the interpretation according to which a group of three men lifted a total of three 
tables. According to the view set up in the previous section, what we can say is that the 
" See Kempson and Cormack (1981 a, p. 270). 
The first-order existential quantifiers may not be paraphrased by using "at 
least" here. Kempson and 
Cormackjustify this restriction by explaining that "[t]hls can be deduced from the 
logical forms; 'at least, is 
available as an entailment for some proposition Pn' With numerical quantifier 
Vj ust ifPn+l ' entails lpn,. 
The condition does not hold for [(25)]", Kempson and 
Cormack (1981 a, pp. 3034). 
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structure (25) represents one of the external propositions determined by the conventional 
or literal meaning of the sentence (20). The other external propositions would 
correspond, if consensus here is possible, to the readings pointed out above. Nevertheless, 
it is easy to envisage situations that show that the external proposition determined by (25) 
cannot be considered an exhaustive representation of the (relative) specifications of the 
meaning of (20) under the collective-or incomplete group-reading. For example, we 
can provide for (2 5) a situation that supposes a set A of men-A = {a, b, c) -and a set B of 
tables-B= I d, fg) -connected by means of the lift-relation. This situation then allows us 

















Cvi " býý ef 
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It is, we think, clear enough that (I)-(VI) are all (relative) specifications of (25). 
Therefore, this shows that the externality of the truth-conditions represented in (25) 
capture only part of the collective reading of (20). Thus, (I)-(Vl) belong to the level of 
what is said, i. e., they represent possible propositions expressed by (20), under its 
collective meaning-represented by (25). The same, under different specifications, is true 
of some of the other readings (the distributive reading will generate in the proposed 
situation at least 8 specifications). 
The foregoing shows that plural sentences can be strongly underspecified by their 
grammatical or conventional meaning. That is to say, it reinforces the claim supporting 
their nonspecificity. What is even more important is that our examples reinforce the 
acceptability of the distinction between the external proposition (determined by the literal 
meaning) and the proposition expressed, in processing non-univocal (utterances of) 
sentences. Furthermore, plural sentences can be seen as incorporating clear parametric 
factors, provided by both the structure of the sentence (linguistic constraints and lexicon) 
and contextual information. In the case of a sentence like (20), the parametric factor 
deriving from (I)-(VI) is something like what Barwise and Perry (1983) call a 'plural 
resource situation' associated with a set A. This resource situation says whether or not A 
may be interpreted as collection or group. That information can, for instance, be 
represented by means of '+Co11(A)'or'-Co11(A)' (implying in the latter case presumably 
distributivity of the elements of A). Plurality parameters will then help us to get relative 
specifications of plural sentences. By contrast, representation of (an utterance of) a plural 
sentence without using those parameters, such as it happens in (25) above, will qualify 
just as the external reading that we can associate with the sentence. Thus, the semantics 
of plural sentences raises on its own a central issue, which is whether or not and how we 
are to incorporate parametric information in nonspecific representations of sentences like 
(20), so that the rest of the external meanings can be generated (at the moment there are 
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several competing proposals). " 
Finally, as for the external reading of a non-univocal sentence, it express the different sets 
of truth-conditions of the sentence that rely only on the literal meaning. As Us, Ifs or 
DRSs determine such truth-conditions, they define the external readings (or external 
propositions) of sentences. Therefore, according to our explanations in the previous 
section, Us and the rest will not tell us which of those conditions are context-dependent. 
Parameters (in the case of plural sentences) or contextual coordinates (in the case of 
sentences containing indexicals) will do this job. Therefore, determination of the 
(relative) specifications of a non-univocal sentence involving crucially some plurality 
element, will give rise to a parameteiized representation of the sentence. This is the case., 
we shall argue so in chapters five and six, of some sentences containing pronouns 
unbound by their antecedents. 
" It can be said that, simplifying so much, the discussion about the nonspecificity or underspecification of 
plural sentences has to do with whether there is a primitive reading that Will generate the rest of the readings, 
i. e., the collective, distributive, cumulative, or semi distributive reading. 
The alternatives, roughly speaking 
again, are either taking as primitive a nonspecific or underspecified reading which is not included in the set 
of readings normally associated with the plural sentences or taking as primitive one of 
the readings in that set. 
Later, in section 5.1, we shall discuss some early attempts to implement the 
first alternative. Most recent 
discussions endorse the second alternative and include, among others, Verkuyl and van 
der Does (199 1) and 
Lasersohn (1995). For a general and updated discussion see Landman (1996). 
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CHAPTER M 
UNBOUND ANAPHORA AND D-TYPE THEORY 
The general aim of this chapter is to explore a particular theory of non-deictic anaphora 
in the framework of the LF view presented in chapter one. The theory in question sticks 
to the 'descriptive' view of anaphora and has been defended by S. Neale. One important 
advantage of Neale's theory is its applicability to a difficult problem confronting any 
anaphora theory: the so-called donkey anaphora problem. However, as the current 
literature on the topic makes it clear, Neale's theory has some important limitations. 
These limitations suggest a dilemma: either we profoundly modify the foundations of the 
theory or simply abandon it. The specific goal of this chapter is to show that such a 
dilemma is just apparent. Thus, we argue that there is no justification for abandoning 
Neale's theory, and , in the course of 
doing so, we show that the essential features of 
Neale's theory can remain unchanged. The important change, we propose , is rather 
methodological and concerns the nature of the phenomenon under study. That is to say, 
it concerns whether donkey anaphora is a truth-theoretically univocal phenomenon. We 
conclude that, if it is not, a modified version of Neale's theory can be adequately 
formulated and defended. 
In section L, we introduce the common framework that LF theories share and the 
problems generated by unbound anaphora (the type of anaphora which donkey anaphora 
belongs to) within that framework In section 2, we argue that the so-called E- or D-type 
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solution given by Neale to those problems is effectively more successful than other LF 
proposals. In section 3, we discuss a characteristic aspect of Neale's D-type theory, its 
hypothesis of neutrality of semantic number of donkey pronouns. Section 4 discusses 
several criticisms that Neale's theory has generated in recent literature. In section 5, we 
evaluate the consequences of those criticisms on Neale's D-type proposal and discuss the 
apparent alternatives left open. From these alternatives,, it follows that neither treatments 
based on quantification over events, nor treatments retaining uniqueness implications or 
insisting with bound donkey pronouns, are needed in an eventual modification of Neale's 
theory. Finally, what is needed, we claim, is a shift of focus. That shift is a consequence 
of abandoning Neale's commitments both to Geach's truth-conditional approach and to 
a strict Russellian treatment of donkey pronouns. 
3.1 The LF Treatment of Unhound Anaphora 
The anaphoric processes to be examined in this chapter suppose explicit referential 
dependency or coreference between expressions of a given sentence (or of a set of 
sentences). This means that we are not going to consider sentences which contain 
demonstratives or deictic terms as in (1) and (2). 
(1) He is a good teacher. 
(2) Tell him I do not want to work. 
(3)-(7) below reflect rather the type of anaphoric sentence that we will be focused on in 
this dissertation (italics are used for indicating coreference). 
(3) Jim commented on a paper he wrote. 
(4) Leyla commented on every paper she wrote. 
(5) Every woman buys a book she disapproves of 
(6) Some women buy a book they disapprove of 
(7) The president does not love his wife. 
Second, it is a common place in linguistics to represent referential 
dependencies by co- 
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the anaphoric expressions and their antecedents. In this way pronouns and their 
antecedents in (3)-(7) are better represented in (3')-(7') below. 
(Y) [Jim] I commented on a paper he I wrote. (4') [Leylabcommented on every paper she3wrote. 
(5') [Every woman] , buys a book she, disapproves of 
(6') [Some womenl2buy a book they2disapprove of 
(7) [The presidentl2does not love hs2wife. 
There are some technical worries surrounding co-indexing in linguistics', but they can 
be ignored without affecting our examination. That is to say, we assume that co-indexing 
is a useful device that can be used in most linguistic structures describing anaphonic 
processes. 
Given our discussion in chapter one, it is easy to understand now why there is widespread 
agreement among linguists and philosophers of language that analysis of sentences like 
(3)-(7) "provided a major impetus for exploration of how classical logic theories might 
shed light on natural language semantics" (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990, p. 30). 
Both semantical approaches to language-dealing with referentiality, quantification, and 
meaning-and theories more germane to linguistics and syntax-dealing with syntactic 
representation, binding, types of quantifiers, and levels of representation-have been all 
subject to intensive scrutiny because of work on the sort of anaphora instantiated by 
sentences (3)-(7). Generally speaking, anaphoric sentences like (3)-(7) pose a double 
challenge. On the one hand, they pose a particular challenge to theories that see the 
meaning of sentences as expressed by truth-conditions. Since such theories, as we saw, 
try to generate recursive accounts of meaning for a language, the inability to explain the 
anaphoric phenomena in (3)-(7) would eventually put in question the recursiveness and 
' Even though the introduction of co-indexing seems to suggest its interdefinibi lity With anaphon, city, this 
is not the case at least for three reasons. (a)being co-indexed with' is a symmetric relation whereas 'being 
anaphoric on' is an asymmetric relation. (b) 'being co-indexed with' is a syntactic relation whereas 'being 
anaphonc on'Is a semantical one. Thus, from (a) and (b), we can derive the following statement of the relation 
between coindexing and anaphoricity: if a is anaphorically dependent on P then a is co-Indexed With p. (c), 
in a strictly representational semantic theory, e. g. in Kamp's DRT, coindexing is not acceptable in all 
contexts-for instance, in temporal anaphora; see Kamp (199?, pp. 21-2). 
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formality of the entire truth-conditional project. On the other hand, sentences like (3)-(7) 
pose a challenge to syntactic theories. In particular, if syntactic theories do not offer a 
principled way of subsuming the anaphoric relations present in the sentences, the 
adequacy of the generalizations supporting those theories can be philosophically 
disputed. As is obvious, this limitation may become particularly serious for UG theories. 
Neale clearly formulates the two challenges above as follows. 
[A]ny adequate grammatical theory must provide an account 
of when a pronoun can be understood as anaphoric on some 
other NP (a name, a demonstrative, a restricted quantifier, 
another pronoun or even an empty NP ... 
). In addition, for 
every sentence S containing a pronoun P that is understood 
as anaphoric on some other NP, an adequate semantical 
theory must provide an account of the contribution that P 
makes to the truth conditions of S. (Neale 1993, p. 803) 
To ftuther clarify the significance of these challenges we need to introduce the following 
standard definition of 'is anaphoric on'. 
(8) An expression a is anaphoric on an expression P if and only if (1) the semantical 
value of a is determined, at least in part, by the semantical value of P, and (ii) a 
is not a constituent of P (therefore, P functions like the grammatical antecedent 
of a ). 
The challenge of explaining anaphoric relations, on the semantic side, can be restated 
now by means of the following question: given a well-formed syntactic structure S' of 
a sentence containing an expression P, anaphoric on another expression a, how are we 
to determine the semantic value of P? For expressions anaphoric on proper names, the 
answer is unproblematic: the semantic value of the pronoun is determined by the value 
of its antecedent. Therefore, as a consequence of (8) and the Tarskian principle that the 
referent R of a proper name is the bearer of the name R, the definition (9) below 
becomes part of a referential anaphora theory. 
(9) The semantic value of a pronoun [ Pi I that is anaphoric on a referring expression 
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I R, I is the semantic value of ý Ri 1, i. e. ReA ý Pi 1, s)= Ri 
So, if we apply the intuitive constraints (8)-(9) and the QR rule (see chapter one, section 
1.2) to a sentence such as (3), we generate the structure (10) at LF level. 
(10) [Np 
a2paper he, wrote]2 IS J'M1 commented on e2 I 
That the result in (10) is compatible with other structures constrained by Tarskian 
principles is clearly seen by the fact that (10) is isomorphic to the restricted quantifier 
logical form (RQ If) (11) below, which represents the correct truth-conditions for 
sentence (3). 
(11) [ an x: paper x& Jim wrote x ](Jim commented on x). ' 
The previous analysis, applicable to pronouns anaphoric on referring expressions, 
however, will not work for anaphoric sentences whose pronouns have noun phrases as 
their antecedents, for example, sentences (5)-(7) above. The basic reason for that is that 
an explanation of the content of such pronouns in terms of the truth-theoretic axioms that 
apply to their antecedents will fail. It is impossible, for example, to explain the truth- 
conditions of (5) above in terms of the truth-conditions of the sentence'every woman 
buys a book every woman disapproves of. From a semantic point of view, the natural 
option would be to look more carefully at the internal quantification mechanisms of 
sentences (5)-(7). In particular, we should ask , in accordance with 
definition (8), how do 
(restricted) quantifiers determine semantic values In first order logic? The answer is that 
they bind variables under their scope. Therefore, it may be suggested that pronouns 
occupying the same positions as variables at surface level can be treated the same way 
as variables treated at the If level, that is5 as bound variables. Moreover, as we saw in 
'For definitions (8) and (9) see Neale (1993). 
'Anyway, it should be noticed an important distinction between the LF structure (10) and the RQ If (11): the 
presence of the logical conjunction'&' in the latter, which separates the two open sentences in the restricted 
quantifier. 
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chapter one, at LF level, traces created by the QR rule admit an immediate assimilation 
to bound variables. Consequently, it is plausible to formulate the following 
generalization, based on suggestions made by Quine (1960) and Geach (1962): pronouns 
that,, at LF level, are anaphoric on non-referring expressions or quantifiers, operate as 
bound variables at If level. This generalization can be easily applied to our examples (5)- 
(7). For instance, for (5) ('every woman buys a book she disapproves of) we generate 
something like the RQ If structure in (12) below. (12) matches the truth-conditions 
associated with (5). 
(12) [every x: woman x] ([a y: book y&x disapproves y] (x buys y) ) 
On the other hand, if, at LF, we understand the pronoun she of (5) as coindexed to a trace, 
then a bound variable interpretation of the pronoun seems inevitable, as shown in (13). 
(13) [Np every woman, II[S INP [Npa book j[e, disapproves of e2l 12[, e, buys e, ] ]. 
Thus, e,, which stands for she in the LF (13), can clearly be understood as the occurrence 
of the variable Y in If (12). Furthermore, any other Tarskian structure representing (5) 
in a different way should be directly isomorphic to (12). That is to say, any Tarskian- 
motivated structure should be compatible with a treatment of (5), which describes the 
pronoun in question as a bound variable at the syntactic level. In this way, it seems that 
both the syntactic and the semantic challenge above are simultaneously satisfied within 
the framework of a unified theory of semantic representation. 
The bound variable approach, however, faces immediate problems when considering 
examples such as (14)-(16) below. 
(14) Mark caught some fish and Jim cooked them. 
(15) If Mark agrees with a neighbour, then Jim always disagrees with him. 
(16) Just one lecturer was dismissed and then he complained to the comission. 
From a semantic point of view, it is easy to envisage the difficulties. If we take for 
instance, the sentence (14) and formulate its RQ If as in (17), the interpretation obtained 
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becomes unacceptable. 
(17) [ some x: fish x] (Mark caught x& Jim cooked x) 
According to the usual interpretation of the bound variables in (17), that sentence can 
be true under the assumption that Mark caught twenty fish and Jim cooked just two of 
them. However, under such an assumption clearly (14) will be false since it requires that 
each fish caught by Mark be cooked by Jim. Moreover, the bound variable theory as 
applied to (14) goes against the standard logical analysis of conjunction if the theory is 
extended to other more complex cases. For although the theory in question 
entails-correctly-each conjunct of (14) separately ('Mark caught some fish! and'Jim. 
cooked some fish), it cannot do so when applied to e. g. (16). In this latter case, since the 
scope of the quantified phrase juv one lecturer covers the second conjunct, the pronoun 
he will be interpreted as bound by that phrase. Consequently, the theory in question will 
provide an incorrect analysis of the sentence, like in (16) below. 
(16') [Just one x: lecturer x] (x was dismissed &x complained) 
Structure (16') is wrong as an analysis of the logical conjunction in (16) because its truth 
cannot license the correct entailment of (16") below. That is to say, the correct entailment 
of the first conjunct of (16). This is due to the fact that the truth of (16') is compatible 
with the falsity of (16")-i. e. with a reading of (16) according to which more than one 
lecturer was dismissed-whereas it is incompatible with the truth of (16). 
(16 ") [Just one x: lecturer x](x was dismissed)'. 
Now, to explain what is wrong with the syntactic representation of sentences like 
(14)-(16) we must go back to some definitions and principles that we introduced in 
chapter one, section 1.2: the definition of the notion of c-command, the Binding 
constraint (BC) and the General Scope principle (GSP). From these principles, 
it is 
'For these and other problems with the bound variable analysis, see 
Neale (1990) and Evans (1977,1980). 
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possible to derive the following crucial anaphora binding constraint (ABC). 5 
(ABC) A pronoun P anaphoric on a QNP Q is interpreted as a bound variable if and only 
if Q c-commands P J. e., Q has scope over P. ' 
In order to illustrate the application of the previous principles we will discuss again 
sentence (14). Since no special constraints have been stated to deal at LF with the sort of 
syntactic coordination that connectives like and and or create at surface level (SS), we 
may generate for (14) the standard LF structure in (18). 
(18) IS IS INPsome fi sh ,]IIs Mark caught e, ]] and Is Jim cooked them ] ]. 
However,, the phrase some fish in (14) cannot c-command the third S node (the second 
coordinate clause) containing the phrase Jim cooked them since, according to the c- 
command definition, the latter phrase is not immediately dominated by the S node 
created by the QR rule. Given c-command and (GSP), it follows then that them in the 
third S node of (18) cannot be considered as falling within the scope of the QNP some 
fish either. Therefore, according to (ABC), the pronoun them cannot be treated as a 
variable bound by that QNP. In contrast, the purpose of the If structure (17) above is to 
stipulate scope over the open sentence 'Jim cooked x' and, in doing so, to treat the 
variable Y as bound by the restricted existential quantifier '[some x: fish xf. Thus, we 
must conclude that,, whatever the value assigned to LF (18), it has no correspondence 
with structure (17). 
The general conclusion to be drawn from our previous discussion is that since both (17) 
and (18) are clearly unsatisfactory representations of (14), there is a problem in both the 
semantic and the syntactic side of the LF account. We will attack first the syntactic 
problem. 
'See Higginbotham (1980,1988). 
' See Neale (1990) 
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As we saw, within the LF structure (18) the pronoun them is not c-commanded. Alsol 
it does not fall within the scope of any other constituent. So we should, in accordance 
with (ABC), conclude that such a constituent (and any other in a similar position) cannot 
be interpreted as a bound variable at LF. However, this conclusion seems to threaten 
some hallmarks of the LF theory, at least in two senses. First, ptimafacie, we have a case 
where the crucial analogy between the logical notion of scope and the one that LF 
semanticists think underlies natural language does not work. As we saw, since the If 
structure in (17) treats the pronoun as a bound variable,, the second occurrence of'x' is 
not free at all. However, the LF principles seem now to show the unboundness of the 
pronoun in (18). Obviously, if real, - this divergence in the way of representing scope 
affects immediately the degree of generality and uniformity that LF theorists sought to 
gain in positing the aforementioned analogy between the LF level and the If level. 
Second, the application of a direct mapping to Tarskian structures seems also to be 
threatened and, thereby, the application of the Compositionality Principle to LF 
structures. For instance, the S node 'Jim cooked them' in (18) cannot be directly mapped 
into the conjunct 'Jim cooked x' in (17) because the S node should be interpreted as 
specifying a free variable at the If level. Nevertheless, if, in a syntactic structure S' 
associated with a sentence S, one of its pronominal constituents can be interpreted as a 
FOC free variable, then S' cannot be mapped into any well-formed structure of such a 
calculus. Thus, a strict conception of compositionality seems to collapse in this point, if 
we accept the conclusion that there are unbound pronouns at LF and that they must be 
interpreted as free variables. 
The issue at stake can be stated by means of the following question, Is it possible , in 
principle, to adhere to an LF treatment and, nevertheless, tolerate the presence of 
unbound pronouns at the level of interpretation of LF structures? In our opinion, the most 
sound and successful answer to that question has been offered by Neale (1990,1992, 
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1993 ). 7 The guiding idea of Neale's answer, we believe , is to 
demonstrate that Us 
equipped with unbound pronouns can secure systematic LF-If mappings of the 
aforementioned problematic sentences, despite the fact that the LF structures contain real 
unbound pronominal constituents. The main payoff that Neale's proposal promises us 
then is that referentiality and compositionality are not touched. In order to achieve such 
explanatory and descriptive success, Neale introduces new rules at LF and, as 
consequence of that, modifications in If and LF structures are generated. Since we take 
Neale's proposal to be the most successful attempt at formulating a solution for non-c- 
commanded pronouns within a syntactically-motivated framework, we think that such 
a theory deserves to be examined thoroughly. Therefore, in the following sections we 
shall discuss Neale's theory of unbound anaphora extensively and evaluate its pros and 
cons. 
3.2 Neale's Theory of Unbound Anaphora: the Basic Analysis 
However the binding issue is to be solved, it should be clear that to argue for the view 
that there are unbound pronouns is not "to deny that a pronoun P may be anaphoric on 
a quantifier Q that does not c-command it at LF (Neale 1993, p. 805). So, it is the 
anaphora itself and the import of the pronoun in it that is in need of an entirely new 
analysis. This shift in the focus of the explanation of anaphora is not a minor one. Our 
previous syntactic representations allowed us to understand how a quantified antecedent 
binds pronouns, but they remained rather silent about the contribution-if any-of the 
pronouns to the representation of anaphoricity. This is the result of the fact that the LF 
approach described in the previous section was conceived primarily within the 
quantificational tradition of non-deictic anaphora (see chapter one, section I- 1). That is 
to say, within the tradition that sees non-deictic pronouns as logically reflecting their 
quantified antecedents. Thus, many LF theorists argue that it is the quantified antecedent 
Direct antecedents of Neale's views are Davies (1981) and Evans (1977,1980). 
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and its syntactic properties at LF that explains the distinction between deictic (or 
referential) and non-deictic pronouns. ' In short, it is the quantifier that matters, not the 
pronoun. Therefore, the challenge for LF theorists like Neale, who disagree with the 
quantificational view, is to explain how we may generate LF representations where the 
pronoun is the determinant of the interpretation of the anaphoric sentences . 
In order to explain how Neale's theory achieves that goal, we Vill examine those 
anaphoric sentences that will be the main focus of this essay, namely, sentences 
exhibiting so-called donkey anaphora. This type of anaphora is rather a species of 
unbound anaphora. In particular, donkey pronouns are similar to the ones of sentences 
(14)-(16) in their being non-c-commanded by their antecedents. However, unlike of the 
pronouns of (14)-(16), donkey pronouns are not constructed on coordinate-clause 
structures. Also, their quantified antecedents appear embedded in other quantified NPs. 
The following are classical examples, discussed first in Geach (1962): 
(19) Every man who owns [a donkey], beats it,. 
(20) Every owner of [a donkey] I beats it,. 
(2 1) Every farmer who owns [five sheep], vaccinates them,. 
(22) Every student who borrows [some books] , from the library returns them I on time. 
The most interesting aspect of these sentences is that the quantificational. force of the 
antecedents of the pronouns is apparently modified. For instance, sentence (19) seems to 
assert that each donkey owner beats aff the donkeys he owns. That is to say, the apparent 
existential force of the indefinite NP a donkey changes to the force of a universal 
quantifier of the type all donkeys that he owns. The same occurs, e. g. with the sentence 
(22). Therein the quantificational force of the antecedent some books becomes equal to 
all books that helshe borrows. It is easy to envisage that this modification of the 
quantificational force of the antecedent will generate the same binding problem posed 
by sentences (14)-(16). So, the (unrestricted) FOC representation of sentence (19) (and 
sentence (20)) given in (23) below will misrepresent the truth-conditions of the former 
'See May (1985, p. 25) 
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in the same way that (17) does with (16). That is to say, the logical structure (23) cannot 
capture the universal binding of the pronoun by its antecedent. 
(23) ( Vx )(ý3y)[ ( man x& (donkey y&x owns y )) -(x beats y 
Furthermore,, the possibility suggested in (24) is worse as it contains the free variable 'y' 
in the consequent. 
(24) ( Vx) [( man x& (ý] y) ( donkey y&x owns yx beats y 
Neale's strategy contrasts sharply with this defective account. His solution consists in 
mapping LF representations of sentences like (19) (or (20)) into If representations, which 
are quite different from the ones in (23) or (24). From a strictly syntactic point of view, 
Neale's proposal relies to a large extent on some views about LF and QR construals 
expounded mainly by May (1985). According to May, structure (25) below represents the 
LF of (20)-applicable with slight modifications to (19) as well. 
(25) [S' [S [NP [ Np a donkey]2 
[Np every owner of e2 
113 [s e3 beats 't2 
Structure (25) is derived by successively applying the QR rule-first, to the S original 
node (i. e. adjoining the NP3 every owner of a donkey to S) and then to the NP thus 
created (i. e. adjoining the NP2 a donkey to NP3). Notice that (25) incorporates an 
important (for May presumably the most important) syntactic modification at LF level: 
the QR rule does not just adjoin NPs (i. e. embedded quantified phrase) to their S- 
structures, it can adjoin NPs structures to other NPs structures as well. As May points out, 
if we assume that LF-movement exhibits properties of a syntactic (or transformational) 
movement-the rule 'Move a', then the QR rule can be seen as freely instantiating such 
a movement without any further constraint. ' Moreover , it 
is worth stressing something 
'Move cc is a single and very general transformation rule in GB theories, which allows us to move anything 
anywhere. Movements allowed by the rule may be classified as either substitution or adjunction. Finally, cc 
is a variable ranging over syntactic categories. 
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elementary about the structure (25): it does not correspond to the SS of (20) above. At SS 
level, grammar tells us that the indefinite phrase a donkey belongs to only one constituent 
in (20)-i. e. to the quantified NP every owner-and that the indefinite operates as 
modifier of this NP. In particular, it does so by means of the genitive case preposition of. 
Anyway, LF (25) poses some technical problems. The most serious is that any of the NPs 
therein can have wide scope (since they c-command each other) and, accordingly, we can 
end up with rather counterintuitive scope readings. " At first sight, the shared views by 
May and Neale about LF-for instance, the view that (ABC) holds at LF level instead of 
SS level-commits Neale's theory to structures like (25), where all possible scope 
assignments for (20) are revealed. " However, the attractiveness of Neale's theory lies in 
its semantic side. That is, in the way that the theory generates restricted quantifier If 
structures for sentences exhibiting donkey anaphora. As we shall see, once those 
structures are generated, we can easily handle and dismiss undesirable scope assignments, 
based on semantic considerations. 
The guiding idea of Neale's semantic analysis of donkey pronouns is mainly inspired by 
work done by Evans in the 70's (Evans 1977,1980). " Based on Evans's proposal, Neale 
contends that donkey pronouns can be interpreted as-they 'go proxy for-definite 
" In this particular case, NP2 can take wide scope, i. e. it can generate a potential reading of (2 5) that represents 
the situation where, in Mays words, "a single, communally owned donkey is beaten"(May 1985, p. 73), 
" There are some technical reasons behind this commitment. Probably most important of all-for Neale, May 
and other LF-theorists-is that if we don't accept that binding constraints, c-command and the like, hold at 
LF (rather than at SS), then we have a problem to explain'inverse linking' sentences like (1) below. 
(1) Somebody from [every city], despises it, 
Likewise, the acceptance of the structure (25) ( where an NP is raised and adjoined to another NP and not to 
aS node) seems to be needed for explaining some wh-sentences like 
(n) below. See May (1985, pp. 69-70) 
and Neale (1990, pp. 191-194). 
(11) What does somebody from every city despise ? 
"Similar ideas can be traced back to Parsons (1978), Cooper (1979) and 
Davies (1981), 
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descriptions or, by using the term Evans coined, they are E-type pronouns. " On this 
analysis, the anaphoric relation does not arise through the binding of the pronoun by its 
quantified antecedent. Rather, it is the common descriptive material and the uniqueness 
presupposition imposed on the definite description that ensure that both the antecedent 
and the pronoun denote the same object(s). Intuitively, this means that donkey (and 
unbound) pronouns can be interpreted (in a way to be specified by LF constraints) as 
descriptions of the form the F or the F that is G. Thus, the interpretation process takes 
place in the course of trying to fix the descriptive content of the pronoun and is not a 
consequence of fixing its connection (as a trace) to an LF structure. According to Neale, 
the descriptive content of the pronoun is directly reconstructed. That is to say, the 
pronoun is descriptively reconstructed according to a rule that, by respecting Tarskian 
and LF constraints, copies lexical material just from the antecedent,. without any 
additional processing. Finally, as Neale recognizes, whereas pragmatic factors have some 
bearing on the complete specification of the description in question, they are explicitly 
left out of the rule of reconstruction of pronominal content. " 
We will first introduce a technical version of Neale's recovery rule (as formulated in 
Neale 1993) and then a simpler and informal version. The interest of the technical 
version lies in the fact it is formulated in terms of k-th variables and scope relations and, 
therefore, shows how Neale's proposal can be systematically connected with both the 
Tarskian background and the LF theory. The version is as follows: 
(DP) If a pronoun Pk is anaphoric on but not c-commanded by a QNP 11 Qk: alk'with 
"Anyway, there remains an important difference between Evans'E-type pronouns and pronouns that go proxy 
for definite descriptions, namely: the Kripkean rigidity of E-type pronouns that Neale rejects. According to 
Evans (Evans 1977,1980) E-type pronouns are descriptions that have their referents figidlyfixed in Kripke's 
(1972) sense. Thus, they are a mixed category. In Neale's words "they are not genuine referring expressions 
[ 
... 
] but they are supposed to be rigid desCnptions"(Neale 1990, pp. 184-185). Instead, Neale's pronouns are 
Russellian descnptions. Hence they are My non-referential in nature as FOC quantifiers are. in particular, 
they give rise to scope ambiguities in both extensional and intensional contexts. For an extensive discussion 
of the difference between Neale's and Evans' treatments see Neale (1990, pp. 184-19 1). 
14 This acknowledgement suggests, as we shall see in the following chapter, that Neale thinks of donkey 
pronouns as to a certain extent underspecified. See Neale (1990, pp. 184,26 1). 
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scope" P, thenpkiSunderstood as '[thek: (X aPI k- 
In Neale's words, DP expresses the idea that the pronoun P is understood "as a definite 
description typically recovered from Q and everything Q c-commands at LP (Neale 
1993, p. 813). Moreover, from DP, it follows that although the unbound pronoun can still 
be treated as the k-th variable of a sequence, it is not going to receive the interpretation 
associated with a variable 'x 'falling within the scope of the quantifier'[Q - (x]k. Finally, k k- 
DP shows that the descriptive content of the pronoun will correspond (usually) to the N' 
restriction-oc-and the scope--p-of the determiner 'Qk. Neale calls the pronouns 
recovered by DP rule, D-type (rather than E-type) pronouns. " 
The whole significance of the above rule can be preserved in a less technical but more 
intuitive fon-nulation. We will choose that stated in Neale (1990) and termed P5 rule. It 
is formulated in the following ten-ns: 
(P5) If x is a pronoun that is anaphoric on, but not c-commanded by, a quantifier '[Dx: Fx]' 
that occurs in an antecedent clause '[Dx: Fx] (Gx)', then x is interpreted as the most 
"impoverished" definite description directly recoverable from the antecedent clause 
that denotes everything that is both F and G (Neale 1990, p. 182). 
P5 behaves quite intuitively indeed. For instance, P5 says to us that the pronoun she in 
the second sentence of (28) can be recovered as in (29) below. Therefore, it dictates that 
interpretation of the pronoun in question matches clearly our intuitions about the 
anaphora in the second sentence in (2 8) - 
(28) [A woman], came in. She, sat down. 
(29) The woman who came in sat down. 
As for restricted quantifier notation, the definite description in (29) and, consequently, 
the sentence (28) can be represented by means of the RQ Ifs (30) and (3 1), respectively. 
" According to the definitions in chapter one, section 1.2, syntactic scope is the open formula to the right of 
the (restricted) QNP that states what is true of the domain of individuals in the quantifier. 
" Neale borrows the term from Sommers (1982). 
100 
(30) the z: woman z&z came in ] (z sat down) 
(3 1) an x: woman x J(x came in) &[ the z: woman z&z came in ] (z sat down) 
Before going to other applications, two general points should be emphasised concerning 
Neale's solution. First, pronouns are not 'descriptively replaced'by their antecedents. In 
semantic terminology,, D-type pronouns are not 'lazy' constituents waiting for a 
replacement when syntactic analysis takes place. " In such a case, as Larson and Segal 
emphasise, unbound pronouns 'are simply not present' at the relevant syntactic level. 18 
Since, according to Neale, recovery of the descriptive material of a donkey pronoun is 
the result of an interpretive, subject to rule, process, a 'laziness' treatment is, 
consequently, incompatible with his proposal. 
Second, on Neale's view, unbound pronouns become quantificational in virtue of their 
being equivalent to Russellian definite descriptions (Neale 1990,1993 , Ludlow and Neale 
199 1). This gives Neale's conception of pronouns two important advantages when 
compared with quantificational treatments of unbound anaphora. The first obvious 
advantage is that a Russellian conception does not impose special assumptions about 
scope in order to capture the connection between the pronoun and the antecedent. 
Quantificational treatments of the pronoun in question, by contrast, must alter standard 
assignment of scope to achieve correct interpretations of the anaphora sentence. An 
example of such treatments has been offered by Geach (1970). According to Geach's 
suggestion, the sentence (28) can be represented by means of the FOC structure in (28'). 
(28') (ý3x)( x is a woman &x came in &x sat down) 
This solution has several problems, perhaps the most obvious one being that if the 
17 Geach (1962). Lazy pronouns go proxy for repeated ocurrences of nouns. Some examples are the following- 
(1) People who buy books tend to read them. 
(n) Running is healthy. It is funny too. 
" Larson and Segal (1995) p. 405. See Parsons (1978) for a proposal along these 
lines. 
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discourse contains further anaphoric pronouns, the scope of the quantifier must be 
altered. Thereby, the evaluation of the truth-value of the sentence containing the first 
pronoun could never be considered definitive. This seems to conflict with our intuition 
that utterance of an indicative, univocal, sentence in discourse "expresses some 
proposition or other (relative to the context of utterance) and hence ought to be evaluable 
for truth or falsity" (Neale 1990, p. 170). Thus, at least from a formal point of view, 
structure (3 1) is more acceptable than (28'). The second advantage of a Russellian 
conception of pronouns concerns object-dependent reference. P5 recovers the descriptive 
content of the pronoun in terms of conditions-provided by a quantificational 
structure-that certain individuals satisfy and not in terms of their direct reference. Thus, 
the content of donkey pronouns is not specified in terms of object-dependent conditions. '9 
Let us consider now problematic cases (19) and (20) again. We will represent first the 
QNP every man who owns a donkey of (19). The RQ If that Neale's theory generates for 
that QNP is the following. 
(32) [everyx: manx &[ay: donkeyy](xownsy)]. 
Structure (32) allows us to clearly represent the restrictive relative clause who owns a 
donkey, in (19). In restricted quantifier structures, relative pronouns like who are treated 
as variables bound by the determiner affecting the whole restrictive relative clause, in this 
case, by the determiner every man. Thus, we attach to the original restriction of the QNP, 
by using the conjunctive particleW, the quantificational phrase binding the variables of 
the restrictive clause. By doing so we obtain the schema '[Qx: Fx & [Qy: Gy](Pxy)], 
which is reflected in (32). Moreover, we know that, at LF level, relative pronouns must 
be c-commanded by their determiners. Now, since the pronoun it in the matrix VP of (19) 
is not c-commanded by its antecedent, the pronoun, according to (ABC), cannot be 
characterized as a bound anaphora. In consequence, P5 determines its descriptive 
content. As the antecedent of it is constituted by the indefinite and everything it c- 
" See Larson and Segal (1995, p 402) 
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commands at LF-i. e. '[a y: donkey yl(x owns y) ',. the most impoverished definite 
description specifying the content of the pronoun will be the one in structure (33) below. 
Thus, the final representation of sentence (19) will come out as (34) below. 
(33) [ the y: donkey y](x owns y) 
(34) [every x: man x& [a y: donkey y](x owns y)] 
([ the y: donkey y&x owns y](x beats y)) 
Evidently, structure (34) represents the correct truth conditions that speakers intuitively 
will assign to (19), that is, that every man who owns at least one donkey beats all donkeys 
he owns. 
Plural instances of donkey anaphora like in (2 1) above can also be adequately treated by 
Neale's descriptive proposal. (35) is the RQ structure that such proposal generates for 
(21). 
(35) [ every x: farmer x&[ five y: sheep y]( x owns y)] ([ the y: sheep y&x owns y 
(x vaccinates y )). 
By simple inspection, structure (35) provides the correct truth conditions of (21). In 
prose, (35) says that every fanner who owns five sheep vaccinates the five sheep he owns. 
Before considering some major issues connected with Neale's initial solution, a minor 
one about scope needs to be considered. In (34)'[the y: donkey y&x owns y 1( x beats 
y)' is the formula attached to the right of the formula '[every x: man x&[ay: donkey 
y] (x owns y) ]'. Thus,, it follows that the former formula corresponds to the scope of the 
restricted quantifier represented in the latter formula. Consequently, we are entitled to 
say that the variable Y in the first formula ends up bound by that quantifier. 
Now we will show how Neale's theory manipulates sentences with unbound pronouns 
such as the ones exhibited in sentences (14)-(16) above. Let us consider first (14). Its RQ 
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If, according to Neale, will be (36) below. 
(36) [some y: fish y]( Mark caught y) & [the z: fish z& Mark caught z](Jim cooked z) 
in structure (36), the pronoun them is a D-type pronoun whose content is recovered from 
the first coordinate structure. This allows us in turn to obtain the correct truth-conditions 
for the anaphora sentence of (14). That is'. that Jim cooked all the fish Mark caught. 
Working the same way with (16), we get a similar description, which is shown in (37). 
(37) Dust one x: lecturer x] (x was dismissed) &[ the z: lecturer z&z was dismissed] 
(z complained to the commission). 
We see now that, whereas structure (37) entails its two conjuncts, its truth is incompatible 
with the falsity of either. That is to say, the truth of (37) is incompatible with a situation 
where two or more lecturers are dismissed. 
Finally, the potential of Neale's theory can be additionally tested by confronting it with 
the following complex example from Heim (1982). 
(39) Every boy who likes [his mother] , visits her, at Christmas. 
Now we have two anaphoric links interacting with each other. The possessive phrase his 
mother,. embedded in the restrictive clause who likes, is the antecedent of the D-type 
pronoun her, which is not within the scope of the possessive phrase. The antecedent of 
the pronoun his in the possessive phrase is the restricted quantifier every boy. Since the 
pronoun her clearly is not c-commanded by its antecedent,, by P5 it goes proxy for a 
definite description. The content of the pronoun is then recovered from another definite 
description, i. e. from the mother qfevery boy, which corresponds, in turn, to the pronoun 
his in the restrictive clause. The result will come out as the following RQ If structure. 
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(40) [every x: boy x& [the Y: y mother of x1(x likes y)] ff the y: y mother of x] 
(x visits y at Christmas)) 
It should be clear that structure (40) assIgns the correct truth conditions to sentence (39). 
That is to say, (39) is true if and only if each boy who likes his mother visits her at 
Christmas. 
3.3 Uniqueness,, Numberless Hypothesis and D-type pronouns 
As indicated in the last section, the main virtue of P5 is that it allows us to treat donkey 
pronouns as semantically equivalent to definite descriptions whose content is recovered 
from the quantified antecedent. P5, also, remains compatible with LF constraints since 
it does not transfonn the status of non-c-commanded constituents into anything else. The 
result is a successful treatment of donkey pronouns as unbound ones at LF level. 
Nevertheless, there are two other apparent virtues of Neale's account when compared 
with other donkey anaphora accounts. Thus, we will examine carefully these virtues. 
First, according to Neale, his theory provides an analysis of donkey sentences that "(a) 
delivers the correct (Geachian) truth conditions, and (b) honours a Russellian treatment 
of singular indefinite descriptions" (Neale 1990, p. 236). We can explain both claims as 
follows. Geach (1962) suggested that a natural formulation of the semantic content of 
sentences like (19) can be stated by means of the FOC structure in (4 1). 
1) (Vx) (Vy) (( man x& (donkey y&x owns y)) - (x beats y) ) 
By simple inspection, structure (41) is logically better than the If (24) of the last 
section-it does not contain any free variable, and semantically more felicitous-it 
captures effectively the apparent universal binding of the donkey pronoun. However, the 
semantic felicity of (4 1), in Neale's opinion , is not a consequence of any'universal' 
force 
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additionally associated with the indefinite QNP a donkey in (19). He formulates the point 
as follows: 
The universalization of the indefinite description 'a donkey' 
in [(19)] is a logical illusion: It is the pronoun that has universal force, by virtue of standing in for a definite description 
(Neale 1990, p. 236) 
This suggests why Neale rejects the idea that the antecedent QNP is what determines the 
anaphoric connection in donkey sentences. For Neale, the conception of the indefinite 
description a donkey as a type of 'hidden' universal quantifier directly blocks the 
construction of a systematic and compositional semantic theory. Consider his 
explanation of the point in the following passage: 
We want a syvtematic deliverance of truth conditions, - a theory that projects the truth conditions of sentences on the 
basis of the "meanings" of their parts and their syntactical 
structures. And on this score, treating indefinite descriptions 
in (and only in) certain subordinate structures as 
devices of wide-scope universal quantification is, 
at best, a tottering first step. Such a treatment gives us 
no explanation of the apparent "universalization" in [(19)]. 
(Neale 1990, p. 225). 
Neale's defence of his Russellian proposal relies on the indisputable necessity of 
preserving as much as possible, the referentiality and compositionality of the truth- 
conditional semantics. In contrast, the quantification or binding treatments of donkey 
sentences sacrifice the desired compositionality of the semantics and thereby they fall 
short of explaining in a systematic way such sentences. This argument, we believe, is 
theoretically cogent. However, it depends, in turn, on the defence of a strict application 
of the Compositionality Principle in all contexts. Thus, if such an application can be 
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reasonably disputed, Neale's defence can be challenged as well. " In addition, Neale's 
defence seems to entail the following conditional: if Geachian truth-conditions, as the 
ones shown in If structure (4 1) above, represent the intuitive meaning of standard donkey 
sentences, then no additional parameters specifying the interpretation of donkey 
sentences are needed. As we shall argue, there is rather overwhelming evidence 
indicating that this conditional cannot be correct. 
The second virtue of Neale's analysis is, we believe, more compelling. It has to do with 
an immediate problem that any account interpreting donkey pronouns as definite 
descriptions in disguise is bound to conftont. The problem is that, given the standard 
Russellian interpretation of definite descriptions, donkey pronouns must imply a 
uniqueness presupposition or condition. The following example seems to reinforce this 
conclusion. 
(42) Every man who has a daughter thinks she is the most beautiful girl in the world 
As Neale indicates, on the Geachian reading, "the truth of [(42)] entails that every man 
21 
who has more than one daughter has contradictory beliefs" (Neale 1990, p. 228). 
However, both Neale and others consider that issues about uniqueness implications seem 
more related to pragmatic than semantic intuitions. For instance, apparently in the 
following examples we would not expect uniqueness implications: 22 
(43) If Mark agrees With [a waiterfi, then Jim always disagrees with him,. 
(Larson and Segal 1995) 
(44) No father with [a teenage] I son ]ends him, the car on weekdays. (Rooth 1987) 
" Strict application of the Compositional ity Principle takes sometimes the form of a mapping hypothesis 
between semantic and syntactic structures, the so-called 'rule-by-rule' hypothesis; for more details on 
compositionality see Partee (1996). 
It is worthwhile to notice that this statement does not guarantee that Geach's reading (41) implies 
uniqueness in all contexts. 
22 For discussion see Chierchia (1995), Heim (1990) and Kadmon (1990). 
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In (43) and (44) the pronouns remain in unbound positions and this suggests Geach's 
analysis can be used without appealing to uniqueness. For example, in (44) we cannot 
confine our attention to fathers withjust one teenage son. Otherwise, our intuitions about 
the truth-conditions of the sentence would become shaky; e. g. if a father who has more 
than one son lends the car to some but not all of them (in the following section we 
discuss again uniqueness). Thus, it seems that we need a systematic solution that avoids 
commitments to uniqueness implications and preserves Geachian truth-conditions. The 
solution Neale proposes is, in our judgement, both sensible and natural. He says: 
One interesting idea is that in many such cases unbound 
anaphoric pronouns go proxy for definite descriptions that 
are, from a semantical perspective, numberless. (Neale 
1990, p. 234). 
Neale's proposal is constructed on the suggestion-borrowed from Moore (1944)-that 
expressions like whoever wrote Waverley may be translated as definite descriptions that 
are neutral with respect to semantic number. That is to say, those expressions can be 
indifferently read as singular or plural QNPs. So, if '[whe x: Fxf represents the 
numberless description the F or the Fs, the following set-theoretical definition of the 
description in question can be stated. 
(45) [whe x: Fx] (Gx) is true iff IF-GI=0 and IFI -- I 
Neale also concludes that if antecedents of D-type pronouns are number-neutral, then we 
should interpret D-type pronouns "anaphoric on quantifier phrases of the form 'every F, 
'all Fs% and'each Fas semantically numberless" (Neale 1990, p. 235). 
Neale's proposal is ready to respond to two possible objections, from the syntactic as well 
as the semantic side. The syntactic objection is based on the fact that the indefinite 
antecedents of donkey pronouns are syntactically singular ones. If this is the case, Does 
Neale's hypothesis entail that such antecedents are really ambiguous at surface level? 
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Neale's response to this question is direct: there is no problem about the syntactic singular 
nature of D-type pronouns. The only reason for suggesting that semantic numberlessness 
implies syntactic numberlessness would be to assume that indefinites themselves are 
lexically ambiguous. So, they would be read as both plural and singular determiners. This 
view, that has been voiced by some theorists, is plainly rejected by Neale" (we are not 
going to consider Neale's particular arguments on this issue here because in the following 
chapter we shall discuss several arguments against the lexical ambiguity view. ) Thus, for 
Neale, indefinite antecedents remain syntactically singular in number at surface structure. 
The issue for him is whether or not those antecedents can generate genuine cardinality 
implications when we recover the descriptive content of the pronouns anaphorically 
related to them. It should be clear that other determiners cannot-despite their difference 
in syntactic number. For instance, the equivalent sentences (46) and (47) below-whose 
determiners every and all differ in syntactic number-allow us to recover the content 
semantic of the pronouns in (48) and (49) without considering the cardinality 
implications of the determiners. 
(46) Every new philosophy lecturer knows logic. 
(47) All new philosophy lecturers know logic. 
(48) Every new philosophy lecturer knows logic. He is supposed to teach the matter once 
a year. 
(49) All new philosophy lecturers know logic. They are supposed to teach the matter once 
a year. 
If, in (48) and (49), we introduce the cardinallty implications deriving from the syntactic 
number of the antecedents into the descriptions of the pronouns he and they, we will get 
wrong truth-conditions for the sentences. That is to say, the two sentences will not be 
equivalent, as they should be. For, by P5, the pronoun In (48) will 
be rendered as the new 
philosophy lecturer and the pronoun in (49) as the new philosophy 
lecturers. On these 
analyses, (48) will be false if there is more than one lecturer and 
(49) will be false if there 
' See Neale (I 990, pp. 252-253); see also Hintikka and Carlson (1978) 
for other criticisms of such a view. 
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is exactly one lecturer. ' These incorrect predictions are inevitable if we accept that in the 
cases in question the anaphoric pronouns "have added cardinality implications not 
supplied by their antecedents" (Neale 1990, p. 235). Consequently, the numberless 
hypothesis seems the natural alternative to take in such cases. As for donkey sentences,, 
the main concern, however, are cases of indefinite antecedents. In particular, we should 
examine cases where the indefinites are embedded in broader constituents. Let us first 
examine simpler cases, for example, (50) and (5 1) below. 
(50) Every philosophy lecturer borrowed a book from the new Library 
(5 1) Every philosophy lecturer borrowed some books from the new Library. 
Against normal intuitions, literal analysis of the meaning of the indefinite noun phrases 
a book and some books in (50) and (5 1) suggests that the truth-conditions of the sentences 
cannot differ. This claim implies, for instance, that if every lecturer borrowed more than 
one book,, we have to (rather controversially) accept that both (5 1) and (50) are true, and 
that if every lecturer borrowed just one book, both (50) and (51) are true. This 
controversial aspect vanishes once one considers more complex situations. For instance, 
a situation in which one or two lecturers borrowed exactly one book and the rest more 
than one. Under that scenario, we would not like to declare sentence (5 1) false. And the 
truth of (50) is a logical implication of (5 1)'s being true. All these situations force us, 
according to Neale, to stick to a semantic analysis that suggests interpreting both a book 
and some books by means of the cardinal paraphrase 'there is at least one... '. In other 
words, we are forced to stick to the Russellian analysis of such quantified phrases. Neale 
states the point as follows: 
On Russell's account, a sentence of the grammatical form 
'An F is Ghas the same logical form as a sentence of 
the form 'Some Fs are Gs'. In the notation of [restricted 
quantifiers], '[an x: Fx](Gx)'and'[some x: Fx](Gx)are 
logically equivalent; both are true if and only if there is at 
least one F that is G. On a completely Russellian account 
' Neale 0 990, P. 234). 
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of indefinite descriptions, then, since there can be no difference 
between the truth conditional contributions of 'a donkey' 
and'some donkeys', the same must be true of the complex 
noun phrases (i) 'every man who bought a donkey' and 
(iWevery man who bought some donkeys'. (Neale 1990, 
p. 235) 
Thus, sentences (52) and (53) will be treated along the lines of (48) and (49) above. 
(52) Every philosophy lecturer borrowed [a book], from the new Library and then he 
returned it,. 
(53) Every philosophy lecturer borrowed [some books] , from the new Library and then 
he borrowed them,. 
Although the QNPs a book and some books differ in syntactic number, clearly that 
number does not introduce cardinality implications in the description of the pronouns 
anaphoric on the QNPs. 
We can now represent the complex donkey cases (19)-repeated below as (54)-and (55) 
below by using the whe operator. The generated RQ structures are (56) and (57), which, 
according to definition (45), are semantically equivalent. 
(54) Every man who owns [a donkey] , beats it,. 
(5 5) Every man who owns [some donkeys] I beats them,. 
(56) [every x: man x& [a y: donkey y 1( x owns y whe z: donkey z&x owns y] 
(x beats y )). 
(57) [every x: man x& [some y: donkeys y ]( x owns y)] ([ whe z: donkey z&x owns y] 
(x beats y )). 
We turn now to consider the objection formulated from the semantic side against Neale's 
numberless hypothesis. The semantic objection is quite simple. It says that (54) and (55) 
have different truth-conditions after all. Consequently, even if (56) captures the force of 
(54), (5 7) misrepresents the force of (5 5) since the truth of (5 5) does not depend on what 
happens with owners of just one donkey. This objection misses the point if its target Is 
the treatment of the pronoun in (5 5 ý-what really matters in Neale's theory. But Neale 
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agrees the objection is maybe correct if its target is the use of the Russellian treatment 
of plural indefinites in order to analyze the antecedents. In short, in the latter case the 
objector "is contesting Russell's claim that'An F is G and'Some Fs are Gs' are equivalent. 
In short, the objector is urging the following split: 
(*3 )'Some Fs are Gs' istweiff IFnGI>l 
(*4) 'An F is G' is true iff IF nGIý: I" (Neale 1993, p. 236). 
However, rejecting Russell's analysis of plural indefinites poses no problem to Neale's 
proposal. For the different truth-conditions to be assigned to each (indefinite) determiner 
will be a consequence of analysing further the antecedents but not the pronouns, which 
will still remain a unified semantic category. Thus, plural indefinite descriptions may 
carry cardinality implications with them. Concerning singular indefinite descriptions, 
Neale emphasises that no analysis in terms of cardinality is acceptable. His important 
conclusion is stated as follows: 
But singular indefinite descriptions are not semantically 
singular; they do not generate uniqueness implications. 
When we just Wish to say that I FnG I=I, we say Exactly 
one F is Gor'Just one F is G'. The truth of'An F is Gdoes 
not require that I FnG I=1, it j ust requires that I FnG I ý! 1, 
and this is perfectly consistent with the truth of 'Some 
Fs are Gs' , even on the non-Russellian analysis of plural indefinites. (Neale 1990, p. 237). 
3.4 Criticisms of Neale's Proposal 
Let us take stock before proceeding to formulate some serious criticisms to Neale's 
theory. We can sum up the contribution of Neale's analysis in the following three 
characteristics: (i) it permits donkey sentences to satisfy those truth-conditions that are 
usually associated with them, i. e. Geachian truth-conditions; (H) it treats donkey (and 
unbound) pronouns, anaphoric on indefinite descriptions, as semantically equivalent to 
definite Russellian descriptions, whose content is recovered by using a special 
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interpretive rule, P5; and (W) it offers an appealing solution, the numberless 
hypothesis-NE henceforth, to the uniqueness problem, a hypothesis which, according 
to Neale, preserves Geachian truth-conditions. 
During the last five years this initially attractive analysis has come under sharp scrutiny. 
As a result, Neale's theory faces a set of interesting counterexamples. We want to focus 
here on a group of them. We term the examples according to their initial formulations 
and add also some references to important discussions of them (we use here only italics 
to indicate anaphoric linkage) 
(58) Every person who has a credit card pays his/her bill with it. 
(existential readings; Pelletier and Shubert (1989), 
Chierchia (1992,1995), Kratzer (1988), Kanazawa 
(1994), van der Does (1993b), Lappin and Francez (1994)). 
(59) Every person who bought at least two beers here bought five others along with them. 
(sage plant cases; Heim (1990), Chierchia 
(1992,1995), Kanazawa (1994)). 
(60) Every boy danced with some girl. She was a ballerina. 
(Telescoping cases, Sells (1985), Roberts (1987,1989), 
Neale (1990), Ludlow (1994), Poesio and Zucchi (1992)). 
Sentence (58) raises a problem for Geachian truth-conditions, because it is evident that 
the donkey pronoun it does not have universal force. Admittedly, native English speakers 
will understand that the pronoun refers to some or one rather than all credit cards 
everybody may carry. That is, (58) does not entail (for English speakers) that everybody 
who has a credit card pays his bill with all credit cards he/she 
has. 25 
2'Schubert and Pelletier (1989), who first proposed existential readings of 
donkey sentences-they call them 
Indefinite Lazy readings-claim, rather contentiously, that such readings are cases of"generic, or'gnomic, 
understanding of donkey sentences 
(p. 201). However, this view is flawed; see Kanazawa (1994) for 
discussion. 
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Sentence (60) represents a challenge for Neale's recovery algorithm, his rule P5, when 
applied across-discourse. Although we cannot discuss all the technicalities yet, the 
machinery so far gained lends itself to provide a clear picture of why (60) effectively 
poses a serious problem to Neale's theory. The basic reason lies in the fact that a 
Russellian treatment of donkey pronouns forces the latter to accept different scope 
interactions with the rest of the determiners in the sentence. Thus, donkey pronouns must 
interact with the following wide scope reading of the determiner every in the antecedent 
sentence of (60): 
(6 1) [every x: boy x]([ some y: girl yj (x danced with y )). 
Although structure (6 1) does not necessaHly express the preferred reading of the 
antecedent sentence of (60), there are contexts that would suggest felicity conditions for 
it (see Sells 1985). Now, on the assumption that this reading is available, how are we to 
formulate the anaphora sentence of (60)? P5 stipulates that the pronominal content must 
be recovered by taking into account the relevant determiner-some, its 
restriction-girl-and the scope-danced with. Thus, the whole anaphora sentence will 
come out as structure (62) below 
(62) [the y: girl y&x danced with y ]( y was a ballerina ). 
However, structure (62) contains a free occurrence of the variable Y and therefore is not 
a well-formed restricted quantifier structure. This incongruence in the theory poses, as 
Neale recognizes (Neale 1990, pp. 260- 1), a wider problem concerning the nature of his 
recovery rule and its capability to bring'into play'additional contextual information. As 
we shall see in the following chapters, although Neale heads in the correct direction in 
order to find out a solution, the problem posed by (60) is much deeper than he suggests. 
Finally, sentence (59) requires additional technical apparatus. We are going to deal with 
such technical matters in chapter five. Nevertheless, it will not 
be difficult for the reader 
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at this stage to grasp the general problem and some of its consequences. The general issue 
at stake concerns the extent of application of NH. Let us first consider a similar but 
simpler example, sentence in (63). 
(63) Every person who bought a beer bought five others along With it. 
If we do not attribute numberless assumptions to the antecedent a beer in that sentence,, 
i. e. if we attribute to it a uniqueness implication, the only reading of the pronoun it that 
we can recover is the one expressed by the description 'the beer that he/she bought'. 
However, in such a case we are straightforwardly going to make the contradictory 
prediction that every person who bought six beers bought the only beer he/she bought. 
NH liberates us from this inconsistency and others immediately. Conversely, sentences 
like (63) become strong evidence in favour of the existence of numberless D-type 
pronouns . 
16 We can show that by checking the numberless reading of the pronoun in 
question in (62). We will get something like the description'the beer or beers that he/she 
bought', which entails the truth of the whole sentence just when'every man who bought 
at least one beer bought five other beers along with each of the beers he bought' (Neale 
1990, p. 238; my emphasis). 2' Thus, we are left with a quite nice solution that matches 
our semantic intuitions and shows the explanatory and predictive power of NH. 
Nevertheless., the solution at hand will not be useful if we want to make a wider 
generalization by using the case instantiated by (63) as a basis. Sentence (59) in particular 
could not be embraced by such a purported generalization. The reason is that the 
description that Neale's theory obtains for the pronoun in (63) entails a commitment to 
a particular semantic aspect, distributivity. That is to say, it entails the existence of a 
group of one or more beers each of which is connected with each member of another 
group of five beers by means of the buying-along-with relation, as our emphasis in 
Neal e (1990,23 8). 
" Prof M. Sainsbury (p. c. ) suggests that there may be a worry about infiniteness in Neale's analysis if some 
temporal clause is not interpolated, i. e. some clause like 'each of beers 
he initially bought'. 
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Neale's explanation above made it clear. This commitment to distributivity must be 
extended to plural pronouns, and consequently to pronouns such as them in sentence (59). 
Thus, if the distributive description associated with such a pronoun is'each of the beers' 
(the numberless effect is irrelevant here), then , in using that description, we will make 
incorrect predictions in some contexts, e. g. in contexts where one has bought exactly Ax 
beers and not seven, as the sentence implies. For, in such a case, we will get for the whole 
sentence the reading 'every man who bought at least two beers bought five beers along 
with each of the beers he bought'. It is not difficult to realize this latter reading could be 
true in a scenario where everybody bought just six beers. " 
The interesting point about this criticism is that it reveals the internal limitations of NH 
and how they are connected with deeper assumptions to which Neale's theory seems 
strongly committed. One of such aspects is semantic distributivity. " The expression two 
beers is an example of a plural noun phrase and, as Neale acknowledges, usually such 
phrases receive non-distributive or collective readings. " The question to ask is whether 
D- or E-type pronouns can receive such readings as well. Neale's answer is sceptical. He 
argues that questions about collectivity or collections are completely orthogonal to the 
issue of the nature of descriptions and, thereby, of D-type pronouns. Consider the 
following passage: 
The existence of such [collective] readings raises a variety 
of interesting semantical and ontological issues; but to the 
extent that providing an adequate semantics for sentences 
containing plural noun phrases on their collective readings 
' One can visualize this situation as follows: let us suppose that a man bought six beers, a, b, c, d, e, and f and, 
also, he bought a along with b. On the one hand, if he bought c, d, e and f along With b, he bought five beers 
along with b. On the other hand, the same will apply to a, since the buying-along-u4th relation is symmetric. 
This criticism was firstly formulated by Lappin and Francez; (1994); see chapter five of the thesis for more 
detail. 
Neale states this commitment by saying 'I am confining my talk about plurals and numberless 
descriptions 
to cases in which they receive distributive readings... It Is, of course, the simple 
distributive reading of the 
numberless D-type pronotm'it'in [(62)] that we are interested in "( Neale 
1990, p. 258, n. 34); see also note 3 1. 
" See Neale (1990, Ibid. ) 
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is a very general task that has nothing to do with descriptions 
per se, I have not attempted to say anything substantial about 
collective readings of descriptions. (Neale 1990, p. 61, n. 62,, 
my emphasis)" 
3.5 Evaluation of the Criticisms 
A 1.13 11 Asa consequence of the criticisms indicated above, at least three possible evaluations of 
Neale's proposal might be suggested: (a) the proposal is partially wrong-as examples 
like (58) show-because of characteristic (i) above-that is, commitment to Geachian 
truth-conditions. Therefore, such a commitment should be abandoned or at least relaxed. 
(b) the proposal is partially wrong-as examples like (59) show-because of 
characteristic (W) above-that is, numberless hypothesis. Therefore, uniqueness and/or 
something else should be brought back. (c) the proposal is either partially wrong-as 
examples like (60) show-or totally wrong because of (ii)-that is, the Russellian 
treatment of donkey pronouns as definite descriptions. If the first disjunct of (c) is true, 
that treatment should be replaced with an alternative treatment of definite descriptions 
retaining the rest of Neale's proposal; if the second disjunct is true, the entire proposal 
should be given up. 
The alternative (a) suggests, in our opinion, a conception according to which donkey 
sentences are linguistic phenomena inducing semantic non-univocality. The general 
" Neale (1990) substantiates his anti-collectivism in several places, for instance, p. 210, n. 23; p. 215, n. 46; 
p. 258, n. 33. In p. 210 he rejects in particular the possibility of understanding plural definite descriptions, 
and thereby plural D-type pronouns, as denoting 'maximal collections'. He says, 
One often hears it said that a plural definite description 'the F is maximal 
in the sense that it refers to a'maximal collection'of Fs (or perhaps to some 
pragmatically determined maximal collection of Fs). I claim no such thing, 
indeed, I think such talk is ultimately very misleading, even for collective 
readings. 
As we shall see in chapter five, this statement must bejudged, on empirical and philosophical grounds, as 
ultimately incorrect. 
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argument in this case is as follows. Donkey sentences can express, when uttered, different 
propositions. These propositions, although sharing exactly the same anaphoric pattern, 
can be associated-depending on the interaction between the utterance context and the 
literal meaning--with either universal readings or non-universal readings. Consequently, 
we seem to be forced to conclude-to save the grammatical uniformity of the 
phenomena-that if donkey sentences make available both universal (Geachian) and non- 
universal (non-Geachian) readings, that is due to some deeper phenomenon having to do 
with non-univocality of the sentences. 
Now , if 
donkey sentences are really semantically non-univocal phenomena, two questions 
arise. (d) What exactly is the non-univocal phenomenon involved in those sentences? For 
instance, could it be characterized as being an instance of ambiguity, nonspecificity, or 
other well-known manifestations of semantic non-univocality? (e) Where exactly is such 
a non-univocality to be located? For instance, could it be located in the (quantified) 
antecedents,, or in the pronouns, or even in the processing of the anaphoric relation itself? 
Several answers to the previous questions have been offered. For example, an answer to 
the first question has been to suppose some type of semantic ambiguity behind donkey 
structures. The case for semantic ambiguity has been argued in several ways and degrees 
by Root (1986), Rooth (1987), Groenendijk and Stockhof (1990) and Chierchia(1992, 
1995). Concerning the second question, the same theorists have suggested-except for 
Chierchia-that the ambiguity should be located in the determiners or quantified 
antecedents of the donkey pronouns. Perhaps the most important consequence deriving 
from this stance,. as we shall see, is that it imposes a modification on our ordinary 
quantificational logic. In contrast, Chierchia rejects any possibility of locating the 
purported ambiguity in either the determiners or the pronouns. That rejection affects his 
view about donkey ambiguity as well. Such a view entails that 
donkey sentences are 
indirectly ambiguous, i. e. they are processed by interpreters as if they were ambiguous. 
Furthermore, it follows from Chierchia's proposal that each of the two potential reading 
associated with donkey sentences will be generated 
by different treatments or methods. 
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Since the motivations of this dissertation depend to a great extent on rejecting the whole 
idea of a donkey ambiguity theory, we will dedicate an important part of the following 
chapter to a detailed discussion of some of the aforementioned views. 
Holding alternative (b) means that an E- or D-type theory can be successful only if it 
assumes as a basic tenet that D-type pronouns carry uniqueness implications. 
Furthermore, it means that those implications must be appropriately reflected in the 
structures that the theory generates. This view has been strongly advocated by Kadmon 
(1987,1990). As recognized by Neale (1990, p. 244), the natural candidate that both 
dispenses with the idea of numberless D-type pronouns and introduces uniqueness in the 
descriptive structures is an analysis in terms of quantification over events. 32 Neale 
formulates the general argument for treatments in terms of events in the following way. 
Intuitively, the idea seems to be that [the standard donkey 
sentence (19) above] is true just in case every man for whom 
there is a donkey for which there is an event that consists in 
that man buying that donkey is such that there is some other 
event that consists in that same man [beating] the donkey he 
bought in the previous event. Such an analysis is supposed 
to be immune to the original objection concerning uniqueness 
because now uniqueness is relativized to events. (Neale 1990, 
p. 244) 
Implementations of this alternative, for instance by Heim (1990) or Berman (1987), have 
displayed an interesting explanatory power in dealing successfully with, for instance,, sage 
plant cases that Neale's proposal cannot handle. 
Alternative (b) as a whole, however, has some serious flaws. We shall mention just two 
of them. The first problem is related to the idea of directly incorporating the uniqueness 
presupposition as a structural feature of the semantics of unbound anaphora expounded 
by Kadmon (1987,1990). We have already suggested that the empirical motivations for 
"See Heim (1990), Ludlow (1994), and especially Kadmon (1987,1990) 
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that sort of semantic analysis are rather questionable. Most theorists working on the topic 
are inclined to agree with this conclusion. In particular, Kadmon's analysis cannot 
adequately handle sentences with existential readings like (58), or sentences with 
negative quantifiers" like 'no farmer who owns a gun registers it', or complex cases of 
sage plant sentences like (59)" (see Rooth 1987, Heim 1990, Chierchia 1992,, 1995, 
Kanazawa 1994). In all the cases above, intuitions of speakers count against interpreting 
donkey pronouns as implying uniqueness. 
The second problem with alternative (b) relates to events and to an 'indirect' 
incorporation of uniqueness. If, as argued by Neale, we substitute for the numberless 
analysis an analysis endowed with E-type pronouns and quantification over events, 
presumably we will obtain for our standard example (19) (or (54)) something like the 
following structure (where 'Ae' is an existential quantifier ranging over events). 
(Qe) [every x: man x &[ an y: donkey y][Ele]( owns(x, y, e))] ([the y: donkey y& [De] 
(owns(x, y, e))] [ý]A(beats(x, yf )) ) 
It is clear that (Qe) restores uniqueness by relativising the description of the pronouns to 
the events e andfof owning a donkey y by a man x and of beating that particular donkey 
by that particular man respectively. Unfortunately, structure (Qe) cannot represent 
sentence (19) adequately because the truth-conditions of both may differ. For instance, 
given a situation where there is a man b such that b bought two donkeys, (Qe) will be 
false whereas (19) can still be true. In Neale's words, in such a scenario "there is no 
unique donkey c for which there is an event in which b [owns] c" (Neale 1990, p. 245). 
Thus,, this event treatment is impotent to represent the plausible situation in which a man 
owns or buys more than one donkey simultaneously. The trouble, at least in part, with the 
description of events above is that it seems to require a one-to-one correspondence 
between the individuals connected by the owning relation. Although this requirement 
" See next chapter for a formal definition of these quantifiers. 
34However, Kadmon (1990, p. 316-9) shows how simple sage plant cases can be accommodated within a 
uniqueness setting. 
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obviously secures uniqueness of the object denoted by the NP a donkey, it clearly limits 
the explanatory power of the resulting theory. 
There exists, nonetheless, an alternative available to event-theorists which handles the 
problem of matching the truth-conditions of (Qe) and (19). The suggestion, made mainly 
by Heim (1990) and Ludlow (1994), is to introduce minimal situations--or minimal 
events-which the quantifier ranges over. The treatment of sentences such as (19) 
proceeds then according to the following steps: (a) we associate a kind of conditional 
force with donkey sentences, (b) we permit the introduction of an implicit universal 
quantifier over minimal situations, and (c) we spell the pronoun out as a definite 
description. We obtain thus the following structure for (19): 
(Qe' ) [every x: man x] [All s] [an y: donkey yj( owns(x, y, s) 
([the y: donkey y& owns(x,, y, s)][ýls'. -! ýs](beats(x, y, s')) )" 
(Qe') says that for every minimal situations in which a man owns a donkey, there is 
another situation s' related to s 36 in which the man beats the donkey in s'. (Qe') allows 
that a man owns more than one donkey as it does not dismiss multiple minimal situations 
describing the owning by the same man of a donkey. As a result, the truth of (Qe') no 
longer requires the existence of a unique donkey owned by a man. Instead, it requires the 
existence of a unique donkey owned by a man in the minitnal situation s". Indeed, we 
can accept that a donkey pronoun describes sets of such minimal situations, where each 
minimal situation is identified as the one containing a unique pair <a, b> such that a is 
a man and ba donkey that a owns. Therefore, the description remains semantically 
singular and its uniqueness presupposition untouched. Finally, it should be noticed that, 
" (Qel) is taken from Ludlow (1994, p. 173). This formula combines restricted quantifier notation and'binary' 
quantifiers of the form '[All x] ((D , 
T)'. Heim's (1990) notation is set-theoretical. There, the description the 
Fis substituted by a partial functionf which is made salient by the context. 
36 This is a loose way of interpreting the expression'<'; however, see chapter six, section 6.2 for a formal 
definition 
" See Larson and Segal (1995, p. 407) for more detail. 
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C-1- 
- trorn an ontological viewpoint, the previous result is a consequence of two assumptions: 
(1) the commitment to individual objects (the members of the pair <a, b>) underlying the 
analysis, and (2) its commitment to minimal situations and, crucially, to sets of situations 
composed, in their turn, of minimal situations or subsituations. 
We believe the above alternative will not do either, not at least given the premises on 
which it is constructed. Our conviction is based on at least two related reasons. First,, 
from an empirical point of view, as we shall show in chapter five, the minimal situation 
account does not provide an adequate treatment for other sorts of donkey sentences, in 
particular, complex sage plant sentences. Second, from a more speculative point of view, 
the philosophical recourse to subsituations or subevents is quite unilluminating when 
applied to donkey anaphora and clearly questionable when we want to analyse donkey 
sentences involving collective NPs in object position. We will examine a typical defense 
of this sort of minimal event account offered by Ludlow (1994). 
Ludlow maintains a minimal event analysis applicable to simple sage plant sentences like 
the one in (63) above. The example that Ludlow uses in order to support his account is 
the conditional sentence 'if a man buys a plant he buys nine others along with ie. By 
putting technicalities aside, the resulting reading that the minimal event analysis provides 
is that in (Qe"). 
(Qe") All (minimal) events e of buying of a plant by a man are related to ( or included 
in) an event (non-minimal) e' of 'buying of that plant plus nine others'. 38 
Ludlow recognizes that (Qe") could be rejected on the basis that my buying of ten plants 
does not necessarily imply ten subevents or subsituations in which I buy the plants 
individually. For there are cases where plants come in ten-packs (or donkeys in n-herds, 
" In LudlovVs notation, (Qe") corresponds to the formula (i) below ( e* denotes a non-minimal event), 
(1) [All e*] [ [an x: man x& [an y- plant y] (buy(xy, e*))] - [the y- man x& 
[an y- plant y] (buy(xy, e*))] 
( [nine z: plant z& [the y: plant y& buy(xy, e*)] & y,, z] 
(ýIe': ý e*)( buy(x, y, e')) )I 
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for that matter) and cannot be purchased individually. He then argues in the following 
way: 
Even in this case, however, I think it is clear that there are 
(at least) ten sub-events in which the individual plants are 
purchased. Had nine of the plants later died and a friend 
asked when and where I bought the surviving plant, 
I would surely not hesitate to answer. I would answer 
by saying when and where I bought the plant. I surely 
would not say that I did not buy it, but that I bought a 
ten-pack and the surviving plant is part of what I bought. 
(Ludlow 1994, p. 169) 
It is worthwhile to clarify the scope of the philosophical implications behind Ludlow's 
argument. He introduces an atomistic refinement of our ontology of events which affects 
all object-position NPs of sentences with transitive verbs like buy, sell, own, interplay 
and, presumably, perception verbs like see, listen, etc. Since such verbs can take count 
nouns, mass terms and collections or groups indifferently as their object NPs, this 
refinement,, in principle, should embrace all of them. Thus, quantification over events 
involving such verbs will involve quantification over subevents, with a cardinality (if 
any) determined by the atoms constituting the object NP. In other words, the ontology of 
events of speakers will be, in such contexts, richer and more productive than usually 
thought. We believe both friends and enemies of philosophical parsimony would agree 
that such an ontological claim needs to be substantiated by an extensive and detailed 
argument. In our opinion, Ludlow provides nothing like that. 
However the evaluation of the aforementioned ontological claims may be, we think that 
the semantic side of Ludlow's argument can be resisted. The most important reason for 
this resistance is related to collections or pluralities. In the first place, Ludlow's 
ontological refinement creates in our semantics the necessity of artificially distinguishing 
between senses of 'belonging to a plural entity'. Pieces of j igsaws or chessmen are parts 
of sets in the same basic sense as sage plants may be of sage plant ten-packs. However, 
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we would not like to say that buying a chess set involves 32 buyings. And, indeed, it is 
highly doubtful that after losing 31 pieces of a chess set a speaker would reply to the 
question imagined by Ludlow by saying 'Yes, I bought this pawn in Oxford Street five 
years ago' or 'Yes, my grandfather gave me this bishop thirty years ago'. Presumably, 
contra Ludlows intuitions, speakers would reply by saying something like 'No, I did not 
buy this piece. I bought the entire set long ago. In the second place, and related to the 
previous point, it is difficult to see how Ludlows theory can handle some implications 
that the subevent semantics creates for expressions like a heap of or a collection of. 
Again, the selling of a collection of a thousand stamps or the buying of a heap of rice 
grains seems to hardly imply commitments to the existence of a thousand or an undefined 
number of subevents. If this is nonsensical,, where and how then are we to draw the line 
between proper and improper subevents when talking about collections or groups? 
Finally, in order to draw that line we think that an additional definition of 'minimality' 
should be specified. However, if the criterion of minimality cannot depend on the raw 
cardinality of the particular objects involved in the description of the complex event, then 
it is difficult to conceive of a univocal criterion. For complex events can be diversely 
specified. For instance, the buying by a man of 100 sheep can be the selling by another 
man of two herds of 50 sheep. 
Undoubtedly, the discussion above does not show that event or situation treatments of 
unbound anaphora are theoretically impossible. We believe, however, that it does show 
that the plausibility of those treatments relies largely on removing or relaxing therein the 
uniqueness constraint in some consistent and systematic way. 
Alternative (c) implies finally two possible stances. The first one is to endorse apartial 
modification of Neale's conception of definite description in D-type pronouns, according 
to which such descriptions are better represented in certain contexts by non-Russellian 
mechanisms, that is, by referential ones. The treatment of definite descriptions as 
referential within a strict theory of E-type or D-type anaphora has been proven feasible 
by, among others, Lappin (1989), Gawron, Nerbonne and Peters (1991), van der Does 
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(1994), and Lappin and Francez (1994). Although evidently this option introduces a 
certain philosophical distance between the aforementioned proposals and Neale's, we 
think that this partial modification keeps the spirit of the D-type proposal. We will argue 
in that direction in chapters five and six. Since the pragmatical assumptions in Neale's 
theory are mainly motivated by Grice's views, they allow an important interaction 
between contextual information and background assumptions when dealing with 
anaphora across discourse. '9 Now, most current theories about background information 
processing are heavily based on work by Stalnaker (1972,1974,1978, among others). We 
believe that, in the context of a partially modified D-type theory, ' StaInakerian principles 
offer interesting prospects of extension to intersentential anaphora. We enlarge on this 
line of argument in chapter six. 
The second stance is a radical one. It implies the complete abandonment of any E- or D- 
type analysis of donkey anaphora and the acceptance of an essentially different proposal. 
However, such a proposal, we believe, should satisfy two requirements in order to be 
accepted: (i) it should show that any unbound anaphora analysis within the D-type setting 
persistently fails to offer a systematic solution to those problems posed by sentences like 
(58)-(60) above; (ii) it should offer systematic and general solutions for such cases. So 
far, there are no proposals satisfying both requirements. 
Thus, we believe that there are sound grounds to reject options (b) and the radical stance 
of option (c). That is to say, there are compelling reasons to reject treatments of donkey 
" See Neale (1990, p. 184 and p. 261, n. 41. ) 
' Within Neale's Russellian D-type theory, an important clash between StaInakenan and Gricean principles 
can be expected. This clash comes natural given, on the one hand, the acceptance, in StaInaker's theory, of 
notions such as 'pragmatic presupposition' and, on the other hand, the rejection, in Neale's theory, of the 
Strawsonian account of presupposition and its replacement, as we saw in chapter two, with Gricean notions 
such as'proposition expressed', 'proposition meant' and 'proposition conversationally implicated'. As it may 
be recalled from that chapter, with the latter notions, Neale handles the referential challenge that object- 
dependent propositions pose to Russell's theory of definite descriptions (see chapter two, section 2.1.3). 
However, in a modified D-type theory, where we accept that donkey pronouns can 
be interpreted as 
referential definite descriptions, the whole problem of object-dependent propositions vanishes, whatever the 
philosophical evaluation of this move. 
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anaphora relying on uniqueness presuppositions and/or on non-E-type pronouns. 
Moreover, we believe that a referential treatment of unbound pronouns is compatible 
with Neale's D-type theory and, therefore, attractive from an explanatory viewpoint. 
Finally, although we accept option (a), that is, we accept that 'honouring' Geachian truth- 
conditions is a theoretically incorrect goal, we think that there is no need to appeal to 
semantic ambiguity in order to save the non-univocality of donkey sentences. 
Demonstration of this depends heavily on making a case against theories or proposals 
positing a semantic ambiguity within donkey sentences. The last is the main objective of 
the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AMBIGUITY, NONSPECIFICITY AND DONKEY ANAPHORA 
In this chapter we set out the motivations for an analysis of donkey anaphora in terms of 
nonspecificity. In the first place, we shall argue that the natural alternative to that 
analysis, a treatment of donkey sentences as expressing semantic ambiguity, is neither 
theoretically nor empirically cogent. In the second place, we shall suggest that the 
parametric and contextual factors associated with the processing of common nonspecific 
sentences play also a crucial part in the explanation and the processing of the different 
donkey sentence readings. This suggestion is reinforced by a striking parallelism between 
the way that some plural sentences receive different readings and the way that donkey 
sentences receive theirs. Finally, we claim that the formal attractiveness of the 
nonspecificity account stems from at least two characteristics. First, the nonspecificity 
account of donkey anaphora retains the guiding idea of the descriptive treatments of 
unbound anaphora according to which the explanation of the anaphoric relation lies in 
the pronoun rather than the antecedent. Second, a nonspecificity account allows us to 
depict the donkey pronoun as a device that, in accordance with pragmatic and contextual 
knowledge, incorporates parametric factors, which are responsible for the different 
readings that the pronoun gives rise to. 
The chapter consists of four sections. In Section 1, we apply a standard ambiguity test to 
donkey sentences and conclude, from that application, that the prospects of classifying 
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those sentences as ambiguous ones are rather poor. Despite this result, in Section 2 we 
insist with the hypothesis of ambiguity and explore possible internal-to the-sentence 
sources for it, in particular, indefinite determiners. In Section 3, given the poor prospects 
of a theory of ambiguity for donkey sentences, we opt for an analysis of donkey anaphora 
in terms of nonspecificity. In particular, we show how an analysis in terms of such 
notions as external meaning, referential nonspecificity and parameterization seems to 
satisfy most of our semantic and pragmatic intuitions about donkey anaphora. Finally, 
Section 4 recapitulates the main thread of concern examined throughout the chapter and 
makes an initial evaluation of the prospects of the nonspecificity account. 
4.1 Donkey Anaphora and An Ambiguity Test 
If we regard a donkey sentence as expressing semantic ambiguity we can evaluate the 
source of that ambiguity from at least two standpoints (obviously related if we assume 
compositionality): (a) from the standpoint of the sentence as a semantic whole, (b) from 
the standpoint of the internal composition of the sentence. In the latter case, as pointed 
out in Chapter Three, Section 3.2, the analysis will depend on which constituent of the 
sentence produces the ambiguity, the determiner or the pronoun. In this section we shall 
focus on examining ambiguity from the sentence stanpoint. This is followed in the next 
section by an examination of ambiguity from the internal composition stanpoint. 
The discussion about non-univocality of donkey sentences originates from the fact that 
they can, in principle, receive two possible interpretations, the existential and the 
universal interpretation-henceforth, E-reading and U-reading respectively. The 
cumbersome expression 'donkey ambiguity'will help us to designate such a duality of 
readings. 'Now, if questioned as to whether, given such interpretations, donkey sentences 
are semantically ambiguous or not, we can ask ourselves whether there is a way of 
' This convention, however, cannot apply to our discussion in the 
following chapters, where we examine 
other kinds of readings generated by donkey sentences. 
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definitively testing this fact before giving an answer. In other words, we can ask whether 
there is a semantic means of establishing that the duality E-reading/U-reading is a 
manifestation of ambiguity and not of, for example, nonspecificity, vagueness or other 
similar phenomena. A test that seems to provide such a means is the one formulated by 
Quine (1 960)-henceforth QT. Before applying that test to the problem of donkey 
anaphora, it is worth noticing that QT, as any other test of that sort, cannot be considered 
as being able to implement the necessary conditions for a non-univocal sentence to be 
qualified as ambiguous. ' At best, it provides reasonable criteria that match most of our 
semantic intuitions about ambiguity. Therefore, we can take its results,, when they do not 
conflict sharply with those intuitions, to be reliable enough to suggest presence or 
absence of ambiguity, but nothing else. QT-an extensional test of ambiguity-can be 
schematically stated as follows. ' 
(QT) A sentence is ambiguous iff, with respect to a given state of affairs, the sentence 
can be both truly affirmed and truly denied. 
Applied to the paradigm donkey sentence, repeated as (1) below, QT should tell us , in a 
situation A where we truly affirm the sentence (namely, the state of affairs determined 
by the U-reading of (1)) whether we are equally entitled to truly deny the sentence, and 
' The limitations of the ambiguity tests have been classicaly examined in Zwicky and Sadock (1975). The 
most important upshot of their paper is that, where there is a relation of (proper) inclusion between the two 
(or more) intended interpretations or readings of a sentence, the sentence will count as non-ambiguous (see 
Zwicky and Sadock 1975, pp. 23-4)- So, non-univocal sentences containing words commonly considered 
ambiguous like, for instance, a dog Will qualify always as nonspecific, due to the fact that one of the senses 
of the word is included in the other (in this particular case, the sense 'male dog' in the generic sense 
unspecified for sex). Although Zwicky and Sadock's conclusions are intended to apply to lexical cases of 
ambiguity considered by Lakoff (1970), they can be extended to other more conspicuous cases, in particular, 
scope ambiguity caused by the interaction of two quantified NPs. Thus, Zwicky and Sadock's results throw 
also doubts about the nature of certain cases of structural or sentential ambiguity (see Kempson 1977, pp. 
136-7). For more discussion on ambiguity tests see Kooij (1971), Atlas (1977,1989), Lyons (1977), Kempson 
and Cormack (1982) and Roberts (1987). 
3 QT was originally intended to apply to just lexical items (see Quine 1960, p. 121 and p. 13 1) . However, 
extension to sentences is obvious. For discussion see Atlas (1989) and 
for an application to plural sentences 
see Gillon (1987). 
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therefore to get its E-reading. ' 
(1) Every man who owns [a donkey], beats it,. 
Let us imagine that A represents a model in which the following conditions hold: two 
men, Joe and Jim,, own a total of three donkeys; Joe owns Toffee and Jim owns Blackie 
and Spot. In addition, in A Joe beats Toffee and Jim beats Blackie and Spot. Given these 
conditions,, that is to say, given a model or situation in which all donkeys are beaten by 
their owners, we are entitled to truly affirm (1) as implying the reading in (2) below. 
(2) Every man who owns a donkey beats all donkeys he owns. 
However,, clearly A does not entitle us to truly deny (1). ) 1. e., to utter the sentence 
(3), 
which is equivalent (in the proposed situation) to the E-reading in (4). 
(3) Every man who owns a donkey does not beat all donkeys he owns. 
(4) Every man who owns a donkey beats some donkeys he owns. 
We can consider a new situation B with identical conditions as A except that, for 
example, Jim does not beat Spot. In that case, interpreters (in normal circumstances) will 
take it that (1) is false, that is, they Will be entitled to truly deny (1). Then both (3) and 
(4) will be true but indeed (2) will not. And, as a result, we are not entitled to truly deny 
and affirm (1) in the same situation or state of affairs. 
The same argument seems to apply to those sentences like (5) below, whose preferred 
reading is the existential one. 
(5) Every man who has [a credit card], pays his bill with it,. 
'We assume that, as a matter of fact, the domain of the entities 
denoted by the quantified NPs of the donkey 
sentences is nonempty. 
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Let us suppose a model or situation C where John and Joe have in total four credit cards, ) 
namely, John has a Master one and a Gold one, and Joe has a Visa one and a Silver one, 
and John pays his gas bill with the Master card and Joe his phone bill with the Silver 
card. Thus, given situation C, (5) will be truly affirmed on the E-reading, that is, on the 
reading in (6) below. 
(6) Every man who has a credit card pays his bill with one (of the) card(s) he has. 
Clearly, given C, we are not entitled to truly deny (5) and, thereby, utter the sentence 
(7)-the negation of the E-reading, which is equivalent (in the proposed situation) to the 
U-reading stated in (8). 
(7) Every man who has a credit card does not pay his bill with one of the cards he has. 
(8) Every man who has a credit card pays his bill with all credit cards he has. 
This,, we believe, shows us that we are not entitled to truly affirm and deny sentence (5) 
in the same situation or state of affairs. Thus, application of extensional tests of 
ambiguity such as QT or similar ones apparently dictates that donkey sentences cannot 
be ambiguous. However plausible such a conclusion may sound, it might be resisted 
because of two reasons, present already in our discussion. On the one hand, (and as 
indicated in footnote 2) no test of that sort can be taken as specifying necessary (and 
sufficient) conditions for determining ambiguity. On the other hand, QT is weakly 
sensitive to the internal structure of the sentence. That is,, it does not provide any 
suggestion concerning particular constituents of the sentence in question. These reasons 
suggest that, before drawing any definitive conclusion, we must explore whether other 
internal constituents of the sentence in question can be the hidden source of the purported 
ambiguity. 
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4.2 Ambiguity of Determiners or Ambiguity of Pronouns? 
4.2.1 Rooth's account 
A first and obvious alternative when examining ambiguity in the internal structure of 
donkey sentences is to look at indefinites. That is to say, we may consider the indefinite 
determiner a within the restriction of the phrase every F in those sentences as a 
constituent lexically ambiguous between an U-reading and an E-reading. In the U-reading 
case, the indefinite determiner should be interpreted in the same way as the determiner 
any is. But this proposal must be quickly rejected on the basis of well-established 
evidence. ' For example, sentences like (9) and (10) below leave no room for universal 
readings of their indefinites. ' Consequently, (9) and (10) acceptjust E-readings. 
(9) A man from Manchester came to see me this morning. 
(10) My wife read a novel last night. 
Since the theory of full-blown ambiguity of the indefinite collapses immediately due to 
its being'too coarse', a more fine-grained analysis of the donkey constituents seems to be 
called for, if we are to stick to the idea of an ambiguity internal to donkey sentences. An 
example of a more sophisticated ambiguity approach is Rooth (1987). Rooth proposes 
that the apparent universal force of the indefinite (the U-reading) in donkey sentences be 
explained in ternis of the quantificational determiners that are adjoined to the head of the 
QNP containing the indefinite in the restrictive clause. According to Rooth, it is 
necessary to draw a finer distinction in donkey sentences between the head of the QNPs 
(for example, man who owns... or donkey which is owned .. ) and the indefinite NPs in 
the restrictive clause of that QNP (for example, a donkey in who owns a donkey, or a 
51 Generic'uses, as in (1) below, are usually the source for wrongly claiming a full-blown ambiguity of the 
indefinite. In fact, the genericity of (i) is a property of the whole sentence (or clause) rather than of the 
determiner or NP; see Pelletier and Asher (1997). 
(i) A philosopher must know logic. 
'See Neale (1990) and Hintikka and Carlson (1978). 
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man in which is owned by a man). 7 Rooth justifies that distinction by reflecting on the 
relation between the FOC structure (11) below and the paradigm donkey sentence. 
(11) (Vx)(Vy) ff man (x) & donkey (y) & own(x, y)] - beat(x, y)] 
He then argues as follows: 
[S]uppose we agree that [(11)] entails[(a) below]. This tells us 
nothing about models, [ ... 
], where some man beats some 
but not all of the donkeys he owns. Specifically, suppose 
John owns ten donkeys and beats exactly nine of them, 
and that every other man beats every donkey he owns. Then 
is [(a)] true? 
[(a)] Every man who owns a donkey beats it 
[(b)] Every donkey which is owned by a man is beaten by 
him. 
Informants have given me varied and guarded judgements 
about this case. What everyone agrees however is that [(b)] 
is false under these circumstances. What is the explanation 
for the difference in intuitions if [(a)] and [(b)] have the same 
interpretation [ 
... 
]? (Rooth 1987, pp. 253-4) 
Rooth also contends to the extent that the analysis of every and a donkey in [(a)] and [(b)] 
is "extended to other determiners,, similar problems arise". That is to say, hearers should 
interpret sentences (13) and (15) below differently from their standard counterparts, 
namely, (12) and (14). ' 
(12) Most men who own a donkey beat it. 
See Rooth (1987, p. 254). 
'Rooth is here reacting to certain theories of donkey anaphora (for example, Kamp 1981 and Heim 1982) that 
seem to imply that these pairs of sentences are semantically equivalent by relying on the apparent equivalence 
of [(a)] and f(b)] above. However, it is clear that such an equivalence could not be held for the pairs (12)-(13) 
and (14)-(15) below. Thus, let us suppose a situation with a hundred farmers, ninety-nine of whom own 
exactly one donkey, and one of whom owns a thousand donkeys. Now suppose further that the latter farmer 
beats all of his donkeys whereas none of the other donkeys are beaten. In that situation, sentences (12) and 
(14) are false while (13) and (15) are true. See Rooth (1987, p. 254) and Kanazawa (1994, p. 115-6). 
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(13) Most donkeys owned by a man are beaten by him. 
(14) Many a man who owns a donkey beats it. 
(15) Many a donkey owned by a man is beaten by him. 
Therefore, Rooth concludes, these data "motivate a semantic distinction between the head 
of the quantified NP and indefinite NPs in donkey sentences" (Rooth, op. cit. p. 254). In 
particular, according to Rooth, when monotone increasing determiners' (quantifiers like 
every, or most) appear adjoined to the original head of the QNPs that contain the 
indefinite determiner-as in donkey sentences [(a)], (12) and (14), a duality or ambiguity 
of readings of the indefinites seems available. The two readings are the E-reading when 
the indefinite is interpreted within the restrictive clause of the QNP and the U-reading 
when the indefinite is interpreted independently on the head of the quantified NPs. For 
instance, the U-readings generated for the indefinites of sentences [(a)] and (12) may be 
exemplified respectively by the sentences (16) and (17) below. " 
(16) For eve x such that x is a man who owns a donkeY2,., for evely donkey which is 
owned by x, x beats it2- 
(17) For most x such that x is a man who owns a donkeY2, - 
for every donkey which is 
'Being monotone increasing'Is an instance of a quite general property of determiners, namely, their having 
'directional entailingness' (Ladusaw 1979). This general property can be spelt out as the capacity of the 
determiner of preserving entailment from a more (or less) restrictive term to another less (or more) restrictive 
terms. This property and others have been extensively studied by, among others, Barwise and Cooper (198 1) 
and Higginbotham and May (1981). Nontechnical definitions for monotone increasing and decreasing 
determiners can be formulated as follows: given a determiner D, and predicate formulae (Dand T, (a) D is a 
monotone increasing determiner iff '(Dx)(4)x)' and '(Vx)((Dx - Tx)' imply '(Dx)(Tx)'; and (b) D is a 
monotone decreasing determiner iff'(Dx)(4)x)'and'(Vx)(Tx - 4)x)' imply '(Dx)(Tx)'; D is non-monotone 
iff it is neither monotone-increasing nor monotone-decreasing. We can also give definitions of monotonicity 
for restricted quantifiers. In such a case, the scope of the determiner will have to be systematically introduced. 
For example, the following Will be the (nontechnical) definition of a restricted monotone increasing 
determiner: D is a monotone increasing determiner iff '[Dx: 4)x](Tx)' and '[every x: Tx](]Px)' imply 
'[Dx-(Dx](Fx)'. In systematically introducing restrictions and scopes, attribution of the property of 
monotonicity to determiners Will Involve their scope as well. In such a case, a determiner can, for example, 
be monotone Increasing in the restriction (or'leff monotone increasing) but monotone decreasing in the scope 
(or'nght' monotone decreasing). Finally, given the above definitions, natural language determiners like'every 
F', 'some Fs', 'most Fs', and 'the F' Will qualify as monotone increasing whereas quantifiers like 'few Fs', 
'exactly n Fs', 'no Hand just one F'VAll not. It is worth noting that all of these definitions can be formulated 
and studied within a strictly set-theoretical conception of quantifiers; for details see Barwise and Cooper 
(198 1), van Benthem (1983) and Larson and Segal (1995). 
"A similar proposal is stated in Root (1986). See Chierchia (1995) for other details, 
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owned by x, x beats 't2- 
As Chierchia (1995, p. I 11) explains,, the first underlined component in (16) and (17) 
binds the variable supplied by the head of the NP. In his words, the quantificational force 
of the latter depends on the lexical meaning of the determiner. In contrast, the second 
underlined component is fixed for every determiner and binds universally the indefinites 
in the restriction. 
As Chierchia notices, Rooth's proposal can be implemented within a dynamic approach. 
In order to do so, we need to modify the definition of the conditional underlying the every 
determiner. The idea will be that every way of verifying the antecedent leads to a 
verification of the consequent. In other words, we need something like the definition of 
the every determiner in (18) below. Therein the expression '-' stands for a non-classical 
conditional, which depends on verification conditions. Also, as indicated by Chierchia, 
since (18) is equivalent to '[ýjx(D ]-v (T)' (where T contains no free occurrences of Y), 
we can mutatis mutandis obtain, from the dynamic E-reading of a donkey sentence in 
(19), the U-reading in (19') (which is the version of (11) above). 
(18) ( Vx)[ (D -v T]. 11 
(19) (Vx)([man (x) & (ýIy)[ donkey (y) & own (x, y) -v [ beat (x, y)]) 
(19') (Vx)(Yy)[[ man (x) & donkey (y) & own(x, y)] _-V 
[ beat (x, y)]) 
Rooth's proposal, in our opinion, has two advantages in comparison with the full-blown 
theory of lexical ambiguity: firstly, it is an improvement because it dismisses the 
indefinites as a lexical source of the ambiguity of donkey sentences. According to Rooth, 
" Rooth's definitions of determiners involve generalized quantifiers. That is, quantifiers denoting relations 
between sets (see Chapter Five for a more detailed explanation). In turn, the sets related are, in 
Rooth's theory, 
parameterized sets (in the sense of Barwise and Perry 1983). Rooth's 
formulation of the definition of every 
is the following- 
Ileveryll =((g, P, Q, h) I g=h&Pg--Q I (where 9 and hare assignments and 
P and Q range over 
parameterized sets) 
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it is the monotone increasing determiners, interacting with intemal-to-the-QNP 
configurations, that determine the different readings of the indefinites. Secondly, it 
assumes that every donkey sentence will generate two readings, namely, the E- and the 
U-reading respectively. That is to say, it assumes tacitly that, quite apart from the 
contextual factors selecting a particular reading, the ambiguity is a systemadc 
phenomenon affecting each sentence in virtue of its determiners. 
Despite these improvements, however, the proposal is defective on several counts. Its 
main defect is that the shift from the indefinites to other determiners , in order to 
accommodate the ambiguity, does not add anything in terms of adequacy and simplicity 
to the semantics thus constructed. A first general criticism put forward by Chierchia 
(1995) is that the general availability of both the U-reading and the E-reading seems 
extremely doubtful. The point is that if the availability of the readings depends on 
genuine and definite ambiguity, there should be languages where such an ambiguity is 
resolved. In Chierchia's words, one would expect to find languages where "the every 
which has the [E-Jreadings and the one which has the [U-]readings are realized as 
different words or morphemes" (Chierchia 1995, p. 112). And so far we know of no 
language bearing such a difference. The following remark from linguists working on 
ambiguity issues brings out the point made by Chierchia. 
If a distinction in [readings] is a systematic ambiguity 
in some language , then that 
distinction is potentially 
realizable by a formal mark in some other language; 
conversely, a distinction not formally realizable 
is either a systematic lack of specification or an 
unsystematic ambiguity. (Zwicky and Sadock 
1975, p. 5) 
A second and more important criciticism concerns the nature of the E-reading that 
Rooth's treatment assigns to donkey sentences. In our opinion, it is questionable that such 
a reading allows us to attribute any genuinely existential interpretation to donkey 
pronouns. As far as we can see, Rooth's treatment compels us to understand in the 
universal sense those pronouns because their interpretation depends on the monotone 
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increasing determiners associated with the head. This can be seen by checking the 
consequences that follow ftom definition (18) when we consider donkey sentences-for 
example, sentence (5) above-where the E-reading is the preferred one. In such an E- 
reading, the existential import of the indefinite in the relative clause is completely 
transferred to the donkey pronoun in the matrix VP. That is to say, (5) can be understood 
as $every person who has a credit card pays his/her bill with some (or one) of the credit 
cards he/she has'. RootlYs proposal does not enable us to capture this reading as a genuine 
and independent interpretation of the sentence in question. For, given the equivalence 
between 'Vx [(D -V Tf and 'L3 x(D] -v (T)', it follows that the donkey pronoun can 
always be understood universally, that is, as in sentence (16). Accordingly, it seems hard 
to see how preferred E-readings of donkey sentences can be obtained in this approach as 
genuine and independent readings. 
Finally, a semantics that permits ambiguities of determiners of the sort suggested by 
Rooth is bound to face problems of simplicity and generality. For, in order to obtain the 
relevant readings, this semantics must modify standard definitions of some quantifiers. 
The problem in this case is that those modifications can, in their turn, affect general 
properties of the quantifiers In question in certain circumstances. Thus, as pointed out by 
Chierchia, " Rooth's definition will affect the dynamic conservativity of the monotone 
increasing determiners, i. e. the dynamic version of an apparently universal property of 
such determiners. " According to Chierchia, any determiner with the structure of (16) or 
" See Chierchia (1995, p. 112). 
" Conservativity is a determiner relation holding between two sets Y., Y just in case it holds between the first 
and the intersection of the first with the second. Formally speaking, a determiner D is conservative if for all 
X, Y and all M such that X, Yr-M, D(X)(Y) iff D(X)(XnY) (see WesterstAhl 1989). Another alternative 
definition given by Keenan and Stavi (1986) is the folloWing: a functionf is conservative iff for all properties 
P, Q, Pc-AQ) iff (PAQ)c-, AQ). The folloWing equivalences illustrate some natural language conservative 
determiners: 
(a) Many musicians run -Many musicians are musicians who run 
(b) Few polticians snore -Few politicians are politicians who snore 
(c) Jim meets Wilfredo -Jim is Jim and meets Wilfredo. 
Non-conservative quantified phrases are, given the above definition, all but, everyone except or only (see 
Larson and Segal 1995, ch. 8). Since conservativity is perhaps the most general property characterizing all 
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(17) turns out not to be dynamically conservative. Technicalities aside, this has 
immediate consequences in interpreting sentences like (5) above. In Chierchia's words, 
"if [ 
.... 
] we analyze every as in [(16) or (17)], it is clear that Every person who has a dime 
will put it in the metee does not come out equivalent toEvery person who has a dime is 
a person who has a dime and puts it in the meter', for the former entails that every dime 
owned by everyone is put in the meter, while the latter does not" (Chierchia 1995, 
p. 112). " Thus, Rooth's definitions seem to threaten the general adequacy of a semantic 
treatment of unbound anaphora. 
The results of the application of QT and the failure of both the theory of full-blown 
ambiguity of the indefinites and Rooth's theory of ambiguity of determiners lead us to 
conclude that the analysis of donkey anaphora in terms of ambiguity discussed above is 
unattractive. That might also lead one to the rather hasty conclusion that any other 
ambiguity account of donkey anapbora will be unattractive because of its sharing all or 
some premises behind the previous analysis. Nevertheless, there is at least one theory of 
donkey ambiguity that clearly escapes this last conclusion. Therefore, we must examine 
this theory before taking a general stand on the donkey ambiguity hypothesis. 
4.2.2 Chierchia's ý&namic solution 
The theory in question has been defended by Chierchia (1992,1995). It offers an 
interesting solution which retains the ambiguity analysis without positing any internal 
source of the ambiguity in question. According to Chierchia, there is no necessity to 
posit a lexical ambiguity in the determiners since donkey pronouns "have no inherent 
semantic content" (Chierchia 1995, p. 113). He claims that, in analogy With variables in 
FOC,, donkey pronouns have free and bound uses and that these uses do not depend on 
human language determiners, Barwise and Cooper assume that such a property is "the only genuinely logical 
arwise and Cooper (198 1) and constraint" to be imposed on them. For other properties and theorems see 
B 
Keenan and Stavi (1986). For discussion and some alleged counterexamples see 
Keenan (1996). 
" Also Chierchia rejects on simplicity grounds other dynamic definitions of conservativity suitable to 
determiners with U-readings. 
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any structural feature internal to the pronouns or the determiners. As a result', the crucial 
question for Chierchia is how to provide the content for donkey pronouns. In a few 
words, his general answer goes as follows: we must provide the content by relying on LF 
semantics-semantics of binding-and pragmatics-the E-type strategy. The following 
is his own formulation of the point. 
[The] content [of donkey pronouns] is provided in essentially 
two ways: via semantic binding (in the appropriate 
configurations) or via contextually available information. The 
E-type strategy, I believe, is part of the second way of 
individuating the content of the pronouns; it is a strategy to 
retrieve through the context the value of unbound pronouns. 
More specifically, the linguistic and extralinguistic context 
can supply descriptions which can be exploited to 
reconstruct the intended value of a pronoun. (Chierchia 
1995, p. 113) 
Before examining Chierchia! s version of E-readings, we must clarify the main 
assumptions behind his line of reasoning. Chierchia uses a dynamic approach to 
semantics, that follows to certain extent Groenendijk and Stockhof (1990). This approach 
incorporates the idea that interpretation of sentences in discourse is sensitive to conhxt 
change. Chierchia clarifies this view by saying "sentences introduce new discourse 
referents and deactivate old ones, thereby constraining the way discourse unfolds" 
(Chierchia op. cit., p. 8 1). Using Chierch&s approach, we can translate a natural 
language sentence S into a formal language sentence S" to form a formula [S' A pl. The 
latter formula conjoins S' with a propositional variable which can be filled "by adding 
information to S in any possible way". Consequently, 'pý can be seen as a hook onto which 
incoming information can be hung. Chierchia concludes that [S' A p] can be interpreted 
as "a representation of the options one has available as a consequence of uttering S in the 
initial context-that is, as the conaxt changepotendal of S" (Chierchia op. cit. p. 8 1; my 
emphasis). This allows Chierchia to interpret sentences like 'a woman sings' by means of 
the forrnula'ýIx [woman (x) A sings (x) A pf, where the underlined portion is the formal 
" Chierchia uses a version of Montague's Intentional Logic (11L); see Chierchia op. cit. p. 78. 
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translation of 'a woman sings' while 'pý works as the variable over possible continuations 
according to the model of context change potentials. Also, the scope of the existential 
quantifier includes'p'. Thus, it is possible now to interpret a possible continuation of the 
previous sentence like 'she was pretty'by means of the formula'ýIx [woman (x) A sings 
(x) A pretty (x) A pf. And by composing the latter formula in analogy with the former 
one, the variable corresponding to the pronoun she winds up being bound by'ýIx'(which 
corresponds to the NP a woman in the initial sentence), despite the fact that the pronoun 
is not within the syntactic scope of the NP. So, Chierchia suggests that the value of 
sentences be (compositionally) calculated in terms of context change potentials instead 
of truth-conditions. Chierchia proposes to formalize this semantics of context change 
potentials in accordance with the following constraints: the context change potential of 
a standard formula 4) can be represented by means of a ; ý-expression, i. e. ; ýp[4) A 'p], 
which in turn Chierchia abbreviates by means of I (ý'. The 'up-affoW works as "an 
operator mapping the ordinary, static value of a formula into the coresponding context 
change potential". Thus, the sentence 'he sings', statically translated by 'sing (x, )' ( 'x, ' 
represents a 'discourse marker'), can be dynamically translated by I sing (x)', which is 
equivalent to '; ýp[sing (xi) A 'p]'. Finally, Chierchia builds up the logic underlying his 
dynamic semantics by means of non-standard dynamic definitions of logical operations. 
Those definitions, formulated in terms of context change potentials, are as follows: 
(i) AAB= Xp[A(",, B (p))] 
(ii): ý: A =T-IA 
(iii)AvB=-[-AA -B] 
(lv) A-B= -A v [A A B] 
(v) ýIxA = Xpýlx [A(p)] 
(vi) VxA =- Dx -A 
Thus, if 'C' is a standard logical connective or quantifier, 'C' is its (non-standard) dynamic 
counterpart as defined over context change potentials. 
The foregoing enable us to specify how Chierchia obtains his version of the E-reading for 
the paradigm donkey sentence (1) above. Definitions 
Ov), (v) and (vi) are crucial here. 
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In particular, using a conjunction in (iv) has the effect that quantifiers active in the 
antecedent will be able to bind variables in the consequent. 
16SO, 
the canonical translation 
of (1) into a dynamic language will be (20. a) below. 
(20. a) Vx[Xp [man(x) A 3y[ donkey(y) A owns(xy) A 'p]] - Xp[beat(x, y) A 'p]] 
In (20. a) the antecedent corresponds to man that owns a donkey and the consequent to 
beats it. The variable (or discourse marker) corresponding to the pronoun is not in the 
scope of the quantifier corresponding to a donkey. By applying the dynamic definition 
of every in (18) above (20. a) can be interpreted as saying that for every x, either x is not 
a donkey-owning man or x is a man that has a donkey and beats it. " And use of dynamic 
conjunction in the consequent allows a donke to semantically bind it, as (20. b) below y 
makes it clear. 
(20. b) T Vx[ [man(x) A ýIy[ donkey(y) A owns(x, y)]] - ýIy[donkey(y) A owns(x, y) A 
beat(x, y)]]" 
In (20. b) the pronoun it is clearly bound in the consequent by the existential quantifier 
'ýY. Thus, (20. b) entails a (kind of) E-reading according to which, every man who owns 
a donkey beats at least one donkey that he owns. Also, as argued by Chierchia, interaction 
of the previous definitions of logical operators with the non-standard definition of 
dynamic conservativity given in (vil) below is enough to secure conservativity of the 
determiner every in examples like (5) above, where the E-reading is the preferred one. " 
(vil) Det(P)(Q) - Det(P (P A Q) [where P, 
Q are dynamic properties and A is 
" Whereas truth-conditionally'-A v B'and'-A v[AA B]'are equivalent, their dynamic counterparts are not, 
17 See Chierchia (op. cit. p. 92) 
" See Chierchia (op. cit. p. 92) 
" See Chierchia (op. cit. pp. 97-8 and pp. 111-2) 
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a generalized dynamic conjunction] 
Although Chierchia's U-reading coincide with the E-type reading With respect to the 
descriptive conception of the donkey pronoun, the former do not coincide with the latter 
with respect to the nature of the pronoun itself. Instead of conceiving donkey pronouns 
as going proxy for rigid designators (Evans) or quantifiers (Cooper, Neale), Chierchia, 
by following other theorists, contends that such pronouns go proxy for functions from 
individuals to individuals. " The function, according to Chierchia, is contextually 
specified so that "what governs the use of E-type pronouns is simply the fact that in 
certain contexts [ ... ] functions from individuals into individuals become salient in the 
common ground and can be used in interpreting the pronouns" (Chierchia 1995, p. 114). 
Moreover,, this implies, technically speaking, that domains and ranges of such functions 
are contextually supplied. Thus, the U-reading of the sentence generated by Chierchia's 
functional strategy for sentence (1) above will be the one in (2 1). 
(2 1) Vx[[ man(x) & ýly[donkey(y) & owns(x, y)]] - beats(x, Ax))] 
fa function from men into the donkey (or donkeys) they own. 
The function in (2 1) then picks out the individual or individuals in the range (i. e. donkeys 
owned by men in the domain) and allows us to describe them in the E-type way (i. e. as 
the donkey or donkeys owned by those men). Number-neutrality or numberless is 
secured, according to Chierchia, by the ftmctional interpretation because "when pronouns 
are interpreted functionally, they seem to have a particular semantic property, namely that 
of being unmarked as to whether the value of the function is singular or plural" 
(Chierchia 1995, p. 115). Since we shall discuss in detail the functional conceptions of 
donkey anaphora in Chapter Five, we will not deal here with other technical aspects of 
Chierchia's theory. 
See Chierchia (op. cit., P. 116). In Chierchia (1992), this author assumed a slightly dIfferent functional 
conception, according to which U-readings are obtained from choice functions mapping individuals to one 
individual in the range (see Chapter Five). Nonetheless, Chierchia makes an explicit rejection of the choice 
function conception in Chierchia (1995), after some criticisms of it by Kanazawa (1994). 
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The results of Chierchia's account seem more satisfactory than those of the previous 
proposals. First of all, in his approach there is no lexical ambiguity at all. That is,, the 
ambiguity does not involve any constituent (either determiners or pronouns) of the 
donkey sentence. Rather the ambiguity is to be located , if we understand Chierchia 
rightly, in the modules that the speaker appeals to in interpreting sentences-namely 
logic, semantics, and pragmatics-and in the different emphasis that the speaker put on 
each module when he uses the sentences in real communication. Accordingly, it seems 
fair to say that Chierchia's proposal entails that ambiguity of donkey sentences is an 
indirect phenomenon, namely a consequence of applying different methods in the course 
of processing donkey sentences by interpreters. Second, Chierchia's approach has greater 
explanatory power than Rootlfs because the former generates the genuine E-reading of 
donkey sentences with monotone increasing determiners and, thereby, the preferred 
reading of sentences like (5) above. Third, Chierchia's nonstandard definitions of the 
determiners match the standard ones and, consequently, preserve, to a certain extent, all 
relevant universal properties of those determiners. 
Despite all these positive aspects, Chierchiaýs proposal has several technical and 
methodological flaws that make it a hopeless solution. Most flaws have been singled out 
by Kanazawa (1994) and Lappin and Francez (1994). We shall consider here only the 
problems that Chierchia's theory raises at the methodological level. 
As we saw, one of Chierchia! s objections to Rooth's proposal is that the latter involves an 
undesirable loss of simplicity and, thereby, of adequacy. However, Chierchia's proposal 
is subject to the same criticism if identical standards of simplicity and adequacy are 
applied to it. Chierchia's solution introduces a complex methodological hiatus in the 
semantics for which no argument is provided. Such increase in complexity seems 
inevitable because the relevant anaphoric readings are going to be generated differently: 
the binding theory will be responsible for one type of representation-the E-reading with 
the bound interpretation of the pronoun-and the E-type strategy will be responsible for 
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another completely different one-the U-reading with the unbound interpretation. 
Nevertheless, Chierchia produces no explanation to persuade us that this complexity 
describes a real dichotomy in the way that interpreters process anaphoric sentences 
bearing either E-readings or U-readings (or even both). The necessity of such an 
explanation is hardly trivial since, as pointed out by Lappin and Francez (1994, p. 400) 
"the pronouns in both sets of sentences appear to exhibit the same sort of anaphoric 
relation to their antecedents. " The point can be expressed by the following question. Why 
should we assume that the readings in question express two different and 
incommensurable types of anaphora, when firm syntactic intuitions seem to indicate that 
the anaphoric relation is a uniform phenomenon? In fact, as Lappin and Francez argue, 
the apparent difference between Chierchia's readings seems to depend on "the strength 
of the description associated with the pronoun rather than on the nature of the connection 
between the pronoun and the indefinite NP which is its antecedent" (Lappin and Francez 
19945 Ibid. ). In one case, the U-reading, we get a definite description (of the value of the 
function) like the F such that S and, in the other case, the E-reading, we get an existential 
description like at least one F such that S. Differences between both types of descriptions 
seem thus to reduce to different logical conditions on the same anaphoric relation rather 
than to differences in the type of anaphora involved, as Chierchia wants us to believe. 
A second weakness of Chierchia's approach, also suggested by Lappin and Francez, 
concerns the absence of some clear criterion of preference of readings for particular 
sentences. Apparently this defect is remedied in Chierchia (1995) by suggesting "salience 
in the common ground" as what selects the U-reading. However, as argued by Heim 
(1982), salience-although a desirable constraint in donkey anaphora theories-can hardly 
be the sole operative notion in donkey anaphora across discourse. In Chapter One, 
Section 1.3, we examined examples like the following, discussed by Heim: 
(22) 1 dropped ten marbles and found them all except for one. It is probably under the 
sofa 
(23)? 1 dropped ten marbles and found only nine of them. It is probably under the 
sofa. 
144 
(24) Jim owns a donkey. Mary beats it 
(25) ? Jim is a donkey-owner. Mary beats it. 
Heim argues that, e. g. in (24)-(25), since'Jim owns a donkeyand'JIM is a donkey-ownee 
are equivalent, an utterance of either sentence should make Jim's donkey (or donkeys) 
contextually salient. However, she contends,, since the two occurrences of the pronoun 
it are not equally felicitous, we must conclude that "the salience-shifting potential of an 
utterance is not predictable from its truth-conditions and the surrounding circumstances 
alone" (Heim 1982, p. 21). Since the pronouns in (22)-(23) and (24)-(25) must be 
interpreted by means of U-readings (e. g. as the marble that I did notfind or the donkey 
(or donkeys) Jim owns), Heim's conclusion applies also to Chierchia's suggestion of using 
salience for establishing the anaphoric linkage. Thus, if the E-type strategy is available 
across discourse, this cannot only be the consequence of salience mechanisms. Besides, 
it is clear enough that salience (or other pragmatic mechanisms) cannot be ascribed to 
just a particular type of reading of donkey sentences. These sentences can come in 
different fon-ns and the more complex the form, the shakier the intuitions related to them 
will be. Sentence (26) below is a case in point. 
(26) Most students who took a coursefrom Peter last year liked it (Kanazawa 1994) 
To be sure, speakers do not have firm intuitions about the interpretation assignable to 
(26 ). 21 
Therefore, how are we to proceed with examples like this one if we are to accept 
Chierchia! s view? It seems to us that no one clear-cut answer to that question is going to 
come from that view. 
A final objection to Chierchia's proposal has to do with the alleged pragmatical 
21 Apparently most speakers tend to agree that (26) can bejudged true even in situations where 
half of Peter's 
students did not liked some of the courses they took 
from him. See Kanazawa (1994, p. 1] 6) 
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motivation of the E-type strategy. At first sight, Chierchia's contention looks reasonable 
as it is widely accepted by many theorists (Neale among them) that E-type strategies can 
easily implement pragmatic processing mechanisms. However, this does not prevent us 
to syntactically implement such readings as well. In particular, E-type strategies may be 
seen as implementing syntactic generalizations provided by a theory of binding. For 
example, in Parsons (1978)'s theory the definite descriptions that stand for E-type 
pronouns are obtained by mere syntactic transformations and, as Heim emphasises, in 
such a theory, "the relevant matching-relation [between a definite description and a 
clause containing the indefinite antecedent] is characterized in purely syntactic terms" 
(Heim 1982, p. 74). 22 This conflicts with Chierchia's analysis of E-readings, which 
compels us to obtain such readings only by pragmatic means and with no recourse to any 
syntactic constraint. Thus, given that Chierchia's theory assumes that the essential 
difference between both readings of a donkey sentence relies on different, excluyent, 
strategies (the binding vs. pragmatics dichotomy), Parson's binding analysis and others 
similar to it represent a challenge to that assumption. Since Chierchia does not provide 
any further argument to substantiate the mentioned dichotomy, we must therefore 
conclude that his proposal remains questionable. 
4.2.3 Are donkey pronouns ambýguous? A misleading criticism 
It is still open to theories defending an intemal-to-the-sentence factor as the source of the 
donkey ambiguity a last alternative: to identify the pronoun and its interaction with the 
every determiner as the precise origin of that ambiguity. Consequently, it is reasonable, 
before concluding our examination of the donkey ambiguity hypothesis, to ask whether 
there is any theory holding the donkey pronoun as responsible for the purported 
ambiguity. This is not a matter of little importance for our purposes here since, as we 
saw, the Evans-Neale theory is one that explains the donkey anaphora phenomenon just 
in terms of the pronoun. So , it comes as no surprise 
to consider that theories sharing 
views similar to Neale's assume the donkey ambiguity hypothesis as well. For instance, 
See also Larson and Segal (1995, p. 403). 
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it has been argued by Chierchia (1995) that the theory formulated by Lappin and Francez 
(I 994ý-a proposal clearly influenced by Evans' work-is the most clear example of an 
E-type theory defending the ambiguity hypothesis. " Since Lappin and Francez's theory 
shall be analysed in detail in the following chapter and our analysis therein differs 
markedly from Chierchia! s, we shall restrict ourselves here to Chierchia's version of such 
a theory rather than the theory itself 
Chierchia regards Lappin and France2s proposal as a non-Russellian modification of the 
E-type strategy, which generates the E- and U-readings by interpreting donkey pronouns 
as a particular kind of function. This is a function that maps individuals into either a 
maximal collection or some of the values of such a collection. In the first case,, the 
function is a standard one,, while the second represents a choice function. It is then 
stipulated that when a certain condition is satisfied, the pronoun must be associated with 
a choice function. This function wilL, in turn, generate the E-reading. If the 
aforementioned condition is not satisfied, the U-reading will be generated (see Chapter 
Five, sections 5.2 and 5.3). Thus, according to Chierchia, our paradigm example (1) can 
be roughly represented as in (27) and the choice function can be specified as in (28). 
(27) ýIfVx[[ man(x) & Ely[donkey(y) & owns(x, y)]] - beats(x, f (x)) ] 
(2 8)) f: a function from men into one of their donkeys. 
If the ftniction in (27) is understood as a standard, single-valued function, the reading of 
the pronoun will come out as the donkey (or donkeys) owned by a man; if the function 
in (27) is understood as specified in (28), the reading of the pronoun in question will 
come out as one of the donkeys owned by a man. Chierchia's conclusion about this 
analysis is the following. 
[T]his is perfectly analogous to having two interpretations 
of determiners. It merely shifts the locus of the ambiguity 
2' Lappin (1989) is the direct precedent of Lappin and Francez 
(1994). The former was developed 
independently of Neale's work and appeared before of it. 
147 
from determiners to pronouns. Hence it has little explanatory 
value (Chierchia 1995, p. 118) 
We believe that there are straightforward reasons to reject Chierchia's conclusion. To be 
more precise, one could accept that conclusion if the following facts hold in Lappin and 
FranceZs theory: (a) donkey sentences are genuinely ambiguous for interpreters and (b) 
donkey pronouns entail a lexical ambiguity at some level of representation. Moreover, 
the expression "perfectly analogous" in Chierchia's quotation is intended to mean that 
Lappin and Francez's theory is (conversely) analogous to Rooth's proposal. Thus, by 
following Chierchia, (a) and (b) could characterize Rootws analysis too, with the 
difference that in such a case, "donkey pronouns" is replaced with "donkey indefinites" 
in premise (b). Yet both (a) and (b) , in our opinion, can be disputed. 
On the one hand, given the results of our discussion about the ambiguity test QT above, 
premise (a) seems dubious. Thus, we are not going to argue further in that direction. On 
the other hand, (b) is apparently false in both the syntactic and semantic sense. That is 
to say, it is not true that Lappin and Francez's proposal generates ambiguous 
representations of donkey pronouns at the syntactic or semantic level. At the syntactic 
level, that proposal allows us to deal, in the same vein as Neale's theory, with anaphoric 
pronouns non-c-commanded by their antecedents. However, non-c-commanded anaphora 
does not entail ambiguities of representations at the syntactic level (i. e. at the LF level). 
This result was shown as to donkey anaphora in the previous chapter (see Section 3.2). 
At the semantic level, the presence of functions does not entail any lexical ambiguity 
affecting the logical form of the representations. Functions are extensional objects and 
therefore they cannot give rise to any ambiguity at all. Since Chierchia's criticism must 
assume this obvious fact, the ambiguity that he attributes to Lappin and Francez's theory 
must concern the interpretations made available to interpreters by the function in 
question. Indeed, since the values of Lappin and Francez's functions oscillate between the 
whole collection of entities in the range and one of the values of that collection (the 
choice function), the authors assume as a matter of fact that interpreters may read the 
value of the ftinction in two (or more) different ways. Yet the particular interpretation of 
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functional values cannot be provided by the formal representation system containing the 
function. In other words, the presence (or absence) of the condition that triggers one of 
the readings is not provided by the semantic constraints but by the interpreters 
themselves. Thus, such readings are rather the consequence of interaction between 
knowledge about the language system and processing of context and background 
information. And this way of describing how functional values are to be interpreted 
corresponds exactly with what the E-type analysis of pronouns stipulates. 
There isl, therefore, no linguistic ambiguity, i. e. no generation of two or more logical 
forms, induced by Lappin and Francez's system, as Chierchia contends. On the contrary, 
representation of functions in that system-as we shall see in Chapter Five-heavily 
depends on the interaction between parametric factors and extralinguistic information. 
This interaction determines whether or notAx) is mapped into the whole collection in 
its range or into one of the values of that range. Thus, Chierchia's suggestion of a "perfect 
analogy" between ambiguity of determiners and functional readings of donkey pronouns 
in Lappin and Francez's sense is clearly misleading. This fact will become clearer in the 
course of our argumentation in the following chapters. Therein we will show, in 
agreement with Lappin and Francez's theory, that if donkey pronouns are conceived as 
fully parametric in nature, the E- and U-readings are not the only available ones. In fact, 
a wide range of readings can be captured. Finally, since in Lappin and Francez's theory 
no proper ambiguity can be postulated, there is also no "shift of the locus of the 
ambiguity", as Chierchia claims. 
Thus, it emerges from our previous discussion that acceptance of the pronouns as 
responsible for the entire donkey anaphora phenomenon (along Evans-Neale or other 
lines) can hardly entail that donkey sentences are genuinely ambiguous. This is due to the 
fact that donkey and unbound pronouns, unlike determiners, are naturally sensitive to 
contextual or parametric information. It is that information that usually helps us to 
specify the content of the pronouns and thus the different readings. All E-type theories, 
therefore, must, to a different extent in each case, make room for that information. 
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Consequently, it seems clear that, in those theories, no semantic ambiguity needs to be 
invoked. Further consideration of Lappin and Francez's theory in Chapter Five will put 
us in a better position to appreciate the explanatory power of this conclusion. 
From our discussion in sections I and 2, three facts become clear. First we should, on 
methodological and theoretical grounds, be reluctant to accept theories that assume 
donkey sentences to be essentially ambiguous and to generate entirely distinct semantic 
structures. Second, our discussion in Section 2 indicates that such theories take 
determiners as the source of the purported ambiguity, whether directlym-as in Rooth's 
theory-or indirectly-as in Chierchia! s theory. Finally, theories of donkey pronouns 
constructed on the E-type analysis (for example, Lappin and Francez's theory, which 
focuses on such pronouns and exploits their contextual or parametric features) need not 
posit any ambiguity. These three facts immediately suggest answers to the following 
obvious questions: (i) since no donkey ambiguity theory appears to be acceptable,, what 
other alternatives should be considered that accommodate the evidence of multiple 
readings associated with donkey sentences? (ii) What elements or constituents of donkey 
sentences are responsible for the range of such readings? 
Concerning question (i), we believe that there are sufficient grounds for preferring a 
theory that regards donkey sentences as semantically nonspecific or underspecified, in 
accordance with our defmitions in sections I and 2 of Chapter Two. Concerning question 
(ii), and granted that the answer to (i) has been accepted,, it comes as natural to suppose 
that the pronouns are responsible for the range of readings. For, as we have suggested, 
such pronouns seem to express referential nonspecificity. In the view preferred in this 
essay this means that we are going to choose an E- or D-type treatment as the general 
framework backing the discussion in the forthcoming chapters. Whereas we are going to 
do so for the rest of the dissertation, it is worth noticing here that there is, as far as we can 
see, no a priori reason to reject other treatments , if they 
focus on the donkey pronoun and 
take the latter as the source of the nonspecificity. 
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4.3 Nonspecificity of Donkey Pronouns: Linguistic and Pragmatic Motivations 
We turn now to consider the prospects of applying an analysis in terms of nonspecificity 
to donkey amphora. As we saw in Chapter Two, an important amount of nonspecificity 
of sentences flows from pronouns-indexical and anaphoric ones--(recall examples 
(9)- (10) in Section 2.2). 21 Unbound pronouns, anaphoric across sentential boundaries, 
seem to behave the same way. To begin with, consider the following examples below. 
(29) My dog has escaped. Apparently, it was unhappy. 
(30) Thefather of each girl cheered her. Then he waved to her. 
(3 1) Smith's murderer is insane. He should be jailed for life. 
Nonspecificity surfaces in each case, although for different reasons. In (29) the reason is 
just indexicality, transmitted from the NP my dog to the pronoun it. Sentence (30) 
(putting aside some technicalities with her) shows that, since the denotation of the NP 
thefather of each girl depends on the denotation of the NP each girl-embedded in the 
former, the pronoun he in the anaphora sentence inherits immediately such dependence. 
Indexicality and background information play a straighforward role in the task of 
sharpening the range of readings available in both cases. Finally, sentence (3 1) shows the 
extent and pervasiveness of nonspecificity in anaphoric processes. As we shown in 
Chapter Two (Section 2.1), Kripke (1977), Neale (1990), Recanati (19 89,1993) have 
aptly argued against many pragmatists" that the description Smith's murderer can hardly 
represent a case of ambiguity between a referential and an attributive interpretation. As 
we indicated,, the description in question is rather Russellian in nature, although with 
referential and nonreferential uses determined at the level of what is said and not at the 
level of simply literal truth-conditions. If this view is accepted, then, as Recanati 
convincingly argues, Smith's murderer may be understood as implying indeterminacy or 
"In fact quantified determiners can also be semantically underspecified or nonspecific with respect to both 
scope and aspects of interpretation other than scope. This happens with quantifiers 
like 'many' and TeW; see 
Reyle (1993), van Deernter and Peters (1996) and Alshawl (1996). 
' Donellan (1966,1968), StaInaker (1972), Partee (1972), Kaplan (1978), Barwise and Perry (1983) among 
others. 
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nonspecificity between both uses at the level of the linguistic or literal meaning. This 
view implies that, whatever the properties and uses that speakers may associate with its 
antecedent, the pronoun he in (3 1) inherits the nonspecificity from its antecedent. 
It is easy to realize how, in the above sentences,, the pronoun inherits the nonspecificity 
from their antecedent NP: speakers are going to interpret the former as a copy of the 
latter. So, for example, the pronoun he in sentences (30) and (3 1) will be interpreted 
simply as the father of each girl and Smith's murderer respectively. Speakers do not 
introduce, therefore, additional specifications of the pronoun, beyond the linguistic and 
extralinguistic information that the antecedent sentence provides. In other words, the 
domain of application and the range of readings of the pronouns coincide with the 
domain of application and the range of readings of their antecedents in the first sentence. 
Yet if an unbound pronoun interacts with a determiner in a more complex environment,, 
the interpretation of the former will inevitably involve a modification of their range of 
readings. Intersentential donkey anaphora, i. e. donkey anaphora across sentential. 
boundaries, provides us with the following examples of this sort of interpretation (each 
example is accompanied with its most probable interpretive counterpart). 
(32) If a philosophy student has a chair, it is in the kitchen. 
(33) If a philosophy student has a chair, the chair (or chairs) he/she has is (are) in the 
kitchen. 
(34) Everyfarmer owns a gun. Slhe keeps it in a safe place. 
(35) Every farmer owns a gun. The farmer keeps the gun or guns he/she owns in a safe 
place. 
(36) Either this house does not have a bathroom or it is in a funny place. 
(37) Either there is no bathroom in this house or the bathroom (or bathrooms) there is 
(are) in this house is (are) in a funny place. 
(38) A woman and a man arrived in a large truck. The woman got out and began dancing 
in the road while the man played the accordian. 
(39) A woman and a man arrived in a large truck. The woman who arrived in a large 
truck got out and began dancing in the road while the man who arrived in a large 
truck played the accordian; the woman and the man arrived in the same truck and 
perhaps other women and men arrived in the same truck too. 
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Sentences (32) and (34) exemplify how speakers manipulate or process information 
coming from the determiners and the restriction of the antecedent in order to recover the 
content of the pronoun. This is shown in sentences (33) and (35). Since, according to 
Neale's theory, the semantic number of unbound pronouns anaphoric on indefinites is 
indeterminate,, those pronouns must be recovered in (32) and (34) as the chair or chairs 
and the gun or guns, respectively. Thus, speakers alter the apparent uniqueness of the 
indefinite in the antecedent sentence and establish a different,, wider range of values to 
which the restriction of the indefinite can apply. Furthermore, speakers recover in a 
different way the restriction of unbound pronouns of (32) and (34), depending on whether 
such pronouns are anaphoric on indefinites or on other determiners. The second sentence 
of (35) makes this contrast evident. There,, the restriction of the pronoun it in the 
anaphora sentence of (34)-anaphoric on the indefinite a gun in the antecedent 
sentence-is recovered as gun s1he owns. By contrast, in the same sentence (35), the 
restriction of the pronoun s1he, anaphoric on everyfarmer in the antecedent sentence of 
(34), is recovered, according to Neale's theory, only as the farmer (see Chapter Six, 
Section 6.1 
, 
for a discussion of this result). These examples of content recovery show 
that, in Neale's words, "additional contextual information must be brought into play if a 
sensible interpretation [of the pronouns] is to be provided" (Neale 1990, p. 26 1). In other 
words, speakers who interpret discourses containing unbound (and donkey) pronouns 
cannot simply copy the content of the antecedent. They must modify the interpretation 
or (range of the) reading determined by that antecedent in accordance with linguistic and 
extralinguistic infon-nation. In addition, as argued by Roberts (1987,1989), Sells (1985) 
and Ludlow (1994), sentence (34) represents an apparent exception to the General Scope 
Constraint ((GSP); see Chapter One, Section 1.2) on unbound anaphora, according to 
which a pronoun cannot be anaphonc across sentential boundaries on a determiner of the 
form every X. That is to say, an unbound pronoun cannot be anaphoric on a determiner 
every X that precedes it but does not c-command it. "For instance, anaphora is apparently 
See Heim (1982, pp. 199 ff ). She calls simply this constraint the Scope Constraint and considers it a 
condition on scope and coindexing of NPs rather than a requirement on 
'anaphoric relatedness'. The syntactic 
formulation is the following: do not adjoin an NP any higher than to the 
lowest S node in which it originates. 
See also Chierchia (1995), Barwise (1987), and Kamp (198 1). 
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prohibited by such constraints in the following sentence: 
(40) ? When every Italian is overweight, he is happy. " 
The only way, therefore, of explaining the felicity of such examples as (34) is to suppose 
that in processing them speakers and hearers make an intensive use of extralinguistic 
information instead of only applying semantic constraints. 
Sentence (36), an example by Barbara Partee, nicely illustrates how overcoming the 
scope that negative (or monotone decreasing) determiners can have over a donkey 
pronoun permits the specification of its range of readings in contexts of intersentential 
donkey anaphora. " Thus, speakers and hearers are able to recover a defined range of 
readings for the pronoun it despite the fact that the range of the values of the antecedent 
seems empty. The pragmatic basis of all these interpretative mechanisms appears clear 
when one observes some of their consequences. The most important of those 
consequences is an exception to another constraint on anaphoric relations: the 
accessibility constraint. Roughly, this constraint stipulates that an indefinite can be an 
antecedent of a pronoun if and only if the closest binder (a quantificational, non- 
indefinite NP, a negation or an adverb of quantification) c-commanding the indefinite, 
c-commands the pronoun as well. " In such a case, we say that the antecedent is 
accessible to the pronoun. It is easy to check that all standard donkey sentences-e. g. 
'every farmer who owns a gun registers it'-are licensed for the accessibility constraint, 
since in those sentences the indefinite (a gun) is c-commanded for the same determiner 
'It is worth noting here that Neale explicitly rejects the idea that a semantic theory must prevent pronouns 
from being interpreted as anaphoric on an every phrase that does not c-command them; see Neale (1990, 
pp, 232-3) 
" This conclusion would apply equally well to sentence (36) if its negative determiner were no bathroom. 
A technical definition of accessibility given by Chierchia (1995, p. 8) is as follows- 
(1) An indefinite a can antecede a pronoun P iff the lowest binder that c-commands a 
c-commands P- 
(11) Binder: adverb of quantification, quantificational, non-indefinite NP, or negation. 
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(every farmer) that c-commands the pronoun. Thus, although the pronoun it in the 
anaphora sentence of (36) is not c-commanded by the negative determiner does not in the 
antecedent sentence, clearly the felicity of the sentence overcomes that constraint. 
Consequently, a bathroom cannot be accessible to the pronoun in question. A similar 
thing happens with the pronoun it in (34) that is not c-commanded by everyfarmer in the 
antecedent sentence. " This suggests that hearers process the pronouns in (34) and (36) 
in direct interaction with context and pragmatics in order to secure the felicity of the 
anaphoric linkage. " 
Finally, sentence (38) exemplifies a problem affecting definite descriptions quite 
generally: the problem of incompleteness of description. That is to say, the problem 
posed by the use of descriptions like the F when (in the utterance context) there is more 
than one F. " Felicity of anaphora by using incomplete descriptions as pronouns shows 
the degree of context dependence that the process of interpreting such pronouns can give 
rise to. For example, the descriptive reading of (38) in (39) shows to what extent the 
interpretation of the former depends on contextual information. In other words if, put in 
the position of using the information in (39), a speaker s feels compelled to utter (38), it 
must be accepted that her interpretation of the semantic number and the restriction of the 
description in the anaphora sentence of (38) and her use thereby of the determiner the 
" Other examples of sentences that overcome the accessibility constraint are the fOllOwing: 
(i) It is not the case that John does not have a car. It is parked outside. 
(ii) Every chess set comes with a spare pawn. It is taped under the box (Sells 1985) 
" Chierchia (1995, p. 9) hints at the same conclusion. He says. 
The key observation in this connection is that anaphora across 
inaccessible domains is highly sensitive to various aspects of the context 
-what is known or presupposed by the speaker, the specific 
properties of the lexical items involved in interaction with what the 
extralinguistic facts are, and so on. 
Finally, Chierchia insists that such underdetermInatIon by the context separates donkey anaphora across 
inaccessible domains from 'plain donkey anaphora'. We believe, however, that this conclusion can be 
disputed; see footnote 37. 
"See Neale (1990, pp. 93 ff) for an extensive discussion of the implications of this problem for a Russellian 
approach of descriptions. 
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will be a matter of contextual specification. Also, the range of readings of the anaphora 
sentence in (38) will be dependent on the processing of extralinguistic information that 
other speakers will use in order to interpret the utterance of s. Let us take the problem of 
determining the semantic number as an example. The use of the incomplete descriptions 
the man and the woman points out that there are uniqueness implications involved. Thus, 
the question is to know whether such implications are derivative from the linguistic 
content of the indefinites a man and a woman. The answer must be negative, given the 
fact that (39) involves the possibility of other men and women arriving in the same truck, 
who can thereby be described equally well by using the same restriction. Therefore, the 
uniqueness implications in (38) are highly constrained by contextual factors surrounding 
the utterance rather than by linguistic information. Also, the fact that only one individual 
can satisfy each incomplete description, i. e. the fact that the range of the individual 
values can be reduced to one in each description, derives mainly from the intentions, 
beliefs, and background knowledge that interpreters must attribute to s when using such 
descriptions. 33 
So far we have considered that parameters associated with E-type pronouns are amenable 
to specifications in terms of semantic number, restrictions, gender, etc. However, we 
have not addressed another aspect that,, as we saw in Chapter Two, Section 2.2, can 
generate a widespread nonspecificity in sentences: the aspect of plurality. We know 
already that the appearance of such an aspect is associated with processing of the 
±Coll(X) parameter of sentences containing plural NPs. Therefore, in fragments of 
discourse containing an E- or D-type pronoun anaphoric on a plural NP, we should expect 
" indeed, as argued by Sellars (1954), Kfipke (1977), Sainsbury (1979), Davies 
i 
(198 1), Blackburn (1984) 
and by Neale (1990), incompleteness is a general problem not just affecting descriptions but the very use of 
quantified phrases in natural language, According to Neale, if this is the case, a solution for it will require "a 
quite general account of incomplete quantifiers" rather than a modification of the Russellian analysis (see 
Neale 1990, p. 242). However, see Larson and Segal (1995, pp. 333-4), for some arguments against 
assimilation of description incompleteness to quantifier incompleteness. 
Other examples of incomplete descriptions underdetermining the recovery of the content of unbound 
pronouns are the following: 
(1) 1 bought a donkey and a horse last week. For some reason the 
donkey will not eat anything. 
(11) Socrates kicked a dog and it bit him and then he kicked another dog and it did not bite him 
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the former to be sensitive to the nonspecificity generated by the latter. This is observed 
in the following examples (from Neale 1990). 
(4 1) The men washed their hands. Then they went home. 
(42) The men carried two pianos down the stairs. Then they loaded them onto a truck. 
(43) The men carried two pianos down the stairs. Then they washed their hands. 
In each sentence above the classical interpretations of plural sentences are shown 
unequivocally. The plural pronoun in (4 1) inherits the distributive interpretation from the 
antecedent (presumably induced by the VP and the object NP in the antecedent sentence). 
The plural pronoun in (42) inherits the collective interpretation from the antecedent 
(presumably induced by the VP and the object NP). Finally, the pronoun they in (43) does 
not preserve the collective interpretation of the antecedent and introduces, instead, the 
distributive interpretation because of information coming from the VP and the object NP 
in the sentence. Moreover,, the number of readings in each case depends on processing 
background or contextual information, which will, in turn, affect the ±Coll (X) 
parameter. For instance, in a situation where the men in question are three, there will be 
at least five readings of the antecedent sentence of (42) and (43) (with +Coll(X) 
parameter), a similar number for the anaphora sentence of (43) (with -Coll(X) 
parameter) and a number of three for the anaphora sentence of (41) (with -Coll(X) 
parameter). 34 
The interpretations above indicate that plural E-type pronouns are as sensitive to plural 
parameterization as normal plural NPs are. Something similar seems to happen with 
plural E-type pronouns whose antecedents are syntactically singular (indefinite) 
antecedents. Consider the following, perfectly felicitous, examples. 
(44) Few farmers bought a donkey, but the donkeys were hitched together in a short mule 
train (Schein 1993) 
' The total number of readings for (43) will be obviously higher 
due to the combination of the collective 
interpretations of each sentence. 
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(45) Every farmer bought a donkey and they were hitched together in a short mule train 
(46) Every student collaborated in a play during the year and then they were put on to 
different audiences. 
The felicity of sentences (44)-(46) despite the clash in syntactic number between their 
antecedent and anaphora sentences is well explained in a D-type theory as it assumes the 
numberless hypothesis for E-type pronouns. Also, in many cases such pronouns seem to 
refer to collections or groups of individuals-Le. they get the +Coll (X) 
parameter-despite the singularity of their antecedents. Thus, as indicated by Schein, in 
examples (44) and (45), the plural donkey pronouns "refer cumulatively to whatever 
donkeys any farmer bought " (Schein 1993, p. 13). Therefore, clash in syntactic number 
does not affect the felicity of the anaphoric connection in such sentences. The anaphora 
sentence of (46) also shows collective or cumulative reference to the donkey pronoun in 
the antecedent sentence. In addition, (46) shows how collective and distributive 
interpretations, induced by the VPs and lexical material, can interact with the collection 
determined by the E-type pronoun. In this case, the verb collaborate in the antecedent 
sentence induces a collective interpretation of the pronoun while the verb put on, plus 
context, reinforces the distributive interpretation of the pronoun. 
4.4 Conclusions and Prospects 
From the previous examination of sentences (32)-(38) the following consequences seem 
to follow: (a) sentences exhibiting donkey anaphora across sentential boundaries are 
nonspecific or underspecified with regard to linguistic information; (b) the nonspecificity 
underlying donkey pronouns also explains why hearers appeal to a great amount of 
processing of contextual information when interpreting them; (c) usually, processing of 
contextual information is an specification of parametric information pertaining to the 
pronoun (for instance, semantic number, restrictions, gender, or sensitivity to 
determiners). That specification, in its turn, will affect the range of readings available 
in the anaphora sentence. (d) As far as the arguments about donkey anaphora given in 
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Chapter Three are convincing enough, as we believe they are, we should expect that D- 
or E-type accounts of donkey pronouns will capture systematically the specifications of 
the readings donkey pronouns. 
From the above picture plus our rejection of the ambiguity hypothesis it follows, we 
think,, an attractive generalization of the nonspecificity hypothesis embracing all kinds 
of donkey anaphora and all sentences containing the latter. Similarly,, it follows that D- 
or E-type theories provide an appropriate framework to deal, on the semantic side, with 
such nonspecificity. Some theorists in the field have informally aired these conclusions. 
For instance, Neale says (in discussing the semantic import of his rule P5), 
when we interpret utterances [of sentences containing 
D-type pronouns] we [ ... 
] bring to bear a lot of background 
assumption and contextual information, including 
information derived from preceding utterances [ ... 
I and 
we use this in filling out those aspects of the utterance 
that are underspecified by linguistic form, including 
the assignment of referents to those pronouns that are 
referential and the assignment of descriptive content to 
some of them that are not. (Neale 1990, p. 184)" 
Kanazawa (1994), more explicitly, makes the following remarks. 
What follows is a pure speculation [ ... 
I 
The primary assumption I make is the following: 
(109) The grammar rules in general underspecify the 
interpretation of a donkey sentence. 
Thus,, I assume that, for any donkey sentence, the grammar 
only partially characterizes its meaning, with which 
a range of specific interpretations are compatible. So the 
truth value of donkey sentences in particular situations 
" Elsewhere Neale insists on the generality of the idea by saying: 
the phenomenon of underspecified. D-type pronouns is not restricted 
to cases involving anaphora on singular 
definite descriptions (Neale 
1990, p. 242) 
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can be left undecided by the grammar. This may not 
be such an outrageous idea; it may explain the lack 
of robust intuitions about donkey sentences. (Kanazawa 
1993, p. 15 1)" 
Nevertheless, we think that if the idea of 'donkey nonspecificity' is considered in its own 
right and not just as a disposable speculation, its powerful appeal becomes clear. Once 
the idea is couched in an appropriate theoretical background, it enables us to make clear 
sense of the phenomena under examination. D-type theory (or a variant of it along the 
lines envisaged in Chapter Three) clearly provides that background. Yet, unlike Neale's 
D-type theory, the nonspecificity view considers the main features of a D-type theory 
(namely numberless hypothesis,, sensitivity to determiners and recovery of restrictions by 
using the rule P5) to be uniformly connected by the same motivation: to show how 
interpreters systematically reduce the basic nonspecificity or underspecification of 
donkey sentences. This is done by manipulating, altering, filling out, etc., with the help 
of contextual information, parameters located in the representation of the pronouns (for 
instance, semantic number, gender, maximality of the determiner, etc. ). Consequently, 
the nonspecificity conception provides us with a unified view of the relevant aspects of 
a D-type theory where they are seen as a set of systematic constraints on the parameters 
of donkey pronouns. 
Equally important, from our arguments in Chapter Two, we have now a clear pragmatic 
background to support a nonspecificity analysis of donkey sentences. This 
background-the Gricean enriched story-supplies a simple answer about how we can 
pragmatically explain the process of disambiguation of such sentences. According to that 
story, we might say that at the level of the linguistic or literal meaning standard donkey 
sentences have a unique meaning given by its external truth-conditions. These conditions 
will correspond to the U-reading. However, as literal meaning does not determine what 
is in fact said or expressed in uttering the sentence, just the contextual infori-nation can 
' it is worth noting that, despite this speculative claim about nonspecficity and context, 
Kanazawa rejects 
explicitly E-or D-type treatments (see Kanazawa 1994, p. 130 n. 
28). Instead, he endorses the dynamic binding 
approach to donkey anaphora. 
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tell us if interpretation of parameters counts as crucial or not (i. e. if it provides a 
contextual truth-condition or not) to the interpretation of the donkey pronoun. If in a 
certain context it can, then some reading other than the U-reading must be preferred, in 
particular, an E-reading. In such a case, the interpretation of the utterance of the sentence 
will incorporate the E-reading as a part of the content of the general proposi ion t 
expressed. If, in another type of utterance context, the contextual information is of no 
help to the interpretation, then the conditions associated with the U-reading will be 
considered as full-blooded truth-conditions and the (general) proposition expressed by 
the utterance will incorporate such a reading as a part of its content (see Chapter Two, 
Section 2.1). Notice that, at this point, disambiguation of donkey sentences is a matter 
quite independent of the problem of the usages of definite descriptions. That is to say, 
the discussion about the referential (or non-referential) nature of the pronouns has no 
direct impact on the selection of E- or U-reading, because under both readings we can 
implement referential or non-referential treatments of the pronouns. However, the issue 
of referentiality is crucial in trying to explain how speakers and hearers can deal with 
pronouns unspecified by the grammar (see Chapter Five, section 5.5). 
We think that the nonspecificity conception has much to commend it. And although some 
theoretical resistance to it might be found, " the enormous descriptive advantages that 
'Perhaps the most important of these objections has to do with accessibility. In ternis of accessibility, our 
generalisation implies that donkey pronouns are nonspecific and, thereby, context dependent in both 
inaccessible and accessible domains. Nevertheless, as we indicated in footnote 33, it has been argued by 
Chierchia (1995, pp. 9-1 0) that plain donkey anaphora in accessible domains does not seem to be affected by 
contextual or pragmatic factors but rather it is "governed essentially by structural factors. " We believe that 
one can reduce the force of this potential objection by appealing to a number of reasons. First, we think that, 
however valuable the Accessibilty Hypothesis may be, as a syntactic claim, it cannot support adequately 
prohibitions or constraints on what can or cannot be pragmatically processed. In fact, we have seen before 
that both Accesibility Constraint and Heim's Scope Constraint, are overcome when speakers process 
contextual information across sentential boundaries. Therefore, imposing conditions on what can be 
processed in an accessible domain seems at least artificial. Also, as we will see in 
Chapter Six, complex sage 
plant cases, i. e. examples of plain donkey anaphora, can succesfully 
be treated if we assume a strong 
interaction between lexical information and contextual conditions on the parameters of the pronouns. 
Second, there is no theoretical prohibition to translate the linguistic meaning of sentences which generate 
donkey anaphora across inaccessible domains into plain 
donkey anaphora sentences. For instance, the 
linguistic meaning of sentences (32) and (34) above may 
be translated by means of the following sentences: 
(32') Every philosophy student who has a chair, has it in the 
kitchen. 
(34') Every farmer who has a gun, keeps it in a safe place. 
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the theory offers, we suggest, should be weighted in favour of it when formulating its 
final evaluation. In particular, most problems lurking around Neale's original theory (E- 
readings, sage plant cases and telescoping cases) can be successfully dealt with by using 
some version of the nonspecificity account, as we shall show in the following chapters. 
Third, the rule of accesibility is overcome when we combine a standard plain donkey anaphora with 
incomplete descriptions in inaccessible domains. For instance, compare examples (i) and (ii) below. This 
applies to plural sentences as well (see sentences (44)-(46) above). 
(1) ? Every farmer who has a cow keeps it in a safe place. It is happy. 
(Ii) Every farmer who has a cow keeps it In a safe place. The cow or cows are happy 
Fourth, finally, it seems clear that the Accessibility constraint for indefinites cannot be held valid for every 
natural language. For instance, in Spanish, sentences like the folloWing are perfectly acceptable: 
(ill) Slempre que Maria tiene un gato lo maltrata. Ademas, lo obliga a estudiar 
semintica y, a veces, Io obliga a estudiar 16gica. 
[Every time Maria has a cat batters it. Also, she forces it to study semantics and sometimes logic] 
(IV) Todo profesor de logica que tiene a1gunos gatos los malcria. Les cuenta 
historias extravagantes y de vez en cuando les tira un filete. 
[Every lecturer of logic who owns some cats spoils them. He tells them 
bizarre stories and, sometimes, gives them a fillet. ] 
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CHAPTER V 
THE FUNCTIONAL TREATMENT OF DONKEY NONSPECIFICITY 
In this chapter the claim that donkey sentences are nonspecific in nature is technically 
substantiated. We argue that, torn between two general ways of dealing with 
nonspecificity, the scalar and the functional account, we should consider, from a 
methodological point of view, the latter as more suitable than the former to tackle donkey 
anaphora. The option for the fimctional account agrees with two general views defended 
in chapters 2 and 4: (a) representing the meaning of context-sensitive sentences (or 
discourses) is an issue about representing functional dependencies, and, (b) 
disambiguation of nonspecific sentences (or discourses) involves a relation between 
external truth-conditions and the proposition expressed by the utterance in a given 
context. Application of these general views to the problem of donkey pronouns will 
provide us, as we shall show, with a theoretically illuminating and empirically successful 
solution. 
Our reasorung in favour of a functional conception of nonspecificity of donkey sentences 
is as follows. First, by drawing on work by Heim (1990), Gawron, Narbonne and Peters 
(1991), Chierchia (1992), and Lappin and Francez (1994), we show that the 
nonspecificity of donkey sentences is an expression of functional dependency to be 
located in the pronouns of those sentences. Such pronouns incorporate parametric 
information supplied by linguistic and extralingwistic factors. E-type and donkey 
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pronouns can thus be seen as context-dependent functions, which are an essential part of 
the representation of the sentences containing them. Furthermore, distinct readings of 
donkey sentences will be generated as long as the parameters involved are specified. By 
contrast, if those parameters are not specified, the sentences will remain nonspecific at 
the semantic level of representation. This agrees with the chief idea motivating the 
nonspecificity view, namely that at the level of interpretation nonspecific sentences must 
be assigned a single semantic representation from which particular specifications can be 
derived. 
Second, a functional nonspecifity view of donkey sentences allows us to explain a broad 
range of irregularities associated with those sentences. This is possible we think if the 
functional conception underpinning the nonspecificity view is adequately modified and 
extended. A fundamental modification is the introduction of formal constraints that 
permit us treating donkey pronouns as choice functions. These functions select, given 
certain structural conditions, only one value from a previously specified range. So 
extended, the functional treatment generates a set of readings of donkey sentences that 
cover some important irregularities, in particular E-readings and sage plant cases. 
Third, functional treatments clearly explain important cognitive assumptions that 
speakers appeal to when considering propositions involving E-type pronouns. We argue 
in particular , in accordance with our arguments 
in Chapter Two, that speakers are 
committed in such linguistic contexts to unspecified reference and to the mechanisms 
that that sort of reference involves. 
5.1 Scalar Nonspecificity and Donkey Anaphora 
If the account of nonspecificity of donkey sentences expounded in the last chapter has 
some chance to work, it should enable us to meet at least the followIng three 
requirements: (a) to fix the semantic content of donkey sentences by means of a unique 
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basic representation; (b) to make sure that their basic representation is mapped into only 
one linguistic representation (LF, SS or other structures); and (c) to show that the basic 
representation bears a logical connection to all relevant interpretations or readings of 
donkey sentences. Requirements (a)-(c) seem quite clear desiderata. Requirement (b), 
in particular, is satisfied by such donkey anaphora approaches as Neale's because of their 
clear LF motivations. When it comes to the implementation of requirements (a) and (c), 
however, there is no unequivocal way of proceeding. In order to clarify the problem 
posed by (a) and (c) we will need to discuss some general issues involving nonspecificity. 
The problem with (a) and (c) is rather methodological and has to do with how the basic 
representation (whatever it may be) of a nonspecific sentence is defined. If we define that 
representation in terms of literal truth-conditions only, the range of readings of the 
sentence will be generated only by the external meaning of the sentence, that is,, by the 
specification of its external truth-conditions. This option will thus raise a truth- 
functional conception of nonspecificity. If we define the basic representation in terms 
of both contextual information and truth-conditions, the aforementioned range of 
readings of the sentence will further be specified. Since each reading of this extended 
range will be selected by taking into account parametric factors, this option will in its 
turn define a parametric conception of nonspecificity. 
On the truth-conditional account of a nonspecific representation, the basic problem posed 
by (a) and (c) is determining which reading-formulated in a FOC, restricted quantifier 
(RQ) or another structure-embraces the rest of the readings. As the literature about 
nonspecificity suggests, the problem above is twofold: on the one hand, it implies the 
problem of finding out a sufficiently nonspecific representation entailed by all remaining 
readings; on the other hand, it is necessary to show that the purported basic 
representation is effectively able to generate, by appealing to special procedures of 
derivation the remaining readings. ' Those procedures Will give rise to particular 
'This is particularly clear in the literature on plurality; see Chapter Two, 
Section 2.2 and Landman (1996) 
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entailment (or quasi-entailment) relations between the logical forms thus derived. Hence 
the truth-conditional view of nonspecificity originates a so-called scalar treatment of 
nonspecificity, according to which the different logical forms associated with a 
nonspecific sentence will be derived by a rules set reflecting the particular semantics and 
syntax of the sentence. 
In the parametric view of nonspecificity, by contrast, there is no problem with particular 
entailments between readings. For according to this view the basic representation of a 
nonspecific sentence is strongly dependent on information supplied by context and 
background, i. e. by speaker's (and hearer's) presuppositions, beliefs, expectations, etc. 
This implies that the connection between the basic representation and the specific 
readings cannot be a logical (or quasi-logical) one. It will rather depend on how, in 
processing contextual information, speakers fill in the parameters of the nonspecific 
representation. Problem (c) therefore is not relevant on the parametric view of 
nonspecificity. Problem (a), however, is equally crucial for it. Since, as we shall see, on 
the parametric view referential nonspecificity must be disambiguated through particular 
context-sensitive functions, the parametric view will give rise to afunctional treatment 
of nonspecificity. Under this treatment, the relevant readings of a nonspecific sentence 
are generated when the context-sensitive functions are appropriately processed by 
interpreters. Problem (a) on the parametric view is therefore equivalent to that of finding 
out an adequate function and appropriate constraints on the latter that match our semantic 
and linguistic intuitions about the nonspecific sentences under examination. 
The two aforementioned views of sentential nonspecificity provide us with two possible 
routes for treating the nonspecificity of donkey sentences. Both treatments have clear 
antecedents in the semantic literature and offer different solutions to the problem at hand. 
We think however that there are good reasons to be sceptical about the scalar approach 
and optimistic about the parametric approach. In order to substantiate this claim, we shall 
examine a well-known scalar account of nonspecificity: a theory of nonspecificity of 
plurals defended by Kempson and Cormack (198 1 a). Next, we will evaluate the prospects 
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of applying that theory to donkey nonspecificity. We will suggest that the reasons to be 
sceptical about this theory are mainly methodological. They nevertheless do not coincide 
in some respects with some of the general criticisms voiced against the theory, which we 
believe can be resisted. 
Although Kempson and CormacWs theory is designed to primarily deal with plural 
sentences like (1) below, its implications for other cases of nonspecificity are clear. ' 
(1) Two examiners marked six scripts. 
The main question that Kempson and Corniack tried to answer about sentences like (1) 
was whether they can be assigned a single semantic representation from which "distinct 
specific interpretations, the propositions, [ ... ], are derived from the single semantic 
representation by general rules" (Kempson and Con-nack 198 1 a, p. 260). If the answer 
were positive, they contend, the sentences should qualify as nonspecific. If the answer 
were negative, the sentences should qualify as ambiguous. Also, according to Kempson 
and Cormack, those sentences may qualify as nonspecific despite exhibiting an apparent 
scope ambiguity at the surface level. 
Kempson and Cormack argue that if the potential readings or interpretations of a sentence 
S are, say, R, and R2, and R, entails R2, then S is not ambiguous between R, and R2but 
nonspecific. The logical form (or If) of S will be the one assigned to the entailed 
reading-that is, R2- Due to their claim that sentences like (1) are nonspecific, Kempson 
and Cormack's main effort is dedicated to showing that such sentences need to be 
represented by the basic entailed reading only. Thus,, in terms of this theory such a 
reading will be the 'logically weakest', namely a sequence of (in)existence claims about 
the individuals in the given domain. We will call this argument, the 'ordering by 
2 Verkuyl and van der Does (1996) and Verkuyl (1993) defend, within a model-theoretic 
framework, similar 
views of plural sentences. 
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entailment' argument. ' Kempson and Cormack's next step is to extend their argument to 
all quantified sentences where a scope ambiguity appears. This happens, for Instance, in 
the sentence (2) below. 
(2) Every linguistics student has read a book by Chomsky. 
In first-order logic sentences like (2) can be associated with the two interpretations (2a) 
and (2b) below depending on whether the every or the a detenniner takes wider scope. 
(2a) (Vx) (Lx -((ýIy) By & Rxy)) (weak reading) 
(2b) (ýIy)( By& (Vx)(Lx -Rxy)) (strong reading) 
Since (2b) entails (2a), Kempson and Cormack go on to claim that (2a) should be chosen 
as the single logical representation of (2). Hence they conclude that any sentence similar 
to (2) should be treated as nonspecific rather than ambiguous. ' 
Kempson and Cormack propose some particular rules (together with pragmatic 
constraints) in order to generate a stronger reading from a weaker reading, provided that 
between the former and the latter it holds some entailment relation. For instance, they 
propose a rule that replaces existential quantifiers binding invidividual variables by 
universal quantifiers binding the same variables. This is their so-called Generalising 
Quantifier rule (GnQ) .5A simplified second-order 
formulation of this rule in terms of the 
restricted set notation introduced in Chapter Two, Section 2.2, is given below. 
' The terin was coined by Tennant; see Tennant (198 1, p. 313). 
' Kempson and Cormack (1981 a, pp. 265-6). The idea of dispensing with scope ambiguity was initially 
defended by Reinhart (1979); see Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (I 990, p. 116). 
' See Kempson an Cormack (198 1 a, p. 27 1). The authors offer another rule-the Unýformising nile-whIch 
reverses the order between first-order universal quantifiers and second-order existential quantifiers. As they 
indicate though this rule can be dispensed with when generating stronger readings from plural sentences; see 
Kempson and Cormack (198 1 a, p. 277). 
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(GnQ): replace'[3X: IXIýýnl[(3x) xeX]'by'[3X: IXIýýn][(vx) ex , 
According to Kempson and Cormack (GnQ) allows us, granted that the weakest reading 
of (1) is represented in (3) below, to scalarly generate all readings of sentence (1) 
mentioned in Chapter Two. 'Thus, (GnQ) will license quasi-entailments between (3) and 
the readings in (4)-(7). 7 
(3) [ýIXJXJý12] [ý]S: JXJý: 61 [(Ax)xEXI KDOSES] (Mxs) 
(4) [DX: jXjýý2][(Vx)xEX] ([AS: [Xjý: 6][(Vs)scS] (N4xs)) (distributive reading) 
(5) [ýIS: jXj>6j[(Vs)sGSj ([ýIX: jXj? ý2][(Vx)xcX] (Mxs)) (semidistributive reading) 
(6) [DXJXJý: 2] [DS: IXI>6]([(Vx)xeX] ([(As)scS](Mxs)) & [(vs)seS] ([(ýix)xeX](Mxs))) 
(collective reading) 
(7) [AX: IXI=21 [3S: IXI=6] ([(Vx)xeX][(Vs)sEFS] (Mxs)) (cumulative reading)' 
(Predicates X, 'S' stand for the set of examiners and the set of scripts respectively; M' 
stands for the predicate mark) 
At this stage, one can envisage the following reasoning: Had Kempson and Cormack! s 
theory succeeded in explaining plural sentences, then equally successful applications to 
other areas should be expected. On this hypothesis, there would be good reasons to 
extend the scalar theory to a D-type theory and thus solve some of the scope interaction 
problems affecting the latter (examined in Chapter Three). In particular, the generation 
of U- and E-readings in donkey sentences could also be explained in terms of some 
'Kempson and CormacWs rules overgenerate. They argue, however, that overgeneration can be handled by 
imposing some pmgmatic filters at the level of propositions, i. e. at the level of utterance of the sentences. See 
Kempson and Cormack (1981, pp. 278ff. ). Nevertheless, see Kempson and Cormack (1981b) for some 
persistent generation problems affecting their analysis. 
'An example of these quasi-entailments is specified by means of the following derivation of the distributive 
reading: 
(i) [DX: jXjý! 2j[(9x)xGX1 [AS: jXjý! 6j[3(s)sGS] (Mn) (Logically eq. to (3)) 
(ii) ]X: jXjýý2][(Vx)xeX] ([DS: IXI>61[ (Vs)sC-S] (Mxs)) (GnQ) 
' As indicated in Section 2.2, the reading (7) cannot contain '>' 
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particular entailment ordering underlying those readings. There are, however, several 
reasons against such an extension. Some of them have to do with the critiques that 
Kempson and Cormacles theory has faced. 
Kempson and Cormacles theory has faced two basic critiques. The first one concerns the 
ordering by entailment argument, the second concerns the status of Kempson and 
Cormacles procedures of generation. The first critique has led into two directions. First, 
as indicated by several theorists (Bach (1982), Schein (1993) and Poesio (1996)), 
approaches like Kempson and CormacVs face a descriptive problem. For it Is not clear 
that a sentence with two quantifiers always possesses two interpretations, one of which 
entails the other. For example, (8) below does not have an interpretation weak enough 
to be entailed by all the others, and yet apt to capture all truth-conditions of the sentence. 9 
(8) Few philosophers attend many linguistics conferences. 
Second, the chief objection to the ordering by entailment argument involves a problem 
with logic and compositionality. This critique has been voiced by Chierchia and 
McConnell-Ginet (1990) and Poesio (1996). The ordering by entailment argument as 
applied to sentences like (2) pressuposes the validity of the following entailment schema. 
(9) ý3v - VýI 
By the logical law of contraposition, (10) follows from (9). 
(10) - VýI -- DV 
The problem, as noticed by Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet, is that "negation reverses 
See Poesio (1996, p. 182) and Schein (1993, p. 296). In addition, 
Schein shows that similar results obtain 
if, instead offew or many, we use non-increasing/non-decreas Ing quantifiers 
like exactly n. Schein is here 
reacting to Verkuyl and van der Does (1996) that, unlike 
Kempson and Cormack's theory, posits the 
sernidistnbutive reading (5) as the weakest one. 
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entailments, such as the one in [(9)] [ ... I So - ýJV is the more general reading (the entailed 
one)" (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990, p. 118). Let us suppose that instead of (2) 
one utters the negation of (2), as shown in (11). According to Kempson and Cormack's 
theory the basic semantic representation of (11) will be the negation in (12) (the negation 
of the weak reading (2a)). 
(11) It is not the case that every linguistics student has read a book by Chomsky. 
(12) - ((Vx) (Lx - ((9y)By & Rxy)) 
So, we end up predicting that the meaning of (11) should be given by its strongest and 
not its weakest interpretation, against what is predicted by the theory. Therefore, as 
argued by Poesio, "one either has to give up compositionality for sentences like [(2a)], 
or to abandon the strategy of letting sentences denote their weakest interpretations" 
(Poesio 1996, p. 182). 
The second critique, as we said, concerns Kempson and Cormack's procedures. It has 
been stated by Tennant (1981) and Davies (1989). According to them the basic problem 
is that Kempson and Cormack's rules lack a clear semantic motivation, what makes the 
approach theoretically unaccountable and its generative force arbitrary. Tennant in 
particular claims Kempson and Cormack's procedures "simply bash one well-formed 
formula of higher order logic into another... But the mangling of meanings by the 
procedures makes nonsense of the claim to have found a logical form ... 
'common to each 
of the possible distinct interpretations'" ( Tennant 1981, pp. 317-8). The problem seems 
to lie in the formulation of the procedures themselves. Thus, Davies concludes that "the 
... question 
is whether the general rules ... can 
belong to the semantic component of a 
total theory, given that they are formulated as syntactic rules. Something like this 
question might lie behind Tennant's complaints that [Kempson and Cormacles] 
procedures 'simply bash one well-formed formula of higher order logic into another' 
(Davies 1989, p. 297). 
The two general critiques above can we believe be evaluated differently, no matter the 
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appreciation one may have of Kempson and Cormack's theory. On the one hand, the 
objections to the ordering by entailment argument affect the general descriptive capacity 
of the theory and are not specifically related to Kempson and Cormack's nonspecificity 
treatment of plural sentences. Within a strictly truth conditional setting such objections 
are we think apt and trenchant. On the other hand, the objection regarding the status of 
the procedures is directly related to the nonspecifity treatment of plural sentences that the 
theory proposes. In this case it seems to us the objection is not decisive. There are several 
reasons that support this opinion, which we shall examine next. 
The objection to Kempson and Cormacles rules has emphasised two basic points: first, 
the procedures of generation of the theory are intended as syntactic devices and yet end 
up doing semantic work. Second, there is no clear rationale, grounded in a general 
semantic theory, for such a move. There are, we believe, two ways of countering the first 
point. In the first place, as far as the formulation of (GnQ) is concerned, one could say 
that such a rule does not differ in type from the standard natural deduction rules in first- 
order logic. An example of these rules is the existential instantiation rule governing the 
universal quantifier in nonempty domains. As we all know although this rule can be 
syntactically characterized, it can also be considered as expressing wide semantic 
generalizations. This consideration is what justifies the systematic incorporation of the 
rule in a total semantic theory. And this is not the only case in point. A similar 
semantic/syntactic consideration happens to the notion of scope. In fact, the notion of 
scope can be formulated in syntactic terms and seen as matching semantic 
generalizations. " However, scope may also be formulated in semantic terms and seen as 
matching syntactic generalizations in a logical system. 11 In the second place, as Kempson 
and Cormack show, their rules are similar to rules dealing with plurals in other semantic 
accounts. In particular, Kempson and Cormacles rules are strictly analogous to game- 
" See Chomsky (1977), Reinhart (1979) and Higginbotham (1980). 
" See Russell (1905), McCawley (1968) and Lakoff(I 970). 
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theoretic semantics rules. 12 We conclude that either the charge of 'formula bashme-that 
is, arbitrariness-brought against Kempson and Cormack's rules applies to all semantic 
accounts whose rules are isomorphic with the first, or, if not additionally substantiated, 
the charge must be dropped. 
Concerning the problem of absence of an adequate rationale, this is not so worrying in 
the light of the previous remarks. Moreover, it is not true that Kempson and Cormack's 
rules are semantically unmotivated. In general, such rules respect all the relevant 
semantic constraints. On the one hand, the whole purpose of readings (4)-(7) is 
motivated by assignments of quantifier scope, which determine, in their turn, the different 
interpretations of the sentences. For instance, (4ý-the distributive reading-is called by 
Kempson and Cormack the 'subject NP with wide scope' reading. (5)--4he 
semidistributive reading-is called the 'object NP with wide scope' reading. (6)-the 
collective reading-is the reading in which both NPs can take wide scope simultaneously 
(Kempson and Cormack call it the'incomplete group'reading ). Finally, (7) is obviously 
the 'scopeless' reading for both NPs (they call it the 'complete group' reading). It should 
be easy to show that Kempson and Cormack's procedures respect assignment of scope at 
the level of interpretation. For example, they are not going to generate from a first-order 
logic formula such as I(Vx)(Ay) (Mxy & Fy))', the second order formula'AX: (Vx) Mxy 
& ý]Y: (Vy)Fy, with the variable 'y'free in the first conjunct. On the other hand, existential 
assumptions are crucial for Kempson and Cormack. According to them plural 
propositions are always referentially dependent. in others words, it is assumed that the 
relevant domains of the sentences above are nonempty. 13 '17his assumption warrants purely 
existential statements as representing the weakest readings of the sentences. We conclude 
that, given the above assumptions, the objection to the motivations supporting Kempson 
and Cormack's nonspecificity approach of plural sentences can be resisted. " 
" See Kempson and Cormack (1981 b) and Tennant (198 1). 
" See Kempson and Cormack (198 1 a, p. 3 02 n. I and p. 3 04 n. 5) 
" See Quezada-Pulldo (1996) for ftuther discussion. 
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In the picture emerging from the previous discussion, the theory in question loses part but 
not all of its initial attractiveness. If the objection to the ordering by entailment argument 
is as we think granted, the application of the theory to cases of scope ambiguity cannot 
be guaranteed. The theory turns thus less general because one of its explicit aims was to 
deal with such ambiguities. As far as the donkey anaphora problem is concerned however 
this conclusion should not have a major import. First, because if our arguments are 
correct, donkey sentences are not ambiguous at all (see Chapter Four, Section 4.2). " 
Second, because the arguments against Kempson and Cormack's rules and their 
applicability to nonspecific plural sentences are not compelling enough. We can be led 
therefore to consider the possibility of extending the theory in question to donkey 
anaphora, cases. That is to say, we can by analogy with the treatment of plural sentences 
produce some particular rules, isolate the weakest reading and scalarly generate the 
remaining donkey readings. The feasibility of this kind of construction can it seems to us 
not in principle be disputed. There is nevertheless a clear methodological limitation to 
what can be expected of that construction. In order to see that, let us flesh out a bit how 
this scalar version of donkey anaphora could be constructed. 
Let us arbitrarily suppose that there does exist a rule analogous to (GNP) in Neale's D- 
type theory, and let us call it the Generalized D-type Quantifier rule or, in short, (GnD- 
type). The content of (GnD-type) could go as follows: every time that Neale's P5 is 
applied to a sentence containing a donkey pronoun, apply (GnQ) to the weakest reading 
of the pronoun andlor its antecedent, i. e. apply (GnQ) to the purely existential 
representations ofthe pronoun and the antecedent. Suppose for the sake of the argument 
that after applying P5 to a standard donkey sentence we obtain the structure (13) below. 
(13) will express, according to Kempson and Cormack's theory, the weakest reading both 
of the pronoun and the antecedent of the sentence (we are not going to use restricted set 
quantifiers here; instead, we are just going to underline the weakened (existential) 
'5 Obviously this claim is intended to apply only to standard donkey sentences where the indefinite is 
confined to the restrictive clause. In other cases, where the indefinite interacts outside the restrictive clause 
with other quantifiers of the sentence, scope ambiguity can be expected. 
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quantifiers in the form 'ýIx). 
(13) [ Dx :x man &[ay: donkey y ](x owns y)] ([ ýIz: donkey z&x owns z]( x beats z)) 
Structure (13) may be interpreted, along Kempson and Cormacles lines, as 'there is at 
least one man of whom is true he owns a donkey and there is at least one donkey of 
which is true it is owned and beaten by the mad. From (13) we can then derive by using 
(GnD-type) the readings in (14) and (15). 
(14) [Vx: man x&[ay: donkey y ](x owns y)]([ ýjz: donkey z&x owns zx beats z) 
(15) [Vx: man x&[ay: donkey y ]( x owns y )]([Vz: donkey z&x owns zx beats z)) 
Sentences (14) and (15) correspond to the E- and U-readings of the standard donkey 
sentence respectively. That is to say, (14) can be interpreted asTor all men who own a 
donkey there is at least one donkey that they own and beat' and (15) as 'every man who 
owns a donkey beats every donkey he owns'. Moreover, it is clear that by using (GnD- 
type) and Neale's theory, we can generate the E- and U-readings of other donkey 
sentences. For example, 'if a man owns a donkey, he beats W, 'every man who owns two 
or more donkeys beats them', or 'if John owns several donkeys, he beats them'. 
These initial applications seem to count in favour of the scalar theory. However, before 
evaluating the theory we need to look at cases where interaction with context is more 
transparent. For instance, consider the following cases. 
(16) John bought somefloppy diskv. Today, he put them in his office with some other 
floppy disks he bought. 16 
(17) Every man who bought a beer bought five others along with it. 
(18) A woman and a man arrived in a large truck. The woman got out and began dancing 
in the road while the man played the accordion. 
" This example comes from Neale (1990, p. 242). It is used by Neale in order to show the underspecIfied 
nature of D-type pronouns anaphoric on plural antecedents. 
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A quick look at the intuitive readings associated with sentences (16)-(18) allows us to 
conclude that they cannot be obtained by using (GnD-type). For instance, the unbound 
pronoun them in the anaphora sentence (16) cannot be adequately represented either by 
the weaker reading'[3x : floppy disk x& John bought xf or by the stronger reading[Vx: 
floppy disk x. & John bought xf. Readings implying that John put in his office at least 
one floppy disk he bought or that he put every floppy disk he bought are not acceptable, 
in the first case because the plural pronoun syntactically implies more than one floppy 
disk, and in the second case because we know from the context that John had already 
other floppy disks in the office. As to sentence (17), an example of sage plant sentences. ) 
the scalar approach fails for similar reasons. We do not want (17) to be equivalent to '[Ax 
: beer y&x bought yfor to'[ Vy: beer y&x bought y]', because either reading will lead 
to incorrect predictions of the truth-conditions of the sentence. As expected, the same 
happens with the representations that the scalar approach generates for (18). 17 
These drawbacks show that there is an important methodological limitation in the way 
Kempson and Cormack conceive nonspecificity, which affects their conception about 
both quantified sentences and plural ones. As we saw in Chapter Two, Section 2.2, 
nonspecific sentences strongly interact with context. This is clear in the case of plural 
sentences. As we argued there, the potential readings (4)-(7), generated only by using 
scope mechanisms, do not exhaust the possibilities of specification of a plural sentence. 
This is an insufficient picture because scope mechanisms can neither discriminate nor 
generate the contextual specifications of the plural sentence. '8We learned that those 
specifications can be obtained only when the parameter ±Coll(X) is filled in with 
information coming from other parameters, for instance, time, structure of agency, VPs 
etc. We argued that similar informational dependencies surface in such donkey sentences 
as (16)-(18). Finally, we concluded that the (relative) specifications of those sentences 
are a consequence of both semantic constraints and processing of contextual information. 
" See Quezada-Pulido (1996) for other counterexamples to (GnD-type). 
" Davies (1989) makes a similar point regarding the number of readings provided by Kempson and Cormack's 
theory 
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In correspondence with the previous conclusion we are now led to conclude that a general 
conception of nonspecificity that allows for parametric dependencies seems clearly 
preferable to a scalar conception. Moreover, this conclusion will apply to scalar 
approaches irrespectively of the pragmatic constraints that the first may impose on their 
potential readings. Thus, the methodological limitations above are the main reason that 
should deter us from pursuing any scalar approach of donkey nonspecificity. 
5.2 A Choice Function Treatment of Donkey Anaphora 
As far as we know, no functional account of semantic nonspecificity as delineated in 
Section 5.1 has ever been defended in the semantic literature. However, we believe that 
several functional proposals dealing with donkey anaphora offer a common basis for 
elaborating our account of donkey sentences. Thus, what follows can be seen as the 
consequence of a broad generalization over those theoretical proposals. 
The roots of the functional or parametric conceptions of donkey anaphora can be 
recognized in early work by Cooper (Cooper 1979). However, explicitly functional 
theories start to be developed in work by Engdahl (1986), Heim (1990), Gawron, 
Nerbonne, and Peters (1991), Chierchia (1992,1995), van der Does (1993b) and Lappin 
and Francez (1994), among others. It is important to point out here, given the general 
nature of our claims, that we will avoid discussing specific commitments of these 
approaches to particular syntactic views. Our position here, at least as far as levels of 
representation are concerned, is rather neutral. The only syntactic principles that we do 
hold in that respect are, on the one hand, the existence of some disambiguated level 
where nonspecific sentences receive only one representation and,, on the other, the 
introduction of something like co-indexing in the structures generated at such a level (see 
Chapter Four for detail). 
A most general agreement among theorists working in a 
functional approach is that the 
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source of the anaphoric linkage lies in the pronouns rather than the determiners. This 
agreement can be broken down into the following three claims shared by most of those 
theorists: (i) donkey pronouns are E-type (or D-type) in nature, i. e. they go proxy for 
definite descriptions when being interpreted; (ii) E-type pronouns are recovered with the 
help of context and pragmatics'9 and (iii) uniqueness hypotheses in E-type pronouns must 
be rejected. In turn, while (i) is implemented the same way for all these theorists, they 
differ with respect to the way of implementing (iii). 
Implementation of (i) is carried out by interpreting the E-type pronoun as denoting a 
proper function. The function in question is a normal one in that it determines the usual 
relation holding between (the arguments of) its domain and (the values of) its range, and 
according to which each element of the former is associated with (or mapped into) only 
one element in the latter. The function is therefore single-valued and denotes 
extensionally defined objects . 
20 As to E-type pronouns, the domain of the functions 
representing them is in principle constituted by entities of some basic semantic type, for 
example, individual ob ects. As we shall see later, this view of the domain must be j 
extended to cover other semantic types. 
Thus, the content of principle (i) can be expressed by means of the following first 
functional constraint. 
21 
(FuC) (a): E-Vype (or D-type) pronouns can be considered as denoting a function 
J(x) of the appropriate semantic type. 
To the unavoidable question about how to interpret the value off in (FuC), the initial 
answer is-in accordance with suggestions given by Cooper (1979)-to appeal to 
11 Most of them reject in particular a Uniqueness Constraint defended by Kadmon (1987,1990); see also 
Chapter Three, Section 3.4. 
' For more detail on functions see Partee, ter Meulen and Wall (1993, ch. 
2). 
" See Heim (1990, p. 13 8) 
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22 contextual salience of the ffinctions. Therefore (and without any further argumentation 
by now) we may add to the constraint (a) above the following one-that incorporates, in 
tum, claim (ii). 
(FuC) (b): J(x) refers to an in principle contextually salient entity of the appropriate 
type. 
Armed with (FuC) (a)+(b), one can easily show how a full range of examples are now 
amenable to the functional treatment. In particular, sentences (19)-(2 1) below fall in this 
category. 
(19) Every man except John put hiv paychequej in the bank. John gave iti to his 
mistress. 
(20) Either Dillon's does not have a bathroomi or iti is in a funny place. 
(2 1) Every man who owns a donkeyi beats iti. 
(19') and (20') below express the ftmctional representation of the donkey pronouns in (19) 
and (20) (the representation is accompanied by an intuitive specification of the function). 
(19') Every man except John put his paycheque in the bank. John gavef(john) 
to his mistress. 
a function from individuals into their paycheques 
(20') Either Dillon's does not have a bathroom orj(Morris Hall) is in a 
funny place. 
fa function from places into bathrooms located in those places. 
The specification of the function in (19') provides the E-type reading of the pronoun it in 
(19), that is to say, John's paycheque. The specification of the function in (20') provides 
the E-type reading of the pronoun it in (20), that is to say, Dillon's bathroom. For standard 
donkey sentences such as (2 1) a simple FOC representation as in (2 V) can be provided. 
' The reader should recall from our discussion in Section 3.2 that 
donkey anaphora theories relying only on 
salience may be heavily criticized. Thus, claim (ii) must 
be seen rather as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the interpretation of donkey pronouns in 
discourse. 
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(2 F) (Vx) [[ man (x) & Dy [ donkey(y) & owns(x, y) ]- beats(x, J(x) 
fa function from men into the donkeys they own. 
The specification of the function in (21') yields the standard E-type reading of the 
pronoun it in (2 1). 
As could be expected, sentence (2 1) leads us immediately to the problem of the 
uniqueness assumption examined in Chapter Four. By claim (hi) above we know the 
functional conceptions must reject uniqueness implications. Yet in order to evaluate the 
explanatory force of each functional approach the way it implements this rejection 
becomes crucial. A first suggestion to implement that rejection is to rely on FuC(b) 
above, i. e. on the contextual salience of the function. This suggestion can however hardly 
be accepted. For if we are to assume non-uniqueness, the contextual salience of the 
functions may make the problem even more pervasive. Heim clarifies the issue as 
follows: 
If there is to be any salient function for the variablef to 
refer to here, and if that function is supposed to have been 
made salient solely because the listener has understood 
the initial portion of the sentence, it is presumably once again 
the fanctionf defined [as a function from a man x who owns 
exactly one donkey to the unique donkey that x owns]. But 
how does the listener know this time that such a function 
is well-defined for the entire domain for which it is needed 
to ensure a determinate truth value for the sentence, i. e. 
that it is well-defined for the whole extension of the N'man 
that own. v a donkey ? (Heim 1990, p. 141-2 ) 
According to this explanation, a speaker may raise to salience the pronoun it-which can 
be represented by the functionf-in sentence (21) by her previous utterance of the N' 
restriction of the determiner every. When the restriction implies uniqueness like, for 
example, in man that owns exactly one donkey the utterance of the restriction seems to 
make naturally salient just one value in the range. That is to say, the resulting function 
is naturally single-valued. By contrast, since the restriction man that owns a 
donkey does 
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not necessarily imply uniqueness, its utterance cannot make salient a single-valued and 
thereby well-defined function. The reason is that if there are individuals in the extension 
determined by the N restriction who own more than one donkey, then no particular value 
in the range of the function can be assigned to those individuals. As a semantic fact 
however the anaphoric linkage should constrain "the function that interprets the E-type 
pronoun, by determining its range" (Chierchia 1992, p. 158). The range, in such a case, 
should be provided by the head of the NP coindexed with the pronoun. " 
The following principle sums up the explanation above: 
(FuC) (c): J(x) is a function whose domain is the N'restriction of the determiner of the 
sentence and whose range is the head of the NP coindexed with the pronoun. 
The problem discussed by Heim can thus be stated by means of the following question: 
how can we make sure that for each argument in the domain of the function (the N 
restriction of the determiner) there will be one value in its range (the head of the NP), 
and, therefore, that the function will not be undefined? 
Two solutions to this problem, both pragmatically motivated, have been articulated by 
the functional approaches. The first one, argued by Heim (1990), resorts to 
accommodation of presuppositional information. The second one assumes that 
contextual factors affect the character of the function itself, which becomes then a choice 
function. As the relation accommodation/donkey anaphora will be examined in the 
following chapter, here we will concentrate on the second answer (yet it is worth 
stressing here that both conceptions are naturally connected) 
Before delving into the different choice function conceptions let us introduce a couple 
of formal definitions taken from set-theory. Choice functions are a direct consequence 
'These formulations are evidently simplifications, as Chierchia emphasises, see Chierchia (1992, p. 159, 
n. 35). 
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of the so-called Axiom of Choice. This axiom states that if A is a set of nonempty sets 
then there exists a choice function of A. Thus, a choice ftinction is a ftmctionf with (a 
presumably finite) domain A andj(X) cX for each X cA. The ftinctionf then, 'chooses' an 
element in each XEFA, namelyj(X) . 
2'As is well known, the Axiom of Choice cannot be 
proved or disproved from set theory axiornatization, since basically it is an existential 
postulate of that theory. 25 In other words, it asserts the existence of a set-the set defined 
by the choice function-without necessarily characterizing it as the extension of some 
previously specified property. 26 Now, this choice function conception offers an attractive 
solution, from a formal standpoint, to the crucial problem indicated above, i. e. how we 
are to select a proper value in the range of the function while preserving the non- 
uniqueness interpretation of the donkey pronoun. 
Chierchia (1992) endorses the choice function conception with the following general 
argument. 
[I]n some obvious sense, the sheer utterance of a sentence 
like [(21)] does make a donkey-valued function salient 
But it won't be a function that maps each man into the 
donkey he owns. It will have to be a function that maps 
each man into one of the donkeys he owns. It will be 
thus,, a choice-function. And, consequently, it won't be 
in general unique. (Chierchia 1992, p. 160) 
This, yet general, argument suggests adding the following general constraint to (FuC): 
(FuC) (d): If uniqueness presuppositions are not present, J(x) is a choice function. 
The question now is to know whether and how functional conceptions satisfying (FuC), 
' See Partee, ter Meulen and Wall (1993) and Machover (1996). 
' As Machover points out, the Axiom of Choice cannot be considered as a special case of the 
Comprehension 
Principle or other principles belonging to standard axiomatic set theory. 
And, In this respect, the Axiom of 
Choice "is markedly different from all other existential postulates of set theory" 
(Machover 1996, p. 78). 
' See Machover (1996, pp. 78-9) and Suppes (1972, pp. 239-40). 
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i. e. (a)+(b)+(c)+(d), can provide the range of readings that donkey sentences are Supposed 
to exhibit. 
Here is a first alternative. Gawron, Nerbonne and Peters (1991) and Chierchia (1992) 
share similar views about how to satisfy (FuQ and generate the relevant range of 
readings. According to them the common basis of both approaches is the role that choice 
functions play in generating the relevant readings. The idea here is that context "will 
make salient not just one [choice] function but afamily offuncdons, all of which are a 
priori good candidates for interpreting" (Chierchia 1992, p. 160; my emphasis). Thus, 
owning more than one donkey in the context of sentence (2 1) means that a man must be 
in a mapping-relation with each donkey in payWcular that he owns. Therefore, the 
conception of a donkey pronoun as denoting a family of choice functions provides 
immediately the U-reading of sentences like (21), because all donkeys will be captured 
by some choice function interpreting the pronoun it, no matter what amount of them a 
man owns. Furthermore,, it is patent that no direct resort to uniqueness is needed. 
Whereas, under this conception, a man can own more than one donkey as his relation to 
each of his donkeys is assured by the character of the function, each assignment of him 
as an argument will yield one value in the range. This suggests that the following 
specification of (d) above might be added to (FuQ. 
(FuC) (e): E-type pronouns constitute a family of equally salient choice functionsj(x). 
Unfortunately, as we saw in Chapter Four, Section 4.2.2, Chierchia! s functional view is 
potentially questionable. Also, our criticism we believe will affect inevitably the 
plausibility of any conception based on similar premisses, for example, Gawron, 
Nerbonne and Peters'approach cited above. Thus, we propose discarding, without further 
analysis, conceptions supporting requirement (e) above 
21 
. 
That is to say, conceptions 
' Apart ftom methodological considerations, according to Kanazawa (1993, p. 157), the deficiency shared 
by both approaches has a logical angle too: the absence of an appropriate treatment and 
definition of 
monotone increasing determiners. 
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supporting (FuC) (a)+(b)+(c)+(d)+(e). 
tn what comes we are going to look at a different alternative that, respecting constraints 
(a), (b), (c) and (d), provides a more apt answer to the problem of generating the readings 
of a donkey sentence. 
5.3 The Functional Generalized Quantifier Analysis 
The treatment of donkey anaphora we are going to introduce in this section is based on 
Generalized Quantifier theory (GQ henceforth) and has been developed mainly by Lappin 
(1989) and Lappin and Francez (1994). Some basic aspects of the approach in question 
will be examined first. These aspects of GQ are (a) its commitment to an E-type view of 
pronouns and (b) its functional treatment of E-type pronouns. 
On the other hand, at this initial stage no appeal to choice functions will be made. As we 
shall see,. however., GQ departs immediately from previous functional conceptions as 
regards the nature of the individual values supposedly assigned to donkey functions. At 
a second stage, choice functions are systematically introduced. Henceforth we will call 
this functional account based on GQ theory, the Functional GQ theory, or simply, FGQ. 
The basic framework of GQ is that formulated in Barwise and Cooper (19 8 1) and Cooper 
(1983). A well-known characteristic of this framework is its treatment of NPs that denote 
set of sets. Roughly speaking, for any NP Pet NJ , the set 
it denotes will contain all and 
only the sets which are related to the set denoted by its N and satisfy the condition 
imposed by its determiner Det. Thus, a sentence of the form [NP VPJ is true iff the set 
that is the extension of the VP is included in the set of sets denoted by the subject NP. 
Thus we get, for instance, the representations in (22'), (23') and (24') for (22), (23) and 
(24) respectively (E corresponds to the domain of entities, S and P to sets of individuals 
who sing and are philosophers, respectively, and X to a set of sets in E ). 
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(22) Every philosopher sings. 
(23) Some philosopher sings. 
(24) No philosopher sings 
(22') ScXE: P ý-= X 
(23') S EF X E: XnPo 
(24') ScXE: XnPo 
Although an exhaustive discussion of the grounds of GQ would fall beyond the scope of 
the present investigation, we are already in a position to ask for applications of GQ to the 
donkey anaphora problem. Lappin (1989) and Lappin and Francez (1994) are recognized 
as the best applications of such a theory to the problem in question. According to these 
approaches, the GQ view will compositionally represent the interpretation of the standard 
donkey sentence (25) by means of (26) and (27) below (numbers are not directly 
represented as predicates of sets here but as expressing cardinality parameters over sets). 
(25) Every man who owns three, donkeys beats them,. 
(26) 11 every man who owns three donkeys 11 =IXgE: (Men n(a: I {b 
own (a, b) In Donkeys 1 2ý 3 1) CX 
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(27) 11 beat them 11 =(w: <w, (XgE: e, & .... 
& ek 6 X)> 61 (c, NP) 
{d: beats(c, d) ) EF NP )) 
Sentence (26) represents the sub ect NP of (25) and sentence (27) the matrix VP j 
containing the plural pronoun them That pronoun comes out in (27) as an E-type pronoun 
(represented by the elements e, & .... & ekof 
X that belong to the set of ordered pairs 
(c, NP)) that, for each man a, denotes the elements of the intersective set specified in the 
right-hand side of (26), i. e. the set of at least three donkeys that a owns . 
2' This 
representation helps us to see how important the intersective set is for determining the 
content of the E-type pronoun in (25). Lappin and Francez offer the following explanation 
28 We are assuming here that IXI corresponds to the cardinality of the set 
X and that own (a, b) is an 
abbreviation for the set of ordered pairs <a, b> which belongs to the set 
Own, i. e. such that a owns b. 
29For any u which is an element of the set in question the intersective set is 
defined as 
(1) (b: own (u, b))n Donkeys 
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of the representation (27): 
[W]e can represent the interpretation of them relative to its 
antecedent [three] donkeys in [(25)] by an appropriately defined 
set of individual terms whose denotations, are not assigned 
independently, but are dependent upon other individuals. In 
effect, each such term denotes a function from individuals 
to individuals (Lappin and Francez 1994, p. 395) '0 
If the sequence e, ..... ek 
(LU) denotes the set of individual terms such that for each 
individual u which belongs to the intersective set of men who own at least three donkeys, 
ei is one of the at least three donkeys which u owns, " then ei can be represented as a 
function fi(u). This function is such that for each appropriate u, f(u) E ({ b: own(u, b)) 
n Donkeys), and fi (u) 9E fj (u). This way the interpretation of the VP beat in (27) is 
given by the set-theoretical representation (28) below, when the interpretation of the 
subject NP of (25) is applied to that VP. Therefore, the interpretation of the whole 
sentence can be specified finally by means of the equivalence in (29). 
(2 8) c: beats( c, e, )&..... & beats (c, ek 
A 
(29) Every man who owns three donkeys beats them true iff 
(Men nfa: I (b: own (a, bn Donkeys I -a 3 1) c: {c: beats ( c, e, ) & ... 
... 
& beats (c, e, ) I 
Sentence (29) says that (25) is true iff every man who owns at least three donkeys beats 
each of the donkeys in the intersective set of at least three donkeys that he owns, which 
is the correct E-type interpretation of the sentence. As a result, the interpretation of the 
paradigm donkey sentence in the left hand side of (30) below becomes unproblematic. 
The standard U-reading in the right hand side of (30) is obtained by making the obvious 
change in the cardinality parameter of (26). 
30 See also Lappin (1989, pp. 278-279). 
31 1 e, .... 
ek )= (I b- own(u, b) )n Donkeys) 
186 
(30) 11 Every man who owns a donkey beats it 11 = true iff 
(Men n {a: {b : own (a, bn Donkeys t- oI)g: f c: beats(c, e&... 
... & beats(c, 
ek )1 
(30) provides indeed the required E-type interpretation, namely that every man who owns 
a donkey beats every donkey he owns. Moreover, in the GQ functional theory E-type 
pronouns, in accordance with Neale's numberless hypothesis (NH), become semantically 
unspecified for grammatical number. In the present proposal, the grammatical number 
of a donkey pronoun is determined by the cardinality bounds of its antecedent, i. e. by 
"the minimal cardinality bound (upper or lower) associated with the determiner of its 
antecedent NP" (Lappin and Francez 1994, p. 396 ). 32 Because both in (29) and (30) the 
lower cardinality bounds are three and one respectively, we get in the first case a 
grammatically plural pronoun, and, in the second, a singular one. The functions denoted 
by the E-type pronouns can, accordingly, be interpreted as mapping individuals to 
maximal collections of individuals. Thus, the interpretation is subject to a maximality 
constraint,, which is specified by the cardinality bounds of the plurality parameter of the 
intersective set. If for instance the cardinality parameter is at least one F, the 
grammatical number of the pronoun must match the lower cardinality bound of the 
intersective set. The pronoun it satisfies this constraint. Now if the cardinality parameter 
specifies at most three Fs, the pronoun must match the upper cardinality bound of the 
intersective set. This is satisfied, for instance, by the pronoun them. By contrast, "the 
cardinality of the intersective set in terms of which [the] denotation [of the pronoun] is 
defined need not match [the grammatical] number [of the pronoun]. " (Lappin 1989, 
p. 282). Thus whereas the pronoun it is singular, its intersective set can contain more than 
one element, and although the pronoun them is plural, its intersective set can contain 
only one element. Therefore, the maximality constraint provides an immediate 
numberless effect on the pronoun. 
Here we pause to note two initial differences between FGQ and other approaches to 
32 See also Lappin (1989, p. 282). 
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donkey anaphora. The first concerns the value of the function and is rather ontological 
in nature. It is that while in FGQ functions are defined and used as usuaL their values are 
additionally restricted due to their belonging to a maximal collection. In other words,, 
according to FGQ the values in the collection must be structurally similar and thereby 
ontologically undistinguishable from one another. This characteristic helps us thus to 
block any underlying argument in favour of the uniqueness of the donkey pronoun. The 
second difference lies in the use of plurality parameters in processing the domain of the 
donkey function, in particular in specifying the parameter of collective reading ( i. e. 
+Coll(X)). As we shall see, this initial invocation to plurality aspects Will become crucial 
at the second stage of the theory. 
Consequently, at the first stage of development of FGQ the following constraint can be 
infeffed: 
(FuC) (f): E- or D- type pronouns denote a functionfix) from individuals 
to maximal collections of individuals. 
Even though the FGQ conception depicted by (FuC)(f) promises a solution to the 
limitations found in the previous functional theories, it is clear that, in its initial 
formulation, the approach does not go very far. In the present GQ theory we are able to 
explain only the standard readings of donkey sentences. The various complex examples 
discussed in the previous chapters remain nonetheless beyond its reach. Therefore, it 
seems necessary to extend FGQ so as to make it apt to deal with such examples. This 
implies that the constraint (FuC)(f) must be further specified. Thus, this brings us to the 
second stage of implementation of the theory in question. 
FGQ implements (FuCXf) by dint of the following two claims due to Lappin and Francez 
(1994): 
(fl): Maximal collections are sunn of indhiduals or i-sunu. 
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(Q): Given an E-type ftinction ,f must satisfy the following maximality constraint: for each argument xfor which j(x) is defined, thefunction selects the supremum 
in the set of i-sums in its range 
Condition (fl) can be spelt out in the following terms. The notion of i-sum derives from 
Link (1983,1987). According to Link i-sums are formed by a particular operation Vi on 
a domain E of atomic individuals. An i-sum term can be, for instance, 'a ViV where a and 
b are atomic individuals. 'a Vi V, in LinVs words, "is supposed to denote a new entity in 
the domain of individuals which is made up from the two individuals denoted by a and 
b" (Link 1987, p. 15 1). Such an i-sum does not denote the set consisting of the values of 
a and b "but rather another individual of the same kind as [the value of a and b]" (Link 
19871, Ibid. ). As a result, the ordered pair (E, Q determines a semi-lattice algebra that 
contains atomic individuals and i-sums constructed from these individuals. E is closed 
under the Vi operation. This operation induces, in its turn, a partial order :! ýj on E 
corresponding to the relation between the elements of E and the i-sums of which they are 
parts. We can call these parts, i-parts". In Link's system we have finally predicates 
constructed from standard one-place predicates like JIF11, which denote the set of all i- 
sums that are in the extension of JIF11 in E. Characteristically, Link symbolizes those 
predicates as*F. "*Fis, intuitively speaking, a pluralized predicate that adds (sets of) 
i-sums to the extension of F. This basic explanation should help us to understand how 
Lappin and Francez conceive formally an E-type pronoun when these authors treat the 
latter as denoting a maximal collection. It is not difficult envisage the ontological 
significance of these modifications. In short, in the GQ analysis E-type pronouns do 
denote individuals but of a special sort. In particular since the denotation of donkey 
pronouns corresponds to collections of i-sums, its structure differs markedly from that 
of a basic set of individualS. 35 
" Group expressions like committee do not have i-parts in Link's semantics. 
They are atoms in E; see Link 
(1987, Ibid) 
Our exposition is obviously very simplified; for more 
detail see Link (1983,1987) and Landman (1989, 
1996). 
35 See Link (1987, p. 15 1) for a philosophical rationale for i-sums 
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Let us consider how Lappin and Francez understand (f2). Let I be a set of i-sums. Then 
the supremum of the set I is the smallest Je I (the least upper bound) such that every i El 
is a part of j. 36 Therefore, E-type pronouns understood as functions whose range is I 
select the smallest i-sum in I such that every other i-sum is a member of it. Also given the 
presence of pluralized predicates in Link's system, Lappin and Francez represent 
numerical determiners as one-place predicates on sets. With these elementary 
explanations in place, we can examine Lappin and Francez's construction of the 
representations of standard donkey sentences. Consider again the paradigm sentence (3 1) 
below (antecedent and pronoun go coindexed). 
(3 1) Every man who owns a donkey, beats it,. 
The predicate owns can now be understood as a pluralized relational predicate *owns, 
which applies to the elements of the set defined by the one-place predicate 1-donkey, i. e. 
the set of i-sums of donkeys with a cardinality of at least one. Thus, the interpretation of 
(3 1) can be captured by means of (32) below (beat is interpreted in the latter as a 
pluralized relational predicate)37. 
(32) ( Men n{a: fb: *owns (a, b )I n 1_donkey :#oI) ý-- { c: *beats( c, f(c) )) 
According to (32), (3 1) is true iff everyone who owns a i-swn of at least one donkey beats 
the entity which is the i-sum value of J(c). On the one hand, c denotes an atomic 
individual in E that is a man who owns an i-sum of at least one donkey. On the other 
' According to Partee, ter Meulen and Wall (1993, p. 276), "[1]n an arbitruy [power set] A we define an upper 
bound of BcA as an element a EA, if it exists, such that for all b c-B, b-<a. An upper 
bound a of B is the least 
upper bound qfB [ ... 
] or the supremum ofB if, for any upper bound c of B, we have a<c"; for more 
detail see Gratzer (1971). 
"in order to make sure that under distributive readings of relational predicates atomic 
i-parts of i-sums are 
the denotations proper of the object NP of the sentence, Lappin and Francez formulate the fOllOwlng 
condition: letx *rl y' represent the relation in which x is an atomic part of the 
i-suin y. Then we can specify 
the following condition on the distributive readings of the relational predicates 
ff *R receives a distiibutive reading, then (a) *R(ab)-= Vc(c 
*jib) R(ac), and (b) - *R(ab)m Vc(c 011b) 
-R(a, c). 
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hand, the supremum in the set of i-sums in the intersective set of (3 1) is the maximal i- 
sum of at least one donkey that c owns. Hence if the maximality constraint in (f2) is 
applied to f(c), sentence (3 1) is true iff every man who owns at least one donkey beats 
the maximal i-sum of at least one donkey which he owns. In other words, (32) implies 
that every man who owns at least one donkey beats every donkey that he owns, which 
corresponds to the standard U-reading associated with (3 1). 31 
Two natural questions to ask at this stage are whether or not FGQ can make room to 
choice functions and, if so, how. Lappin and Francez answer the first question positively 
and their answer serves, in turn, as an answer to the second question. In short, Lappin and 
Francez maintain that if we cancel the maximality constraint in (f2), J(x) becomes a 
choice function. Cancelling the maximality constraint is prompted by pragmatic 
considerations associated mainly with the lexical content of the VP present in the donkey 
sentence. Consequently, in FGQ a donkey function must be sensitive not just to the 
determiner of the N restriction but also to other features of the sentence that interact with 
context and pragmatic information. "If the maximality constraint in (f2) is suspended or 
cancelled, the function maps then individuals to just one of the i-sums in its range. We 
shall henceforth symbolize the cancellation and the application of such a maximality 
constraint as'-J(x)' and as "J(x)' respectively. Let us now consider sentence (33), where 
the preferred reading is the E- one. 
(33) Every person who had a dime, in his pocket put it, into the meter. 
Since under the E-reading this sentence (or more exactly the content of its VP) does not 
require that every dime be put into the meter, maximality can be suspended. Therefore, 
the correct semantic representation of (33) comes out in (34). 
" See Lappin and Francez (1994, pp. 403 ff ). 
39 This implies that Lappin and Francez's view is not committed to any a priori constraint concerning the 
determination of the choice function. 
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(34) (Person n (a: Ib: *ha. v - 
in_his_pocket(ab n 1-dime iE o 
g; f c: *put-into_themeter(c, -J(c) )) 
In this case, -f(c) is a choice function that, for a person c who has in his pocket an i-sum 
of dimes with cardinality of at least 1, yields one of the i-sums of dimes with a 
cardinality of at least I as the value of the function. If the maximality constraint in (fl) 
is applied to f(c) we get 'f(c) , i. e. we get a function whose i-sum is the supremum 
containing all of the dimes in c's pocket. Since, according to Lappin and Francez, "when 
the maximality condition onj(c) is suspended, a donkey sentence is true iff there is at 
least one choice fanctionfic) for which the specification of its truth conditions holds" 
(Lappin and Francez 1994, p. 406), (34) provides the correct reading of (33), namely the 
E-reading. Therefore, whenever such a constraint is not applied-i. e. whenever we get a 
choice function-the E-reading is the representation available. 
A. sked as to the pragmatic considerations determining the suspension of the maximality 
constraint,, Lappin and Francez answer that such considerations have to do with "implied 
cardinality restrictions [of the VP] on the size of the i-sum which can serve as the value 
of [ ... ] the pronoun. This 
implied restriction is pragmatically based and involves real 
world knowledge" (Lappin and Francez 1994, p. 407). In order to see how and when 
these considerations apply, let us consider the following sentences. 
(35) Every person who has a credit card, pays his bill with it,. 
(36) Every person who has a credit card, pays a service charge for it,. 
Pragmatic considerations and real world knowledge related to the VP in (35) determine 
that a person uses often one credit card to pay a particular bill. In this case, the cardinality 
restriction forces the selection of an i-sum (with cardinality of one) from the range of the 
function. An E-reading is thereby obtained. Moreover, the i-sum concerned should be 
considered as nonnziuinwl, since the same pragmatic assumptions determine that other 
i-sums with the same cardinality can serve as values of the function. By contrast, in the 
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case (34) there seems to be no 'pragmatically salient limit'to the number of credits cards 
that a person pays service on, and thereby no restriction on the size of the i-sum in 
question can be imposed. Thus, in this latter case the functions that denote donkey 
pronouns are subject to the maximality condition. Accordingly, the U-reading-the 
preferred one-is obtained. 
We can now formulate the following final specification of (FuC) (f), which encapsulates 
our above explanations: 
(FuC) (f3): If, due to pragmatic considerations on the cardinality of the i-sum, the 
maximality constraint in (Q) is cancelled, fix) selects just one (nonmaximal) 
i-sum in its range, i. e. J(x) becomes a choice function. 
According to Lappin and Francez, (S) suggests an additional generalisation affecting the 
distribution of the U- and E-readings. They argue that, granted that cardinality restrictions 
are introduced by pragmatics and contextual knowledge, the maximality condition is, in 
principle, always available. Hence the U-reading is always in place and becomes, in 
Lappin and Francez's terminology, the 'default interpretation' of donkey sentences. 
Evidence in favour of this generalisation,. they affirm, comes from sentences like (36) 
above and (37)-(38) below. In these sentences the cardinality restriction associated with 
the size of the i-sum is cancelled by means of the introduction of a monotone decreasing 
determiner in both the subject NP and the negation of the VP, respectively. 
(37) No person who had a dime, in his pocket put it, into the meter. 
(38) Every person who had a dime, in his pocket did not put it, into the meter. 
Consider (37). On reflection, the reading associated with this sentence is the one 
formulated in (39). 
(39) Every person who had a dime in his pocket put no dime he/she had into the meter. 
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Thus, the presence of the monotone decreasing determiner in (37) has the effect of 
negating the relation denoted by the VP and thereby of cancelling the cardinality 
restriction implied by the non-negated counterpart of the sentence. Sentence (37) implies 
that there is no "pragmatically salient limit on the number of objects which one does not 
put in a meter at a particular time" (Lappin and Francez 1994, p. 408). FGQ predicts 
clearly this situation. The representation (40) that FGQ generates for (39) specifies this 
prediction. 
(40) ( Persons nfab: *has in his pocket(a, b) In I-dime -, -- o 
Q {c: - *put in the meter(c, -f(c) )) 
Structure (40) corresponds to the U-reading of sentence (39), which, according to Lappin 
and Francez, becomes the default reading of the latter" 
We need to consider finally how FGQ deals with the complex cases of sage plant 
sentences, where Neale's distributivity analysis as well as other proposals fail. Let us 
examine again the standard example in sentence (4 1) below, discussed in Chapter Three. 
As we said there, the truth of that sentence requires that each person who bought at least 
two sage plants bought a total of at least seven sage plants. 
(41) Every person who bought two sage plants I here bought five others along with them, 
Because of its collective basis, FGQ appears to be made for dealing with this sort of 
sentence. If we assume that the matrix VP in (4 1) is interpreted collectively with respect 
to the E-type pronoun them, then cardinality restrictions must be present in the i-sums 
'0 For more detail on the rationale of Lappin and Francez's 
distribution criterion see Lappin and Francez 
(1994, p. 408 ff ). Verbs like rqfiise orfiiled are also explained 
by means of cancellation of cardinality 
restrictions, because these verbs suppose the negation of the matrix 
VP. Obviously, if we do not want to 
represent the meaning of (37) by quantifying over choice 
functions, a natural alternative is to use a dynamic 
construal. For instance, Chierchia (1992) suggests the 
following analysis of sentence (39): 
lp(Vx[[ person(x) & Ay[ d1me(y) & has- in - 
hs_pocket (x, y)II , -y[ dme(y) & has_, n - 
h, s_pocket (x, y) 
& put-ln_the_meter (xy) 11 &-A 
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assigned as values to the pronoun. " So, as cancellation of the maximality constraint is 
inevitable, we end up with a choice function representing the pronoun. This means that 
a structure such as (42) below can be constructed for (41). The natural language 
interpretation of (42) is specified in sentence (43). 
(42) (Persons n {a: I b: *bought (a, b) In 2_sage-plants : f- og 
c: *boughL5 others along with (c, -J(c) )I 
(43) Every person who bought at least two sage plants here bought five others along with 
the at least two sage plants bought by him/her. 
Since the pronoun them in (39) can be understood as specifying a choice function, this 
function will select an arbitrary non maximal i-sum b of sage plants with a cardinality of 
at least 2. Thus, this interpretation of the donkey pronoun plus the interpretation 
associated with the pluralized predicate *bought 5 others along with provide the 
correct E-reading of the pronoun and satisfy the truth-conditions of (4 1) specified in (43). 
The previous result contradicts Neale's opinion (see Chapter Three, Section 3.2) in that 
the collective reading is, in certain cases, the only available interpretation for E-type 
pronouns. Consequently, it seems an inescapable conclusion that the semantics of those 
pronouns must be constructed taking into account collectivity aspects. Moreover, the 
functional approach shows that, even in the simple cases of sage plant sentences, 
distributive views like Neale's may be seriously limited. For if, as Lappin and Francez 
contend, sage plant sentences are singular-i. e. if they contain singular indefinite NPs as 
the antecedents of the E-type pronouns-their VP is interpretable as inducing either a 
collective or distributive readings of the pronouns. Both readings , in this case, are 
equivalent. Hence they provide, for the distributive reading of sentence (44) below, the 
specification in (45). 
41 Lappin and Francez argue that cardinality restrictions attached to VPs and induced by numerical 
determiners do not derive from pragmatic assumptions but only from the lexical content of the VP; see LapPtn 
and Francez (1994, p. 414). 
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(44) Everyone who bought a sage plant I here bought five others along with it,. 
(45) For each person x who bought an i-sum of sage plants here with a cardinality of at 
least 1, for each atomic party of the maximal i-surn a of sage plants with a 
cardinality of at least I such that x bought a here, there is an i-sum -- of at least five 
sage plants such that x bought z here and no atomic part of.: is identical toy. 
It should be clear that (45) represents the U-reading of (44), because the VP boughtfive 
others along with it is interpreted there distributively. In other words, each atomic part 
of the maximal i-surn a that stands for a sage plant is related to each atomic part of the 
non maximal i-sum z which stands forfive others plants. Also, this shows, in accordance 
with Lappin and Francez's suggestion, that the VP need not be constrained by a 
cardinality restriction. However, the VP of (44) is also interpretable collectively. The 
same cardinality restriction holding for (4 1) applies to this case as well. The following 
is the reading in question. 
(46) For each person x who bought an i-sum of sage plants here with a cardinality of at 
least 1, there is a non-maximal i-sum of sage plants y with a cardinality of at least 
I such that xbought y here, and there is an i-sum I of at least five sage plants such 
that x bought z here and no atomic part of z is an atomic part of y. 
Apparently, (46) also allows for E-readings of (44) as the i-sum y of sage plants with 
cardinality of at least I is non-maximal. However., as Lappin and Francez point out, (44) 
can be shown to be equivalent to (45). From that, these authors conclude that the 
interpretations (45) and (46) generated "on the distributive and collective readings of 
[the] VP [of (44)j are equivalent and correct" (Lappin and Francez 1994, p. 415). This 
proves that there is no necessity of assuming any particular commitment to distributivity 
in interpreting donkey sentences (contradicting again Neale's suggestions). On the 
contrary, the FGQ treatment of donkey anaphora makes it clear that actual decisions 
about plurality aspects in donkey sentences are closely related to the interpretation of 
their VPs,, which unavoidably triggers interaction with contextual knowledge. It follows 
therefore that the representation of such sentences and their E-type pronouns should be 
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systematically sensitive to those aspects. 
5.4 FGQ and Donkey Anaphora Nonspecificity: the Semantic Evaluation and the 
Pragmatic Evaluation 
5.4.1 The semantic evaluation 
In this section, we will evaluate FGQ in terms of our previous discussion on the 
functional conception of semantic nonspecificity. We argue that FGQ provides a 
satisfactory fon-nal basis on which to implement our claims about donkey anaphora 
nonspecificity. 
An evaluation of FGQ in terms of nonspecificity should consider at least four aspects. 
The first aspect concerns general adequacy and predictive and explanatory power. From 
our arguments in sections 5.2 and 5.3, it seems clear that a functional theory of donkey 
anaphora that embraces (FuC) (a)+(b)+(c)+(f) should be preferred. FGQ provides an 
elegant and successful implementation of that conception and is therefore the ideal 
candidate to be preferred. This implies also the acceptance at once of (fl)+(f2)+(f3). As 
to functional nonspecificity of donkey sentences however the only assumptions that 
should be taken into account are, in our opinion, (a), (b), (c), and (S). Requirements (a), 
(b) and (c) are already adequately j ustified. Later in this section we shall substantiate our 
option for (0). 
The second aspect to be considered in evaluating FGQ is crucial to us here. It concerns 
the potential availability of the different readings of a donkey sentence. Although Lappin 
and Francez do not make any explicit claim in favour of a nonspecificity analysis, their 
proposal is we think basically compatible with this analysis. Our opinion is based on their 
own evaluation of FGQ and the theoretical tenets supporting it. After implementing (S) 
and showing that the GQ account parametrically generates the E- and U-readings, Lappin 
and Francez state the following conclusion: 
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Our i-surn based E-type account has achieved the objective 
which we adopted [ ... I 
for an adequate theory of donkey 
anaphora. It generates both the universal and the existential 
readings of donkey sentences from a single representation 
through the assignment of distinct values to a parameterized 
feature of these representations[ ... ]. In principle, both 
readings are available for any donkey sentence. (Lappin and 
Francez 1994, p. 406) 
Whatever the weight this conclusion may have within Lappin and Francez's theory, it 
involves a claim compatible with our initial characterization of functional or parametric 
nonspecificity. We can call this claim the availability-in-principle assumption. The 
claim imposes some interesting constraints on functional theories of donkey anaphora. 
Here we indicate three of them. First, it implies that in the representations generated by 
a functional theory linguistic or syntactic constraints restrict but do not fix the semantic 
content of the donkey sentences. Recall that we have argued in favour of this 
consequence in Chapter Four, Section 4.3. Evidently, because of their very nature, all of 
the functional theories are committed to this constraint. 
Second, the availability-in-principle assumption implies a simple principle of adequacy 
for the semantics of donkey anaphora. This principle states that if donkey sentences are 
underspecified by linguistic rules, the semantics of those sentences must systematically 
provide their preferred as well as non-preferred readings. It follows then that the 
semantics must provide nonspecific schemas from which each reading of the donkey 
sentences are specifiable. FGQ clearly satisfies this requirement. For instance, in standard 
donkey sentences with the determiner every affecting the subject NP and numerical 
determiners attached to the antecedent of the pronoun, the theory in question allows us 
to formulate the following nonspecific schema: 
(nss 1) (Fn {a: (b: *G (a, b) )n n_H : 9ý: oI)g; fc: *K(c, "-J(c)) ) 
Intuitively, the expression "'Y(c)' in (nss 1) corresponds to a donkey function which we 
do not know yet whether or not the maximality constraint will apply to. 
One can decide 
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this, as we now know, only after the utterance of the donkey sentence interacts with 
contextual information. Thus, (nss 1) renders in principle available any specification of 
the donkey function resulting from processing contextual information. Similarly for 
donkey sentences with negative monotone determiners (for instance, no) attached to the 
subject NP, one can derive from FGQ the following nonspecific schema. 
(nss 2) (Fn la: Ib: *G (a, b) InnH3, - o )) nfc: *K(c, "J(c)) )= 
Third, in a functional theory the availability-in-principle assumption implies that specific 
readings of a donkey sentence obtain as a consequence of processing certain parameters 
in the functional representation of the pronoun. Because FGQ considers donkey pronouns 
as functions whose values are parametrically determined, this constraint is immediately 
satisfied. It is worthwhile in this connection indicating the parametric features that 
determine the value of the function in (nss 1). The first feature is the cardinality n of the 
predicate H. The second feature is supplied by the pluralized predicate *K, whose 
processing helps us to determine whether or not the i-sum. denoted by the value of the 
function must be interpreted as a maximal collection. In other words, *K helps us to 
determine a third parameter, the maximality operatorY. Finally, as Lappin and Francez's 
theory dictates that, in donkey sentences containing plural indefinite NPs, interpretation 
of VPs is the only responsible for the determination of which plural feature is selected, 
specification of the maximality operator depends to a certain extent on that interpretation 
as well". This implies that the interpretation of the VPs as either +Coll(*K) or - Coll(*K) 
(i. e. as meaning collectivity or distributivity) helps us to specify the maximality operator 
with '-' or Y. respectively. Thus, ideally parameterized specifications of (nss 1) such as 
those in (ss 1) and (ss 2) below can be derived- Schema (ss 1) represents the specification 
of a standard donkey sentence with the numerical determiner three affecting the 
antecedent of the pronoun; schema (ss 2) represents the parallel case with the negative 
monotone determiner no affecting the subject NP. 
'Here Lappin and Francez assume one of the possible explanations of the 
different Interpretations of plural 
sentences. Our claims about nonspecificity do not not necessarily commit us to their analysis. 
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(ss 1) FnIa: (b: *G (a, b) n 3_H o g: ( c: +Coll(*K(c, -fic) 
(ss 2) Fnfa: (b :*G (a, b) n 3_H on(c: +Coll(*K(c, -fic) )o 
More tentatively, schema (ss 3) suggests the representation of the specification of a 
simple sage plant case. 
(ss 3) (Fn {a: {b: *G (a, b) )n 1-H : t- 
( c: +Coll(*G (3ý_along_with), -J(c) ) ). 
The third aspect that we have to consider in evaluating FGQ relates to its pragmatic basis 
and scalarity. FGQ avoids any appeal to entailment (or quasi-entailment) relations among 
the different specifications of donkey sentences. Let us explain why. As we saw, in 
Lappin and Francez's theory, schemas like (ss 1) are generated from nonspecificic 
schemas like (nss 1). What we need to know is then whether the generation of ss schemas 
must be validated by certain entailment (or quasi-entailment) procedures. In other words: 
whether in FGQ the different donkey readings can be generated by using logic only. 
Examining Lappin and Francez's theory one must conclude that the generation of each 
specification derives mostly from non-logical features, in particular from processing of 
the cardinal maximality condition. And cardinal maximality is entirely induced by real 
world knowledge and context. Therefore, it should be clear that maximality can hardly 
license logical relations among the different specifications of donkey sentences. 
The fourth and last aspect to be considered in evaluating the prospects of FGQ as a 
theory of semantic nonspecificity concerns methodology. From a methodological point 
of view, a theory of nonspecificity requires the semantic representations to be as simple 
as possible. Simplicity in linguistics can only be the result of a unified and reduced set 
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of theoretical principles". Now, decisions about different competing theories are usually 
taken on the basis of evaluating, among other things, their simplicity standards. As we 
saw in Chapter Four, Section 4.2.2, Chierchia! s proposal lacked simplicity because of its 
unjustified combination of different principles and constraints in treating of donkey 
sentences. This explained why the proposal was shown to be methodologically 
questionable and thereby dropped. By contrast, Lappin and Francez take simplicity and 
unification to be acceptable desiderata that semantic representations of donkey sentences 
must comply with. For instance, in commenting on Chierchia's analysis they say: 
If, in fact, both kinds of donkey sentences [with E- and 
U-readings] are instances of the same type of anaphoric 
relation, then a theory which assigns a single representation 
to donkey sentences and derives each reading through a 
variation in a parameterized feature of this representation 
is preferable to an analysis which uses two formally 
incommensurate semantic structures to obtain these 
interpretations. (Lappin and Francez 1994, p. 400) 
Hence FGQ is evidently compatible with the methodological premises supporting a 
nonspecificity analysis. 
5.4.2 The PLiamatlC Evaluation 
Let us turn now to other more philosophical issues having to do with the functional 
theories and its connection to Neale's theory. Those issues involves basically examining 
the status of the values that donkey functions are supposed to denote. This examination 
will enable us to take some definite positions about the relation natural 
language 
pragmatics/donkey anaphora. 
" it is worth noting here that Chomsky was the 
first to highlight, in his early work, the significance for 
linguistics of having simplicity measures; see Chomsky 
(1957,1965), Chomsky and Halle (1968) and 
especially Chomsky (1975). Although his views about simplicity 
have undergone subtle changes through the 
years as his views about linguistic theory 
have changed, Chomsky's conviction about the usefulness of 
simplicity as an adequacy criterion 
for linguistic theory remains unchanged; see Sober (1975) and Lyons 
(1991). 
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We held in the beginning of the previous section that any satisfactory functional theory 
of donkey anaphora nonspecificity should endorse the conception implied by (FuQ 
(a)+(b)+(c), plus (f) and (S). If our previous arguments in this dissertation are basically 
correct, (FuQ (a)+(b)+(c) must be considered as necessary conditions to explain donkey 
anaphora nonspecificity. Thus, the question that remains is the following: why do we 
have to accept (f) and (B) as necessary requirements in a functional theory of donkey 
anaphora? As to the necessity of condition (f), our answer put us back to the general 
background provided by Neale's theory. As to (S), the answer depends on what we will 
say about (f). We have first to clarify what we consider being intrinsically valuable in (f). 
Obviously, the crucial aspect of (f) is the association of the values of a donkey function 
with maximal collections, as argued by Lappin and Francez. Nevertheless, it is not 
necessary for a theory of functional nonspecificity to endorse all theoretical assumptions 
behind Lappin and Francez! s conception of maximal collection. On the one hand, we 
think a fimctional theory need not be committed to a conception of collections, according 
to which the latter must be represented by lattice-theoretical structures. Collections can 
well be just sets of a particular type or something else'. On the other hand, collections 
are, strictly speaking, not groups". In particular, unlike groups, collections contain atoms 
or irreducible entities. Thus, in donkey anaphora treatments the commitment to 
collections can, it seems to us, be confined to the idea that donkey functions must take 
as values complex entities-whatever they may be-composed of atomic individuals. 
Now, we can ask ourselves whether is it possible, and how, to connect this idea with the 
general analysis of nonspecificity deployed in Chapter Two. The answer to these two 
questions will allow us to show the strenght and richness of that analysis. As indicated 
in Chapter Two, Section 2.2, referential disambiguation of a definite description in a 
given utterance context does not imply, on the hearer side, an exhaustive specification 
of the thought associated with the object referred to. Following Bach (1987) we argued 
' Lappin and Francez's theory permits altemative conceptions; see Lappin and 
Francez (1994, p. 402, n. 12). 
45 See Link (1987) and Landman (1996). 
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that a hearer, in processing speaker's intentions behind referential uses of descriptions, 
is naturally committed to the idea of 'unspecified or nonspecific reference'. In other 
words, referents that the speaker introduces in communicative processes by using 
expressions such as the F, and pragmatically specified by the hearer, will qualify as 
'unspecified' or 'nonspecific' objects. 
We consider Bach's claim about nonspecific reference a useful clarification about how 
speakers communicate object-dependent thoughts by means of definite descriptions. 
While some semanticists could resist BacVs claim on philosophical or linguistic grounds, 
we believe that its acceptance or rejection should mostly depend on its capacity to 
interact with some interesting semantic approaches dealing directly with reference issues. 
Bach! s picture do have that capacity. In particular, we believe that it is clearly compatible 
with Neale's analysis of anaphora. " One reason to think that way is the fact that the 
semantic property of numberless (Neale's NH) is a primary example of how definite 
descriptions induce unspecified reference in anaphoric contexts. Maximal collections or 
complex individuals become natural ways of spelling out the property of numberlessness 
in the representation of E-type pronouns. Thus, if NH is in general a correct hypothesis, 
as we take it to be, the denotation of the E-type pronouns involves inevitably unspecified 
reference in Bach's sense. In addition, the values of the functions representing such 
pronouns Will involve inevitably i-sums, complex individuals, nonspecific individuals or 
something similar. 
We turn now to address the question about the maximality condition associated with the 
requirement (f). The question can be formulated in the following manner: why and when 
must i-sums denoted by the donkey functions satisfy the cardinal maximality condition? 
The answer to those questions depends, it seems to us, only on whether both the 
numberless hypothesis and the notion of unspecified reference are taken seriously. On the 
one hand, under NH the donkey pronoun it, for example, is associated with different 
46Bach recognizes explicitly a general agreement between 
his views and Neale's; see Bach 0 994, Posicript 
pp. 310-1). 
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nonspecific individuals with cardinality of at least one. Now while pragmatic knowledge 
is not introduced in the furiction, we have to make sure that any individual in the set of 
the nonspecific individuals can be denoted by the function. This can only be insured by 
imposing maximality on the function. On the other hand, in terms of nonspecificity the 
application of the cardinal maximality condition means that, for reasons related to the 
interaction between structural factors-for instance, Vps-and contextual and real world 
knowledge, the values of the fimction are not needed of further specification. in terms of 
Bach's explanation one could say that whenever a donkey sentence with the maximality 
condition is uttered by a speaker in front of somebody, the former is intending the latter 
to recognize that the former intends the latter not to specify further the object-dependent 
thoughts associated with the utterance of such a sentence. 
Finally, we are now in the position of suggesting why functional theories need to endorse 
the requirement (0),, namely why they need to endorse some choice function view. It 
should be clear by now that the choice function conception that should be retained for a 
satisfactory donkey anaphora theory involves simply the requirement that choice 
functions are activated after cancelling the maximality requirement. Thus this conception 
should not be committed to the idea that cardinality restrictions derive basically from 
VPs. as Lappin and Francez's theory takes it. Cardinal restrictions are crucial when 
cancelling maximality obviously, but the empirical issue of their origin, it seems to us, 
can remain open. Accordingly, we have to explain how this version of a donkey choice 
ftmction that we are endorsing can be accommodated in our analysis of nonspecificity. 
We suggest the following story as a reasonable explanation: first, choice functions in that 
version are pragmatically motivated ways of specifying the values that the functions can 
assign to the E-type pronouns. Second, since the reference of those pronouns is always 
an individual compound and not a single individual, the specification in question cannot 
be exhaustive (unless a uniqueness presupposition points out the contrary). Third, the 
foregoing indicates that the reference in question will remain unspecified still after 
processing the function. 
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Furthermore, our explanation accords with an analysis in terms of communicative 
intentions. Let us briefly examine the point. The activation of a choice function means 
the speaker is uttering a donkey sentence with the intention that the hearer recognizes 
that the former intends him/her to specify one of the object-dependent thoughts 
associated with the utterance of that sentence. If, in uttering the donkey sentence, the 
speaker does not intend the hearer to entertain a uniqueness presupposition, then 
specification (by means of the choice ftinction) of an object-dependent thought associated 
with the sentence cannot be exhaustive. In such a case,. the reference of the sentence in 
question will in principle remain unspecified. 
Finally, we take it for granted that intersentential anaphoric discourse contains many 
expressions operating as definite descriptions in disguise-i. e. E-type pronouns. Within 
the latter, the semantic number of the denoted objects is, for reasons put forward in 
Chapter Three, negligible when interpreting the pronoun. This introduces at once the 
whole issue of the nonspecific reference into the analysis of the anaphoric discourse. 
Therefore, we are unavoidably driven to conclude that adequate representation of that 
discourse will contain many mechanisms and uses related to nonspecific reference. In the 
next chapter, we will investigate and disclose several of those mechanisms and uses. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RULES, REPRESENTATIONS AND CONTEXT 
In this chapter we refine our proposal on nonspecificity in D-t3W anaphora. regarding two 
major topics: rules for recovering pronominal content and problems of representation. In 
its turn,, the discussion of these topics will help us to spell out how a D-type pronoun 
proposal based on a nonspecificity conception can deal with the relation between context 
and donkey anaphora. In other words, how such a proposal can generate appropriate 
pronominal content recovery rules that depict anaphora, in donkey sentences as the result 
of the interaction between contextual and semantic knowledge. Furthermore, if we 
expand on this donkey anaphora, conception across sentential boundaries, representation 
of the pronouns will require the introduction of a more flexible framework. The 
framework that we have chosen is Discourse Representation Theory (DRT). Doing so we 
show that, despite its binding conception of donkey pronouns, DRT is suitable enough 
to implement many of the intuitions that have supported our arguments in the previous 
chapters. 
In Section 5.1 we discuss rules of recovery of pronominal content, in particular Neale's 
P5 rule and Lappin and Francez's rules. In Section 5.2, as a consequence of the previous 
discussion, we formulate within the FGQ conception of donkey anaphora a different set 
of recovery rules and offer some applications. In Section 5.3 we explore problems of 
intersentential donkey anaphora and we define, within the framework of DRT, a new set 
of recovery rules . 
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6.1 Functional Recovery Rules Without Nonspecificity 
As explained in Chapter Four, Neale's anaphora theory concentrates on accounting for 
donkey pronouns and the relation in which they stand to their antecedents. In order to 
formally capture this crucial relation Neale formulates his P5 rule. P5 allows us to 
recover directly the content of the donkey pronouns by copying material from their 
quantified antecedents. The content is then rendered as an 'Impoverished' definite 
description. This description denotes everything which is part of both the restriction and 
the scope of the restricted quantifier in the antecedent. This way of presenting Neale's 
theory may, rather imprecisely, suggest that restricted quantifiers play a passive role in 
the recovery process. This is due to the general character of the formulation of P5. This 
rule can nonetheless be specified by clariýing the contribution that restricted quantifiers 
embedded in the antecedents make to the determination of the content of E-or D-type 
pronouns. According to Neale, every natural language quantifier can be evaluated in 
terms of its capacity of satisfying a logical maximality condition. Consequently, the 
recovery of the content of a pronoun anaphorically related to a quantifier is sensitive to 
whether or not the quantifier satisfies this condition. Neale's formulation of the logical 
maximality condition is the following: 
(LM). A quantifier[Dx: Fxl'is maximal if and only if'[Dx: Fx](Gx)entalls 
'[every x: Fx](Gx), for arbitrary G. 
We can thus say that quantifiers likethe F, 'each F, and'all Fs', are logically maximal. 
In contrast, quantifiers like 'an F, 'some Fs', and 'one F, cannot count as logically 
maximal. According to Neale, given condition (LM), P5 can be reformulated as the 
conjunction of the following subrules: 
(M) If x is a pronoun that is anaphoric on, but not c-commanded, by a nortmaximal 
quantifier'[Dx: Fxl'that occurs in an antecedent clause '[Dx: Fx](Gx),, then x 
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is interpreted as'[ the x: Fx & Gxj` 
(P5b) If x is a pronoun that is anaphoric on, but not c-commanded, by a maximal 
quantifier '[Dx: Fx]' that occurs in an antecedent clause '[Dx: Fx](Gx)', then x is interpreted as'[ the x: Fxf. 
It is easy to verify that these two rules enable us to get the same results as the ones 
obtained in Chapter Three by using P5 only. Nevertheless, rules P5a and P5b are 
descriptively more powerful than P5. This can be seen by reflecting on the examples in 
(1) and (2) below: 
(1) The inventor of bifocatv, was a genius; he, ate a lot of fish. 
(2) The inventor of bifocahvj had a nice house2; he, used to decorate '12every year. 
A direct application of P5 to the anaphora sentence in (1) provides us with the 
representation in (3) which can, in turn, be rephrased as in (4). 
(3) [ the x: inventor of bifocals x&x was a genius] (x ate a lot of fish) 
(4) The inventor of bifocals who was a genius ate a lot of fish, 
According to Neale, (4) does not correspond to the speaker intuition. He claims, in 
particular, that speakers would expect the pronoun he in (1) to induce a 'laziness' effect 
in the rephrasing, as specified in (5) below. The material recovered in the definite 
description of (5) is reduced to the nominal (of the'N' restriction) of the antecedent, i. e. 
the expression inventor of bifocals. 
(5) The inventor of bifocals ate a lot of fish 
' Neale's definition of 'antecedent clause' is the following - 
(Ant) The antecedent clause for a pronoun P, that is anaphoric on a quantifier Q ocurring in a 
sentence 4), is the smallest well-formed subformula of 4) that contains Q as a constituent. 
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The case in sentence (6), where the antecedent sentence is more complex than the one 
in (1), shows the correctness of Neale's interpretation of the speaker intuition. Speakers 
would indeed disagree with a translation of the pronoun which uses the nominal plus the 
scope of the quantifier-i. e. the VP adjoined to the QNP of the antecedent sentence. 
(6) The inventor of bifocals I was a genius, a maniac and a troublemaker; he , ate a lot of 
fish. 
Given that similar arguments can be produced for the rest of maximal quantifiers, a rule 
which captures the relation of these quantifiers to their pronouns seems to be needed. P5b 
is the rule in question. By using this rule, the expected laziness effects are immediately 
obtained. Let us consider as a case in point sentence (1) above. As the determiner of the 
antecedent QNP (the inventor of bifocals) of the pronoun he in (1) is logically maximal, 
P5b generates the following representation for the anaphora sentence 'he ate a lot of fi sh'. 
the x: inventor of bifocals x]( x ate a lot of fish) 
Natural language rephrasing of (7) is (5) above. In contrast, the determiner of the 
antecedent QNP of the pronoun it in (2) is nonmaximal-a F, and thereby the P5a rule 
must be applied. As the representation of the antecedent sentence is the one in (8) we get 
the representation (9) below for the pronoun (we interpret the antecedent a nice house 
2 
as inducing numberless on the pronoun, which is represented by the whe determiner). 
(8) the x: inventor of bifocals x ]([a y: nice house y] (x had y 
(9) whe y: nice house y&x had y] 
According to Neale's theory expounded in Chapter Three, the pronoun in question can be represented in 
two ways. This is the result of assigning different scopes to the 
definite descriptions that interact with other 
quantifiers. Thus, the definite description the inventor of 
bifocals in the antecedent sentence generates two 
scope assignments when it is connected for instance with the 
QNP a nice house. The scope assignment where 
the definite description takes wide scope is specified in (8). 
The narrow scope assignment for the definite 
description in question is specified in (i) below. 
(1) [aY: nice house y] ([the x: inventor of bifocals x] 
(x had 
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So, by applying P5a to the pronoun it and P5b to the pronoun he, we obtain the 
representation shown in (10) for the anaphora sentence in (2). Sentence (11) corresponds 
to the intuitive rephrasing of the former. 
(10) [ the x: inventor of bifocals x] ([ whe y: nice house y&x had y] 
(x used to decorate y) ) 
(11) The inventor of bifocals used to decorate each year the nice house that he had- 
The content of rules P5a and P5b can thus be summarised in two general features: logical 
maximality and directness. They intuitively constrain, on the one hand, the anaphoric 
linkage between the antecedent and its E-type pronoun by relying on a property that the 
antecedent has or fails to have, namely logical maximality. On the other hand, having 
evaluated this property, rules P5a and P5b recover directly the descriptive content 
associated with the pronoun by copying material firom the antecedent. Logical maximality 
has already been explained. We now need to explain how directness is supposed to 
operate in Neale's theory. The directness of the recovery process is based on (at least) the 
following two facts. First, in order to determine the content of the pronouns Neale's rules 
regard as only relevant explicit quantificational features of their antecedents. Second, 
pronouns anaphoric on Russellian descriptions "(typically) ha[ve] the same content as 
[their] antecedent[s]. If the antecedent description is elliptical or otherwise incomplete, 
so is the anaphora, and in exactly the same way" (Neale 1990, p. 183). Since donkey 
pronouns are Russellian descriptions in disguise, it follows that the pronouns will possess 
the same explicit quantificational content as the descriptions. Hence, according to Neale, 
rules that recover the quantificational content of donkey pronouns from their quantified 
antecedents need not, in principle, resort to other factors, for instance, background or 
contextual factors. 3 
In Chapter Four, we advanced a reconstruction of Neale's theory in which P5 (or some 
'This conclusion must be weakened because, as was made clear in 
Chapter Four, Section 4.3, Neale explicitly 
recognizes that the isolation of his rules from context is a serious 
limitation afflicting them . 
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version of it) played a central role. Despite its limitations for coping with intersentential 
unbound anaphora, we argued in favour of retaining P5 In the reconstruction concerned, 
on the basis of comparing its results with others supplied by competing accounts. The 
above applications of P5a, and b to pronouns anaphoric on maximal or nonmaximal 
quantifiers should, we believe, reinforce our initial arguments. Since FGQ provides the 
grounds for a functional reconstruction of E- or D-type anaphora, the question regarding 
how to implement P5a, and b rules in this functional setting now seems inevitable. More 
exactly formulated, it seems inevitable-if the general arguments for a functional 
reconstruction of Neale's theory are correct-to determine whether and bow P5a, b can 
be implemented in the FGQ account of donkey anaphora. In fact, the functional approach 
can accept different implementations of the recovery rules and Lappin and Francez have 
advanced their own version of them. Therefore, in order to set up a basis for our 
suggestions about how to implement P5a, b, we will look first at the solution offered by 
Lappin and Francez to the problem of recovery rules. ' 
Before discussing Lappin and Francez's solution, let us clarify how the general problem 
of recovery rules is to be formulated when it comes to dealing with functional theories 
of anaphora. The aim in that case is basically to try and constrain the donkey function that 
interprets the E-type pronoun. That is to say, functional theories must stipulate particular 
requirements on the donkey function to the effect that its domain and range be 
appropriately determined. The idea is that appropriately determined ranges Will facilitate 
the individuation the correct values of the function. 'In the particular case of FGQ, it must 
explain how the domain and the range of the functions can be systematically 
associated-via explicit rules-with the sets or collections of i-sums that the theory 
provides, so far intuitively, for them. 
Lappin and Francez admit that their proposal is not "a fully worked out treatment of the 
Functional solutions (unlike GQ one) are formulated by Heim (1990) and 
Chierchia (1992). 
' This general formulation of the problem is due to 
Chierchia (1992, p. 159). 
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procedures involved in the identification of the function which interprets an E-type 
pronoun" (Lappin and Francez 1994, p. 404). Nevertheless, since we do not know of any 
other functional GQ approach to donkey anaphora in the literature, their solution will be 
taken as representing the'official'GQ solution to the problem at hand. We acknowledge 
that this fact does affect the generality of our conclusions below about recovery rules 
within a functional framework. In short, we are not claiming that such conclusions will 
apply to all functional approaches to donkey anaphora. 
The most remarkable aspect of Lappin and Francez's proposal is that recovery of 
pronominal content depends on the scope assignments to which the antecedent QNP is 
subject. Initially, these authors formulate their solution by means of the following rule, 
that we will call GQE-Ta. 
(GQE-Ta) Letj(x) be the function associated with a donkey pronoun whose 
antecedent NP is a QNP. If QNP is interpreted as within the scope 
of another quantified NP, QNP', the domain ofj(x) is the intersec- 
tive set defined in tenns of the M restriction of Q(the detenniner 
of QNP'), and the range of thej(x) is the set of the i-surns in the 
intersective set defined in terms of the N restriction of Q (the 
detertniner of QNP )( Lappin and Francez 1994, p. 405). 
Simple inspection of the representations in the previous chapter for the standard cases of 
donkey anaphora shows that GQE-Ta yields the correct results. This can be venfied, for 
instance, in the GQ representation (13) generated from the paradigm donkey sentence in 
(12). 
(12) Every man who owns a donkey, beats it,. 
(13) ( Men nfa: {b: *owns (a, b )) n 1-donkey 9, - o 1) Qf c- *beats( c, Ac) 
Since the QNP antecedent a donkey must be interpreted within the scope of every man, 
the domain off(c) is defined as the intersective set of the N restriction of every, namely 
yI is 'Men n {a: 1b: *owns(a, bnI Donke )'. Likewise, the range Of the function i 
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defined as the set of individuals in the intersective set defined by the N restriction of the 
determiner for a given value of a, i. e., '(b: *owns(a, b) In I-Donkey :#o )'. The 
resulting specification of the function associated with the pronoun It is formulated in 
(14). The specification determines the correct range of the ftinction that, provided the 
maximality condition is met, allows us to specify the U- reading of (12). 
(14)f(c) =a function from men who own ( an i-surn of ) at least one donkey into the set 
of (maximal i-surns of) at least one donkey that they own. 
Lappin and Francez also claim that GQE-Ta enables them to get the correct range of the 
functions for any relative clause case within donkey sentences. On the other hand, they 
concede that whereas GQE-Ta can apply to the second donkey pronoun (it) in 
conditional donkey sentences such as (15), it cannot to the first one (he). 
(15) If a farmer I owns a donkey2, he, beats 
't2- 
This is because, according to Lappin and Francez, the QNP that is the antecedent of the 
first donkey pronoun (afiarmer) is not interpreted as within the scope of another 
quantified NP in the sentence. The general solution, in their words, for this problem goes 
as follows: 
The antecedent of he is not within the scope of another quantified 
NP,. and so the value of the function associated with he does not 
depend upon the selection of an argument in the way that the value 
of the denoted by the pronoun it in [(15)] does. We characterize 
the function Ax)associated with he as assigning the same value to 
each individual which it takes as an argument. For every xcE, J(x) 
is the same i-sum. (Lappin and Francez 1994, p. 417). ' 
Ll- 
. l. juence, according 
to Lappin and Francez, the NP denotation of the pronoun is constructed 
in terms of the maximal-given the maximality condition on the ftinctionAxý-i-sum that 
' This condition is formulated as follows: for every i-sum x such that xcE, 
J(x) is the same i-sum. So, it 
defines an automorphism on the algebra 
(E, V). 
213 
is an element of the intersective set'Farmer n (a: 1b: *owns(a, b )) n 1_Donkey )', 
namely the set of sets containing the maximal i-sum. of farmers who own a sum of at least 
one donkey. Consequently, the domain of the function associated with he becomes simply 
E, the universe of entities. The range will, roughly speaking, be the set of all values (i- 
sums) in the intersective set determined by the N' restriction of the quantified antecedent 
of the pronoun. As a result, Lappin and Francez add to GQE-Ta the following rule: 
(GQE-Tb If QNP is not interpreted as within the scope of another 
quantified NP, then the domain ofj(x) is E, and the range 
ofj(x) is the set of i-sums in the intersective set defined 
in terms of the N restriction of Q (Lappin and Francez 1994 p. 418). 
Armed with the rule GQE-Th, we now can specify in (16) the donkey function associated 
with the pronoun he in (15). Thus, the complete representation of the sentence will come 
out as in (17) (' - 'is interpreted as the material conditional). 
(16)j(x)=a function from E into the set of sets containing the maximal i-sum of farmers 
who own at least one donkey. 
(17) (Men n fa: (., Ib: *owns(a, b) n I-donkey ie oo- 
( (Men n {a: {b: *owns(a, b) n I-donkey : qk o 1) g; c: *beats(c, 'fic) )I 
The interpretation of (17) yields the U-reading of (15), which is specified in (18). 
(18) If at least one man owns at least one donkey, then every man who owns at least one 
donkey beats every donkey he owns. 
Moreover, GQE-Tb enables us to deal with conditional donkey sentences where the E- 
reading is prevalent. Examples of sentences of that sort are (19) and (20). 
(19) If a man, has a dime2 in his pocket, he, puts 
'12 into the meter. 
(20) If a house, has a barn2 . it, 
has another two next to 
U2. 
We now are in a position to explore possible relations between P5a, b and GQE-Ta, b. 
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First, it is important to point out two general differences between them. The first relates 
to the determiners. As we saw, the criterion for recovering pronominal content 
implemented in P5a, b is that of sensitivity to the logical maximality of the determiner 
of the antecedent. In contrast, GQE-Ta, b imply that the antecedent QNP of a donkey 
pronoun always provides, via its N' restriction, the range of the function. Therefore, we 
may associate the last rules with the characteristic of being always sensitive to the 
resoiction of the determiners. The second difference concerns the notions of maximality 
underlying each of the rules. In short, logical maximality does not coincide with cardinal 
maximality. This can be seen if we focus on the indefinite determiner a F. According to 
Neale, this determiner is logically nonmaximal because it does not imply'every F is G'. 
However,, it could be cardinally maximal in the context of a U-reading. Furthermore, 
given that Lappin and Francez conceive U-readings as defauft readings, it seems to be the 
case that indeffifites (at least potentially) imply cardinal maximality in donkey contexts. 
Similar considerations apply to other indefinite determiners, for instance, n Fs, some Fs, 
several Fs, at most n FS. 7 
The above differences generate different predictions in some cases too. In order to check 
these predictions let us consider sentences (2 1) and the already examined (2). ' 
(2 1) Every boy, danced with ag'r'2. Afterwards, he I gave her2flowers (Neale (1990))' 
' See Lappin (1989, P. 282, n. 13). As Lappin notices, although universal determiners such as every F lack, 
at surface level, cardinality bounds, they do seem to carry presuppositions of plurality. Nevertheless, it is 
worth stressing here that such presuppositions may be cancelled (see telescoping cases in Chapter Three, and 
note 9 below). 
'I am deeply grateful to Prof Shalom Lappin (p. c. ) for several clarifications related to the 
discussion below. 
It might be argued that the pronoun he in the anaphora sentence of (21) is rather 'marginally salient' in 
comparison with the plural article they. An evaluation of competing theories, 
based on such examples, seems 
therefore unreliable. This observation, nevertheless, conflicts With phenomena observed in 
English regarding 
the determiner every, for instance, telescoping cases and absence of plurality indicators in the definition of 
et, ery. Similar phenomena involving universal determiners can 
be found in other natural languages as well 
(for instance, in Spanish as to the determiner todo). At any rate, whichever way this issue may 
be settled, the 
arguments below will not be affected, since, as Neale argues 
(Neale 1990, p. 234), acceptance of NH for 
donkey pronouns anaphonc on universal determiners allows us to avoid the problem of number agreement. 
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(2) Ae inventor of bifocals, had a nice house2. He, used to decorate 112every year. 
In either of these cases, the application of P5 rules or GQE-T rules in order to recover 
the content of the pronoun he generates different interpretations of the latter. Let us 
examine first predictions resulting from application of P5a, b to some cases previously 
considered. For instance, as for sentence (2), we know already that, by using M, we 
obtain the representation in (2') below for the pronoun he. 
he =[ the x: inventor of bifocals x] 
Moreover, since the pronoun he in the sentence (2 1) is anaphoric on the maximal 
quantifier every, a similar representation for that pronoun is obtained. Under the standard 
interpretation of (2 1) according to which the determiner every takes wide scope, P5b 
recovers the pronominal content of he as indicated in representation (2 F) . 
(21') he =[ whe x: boy x] 
As we already know, Neale's rules recover the content of the pronoun concerned by 
taking into account only the nominal (of the N'restriction) of the subject NP in the first 
conjunct of each sentence. 
Let us now investigate how Lappin and Francez's rules behave with (2 1) and (2). At the 
surface level the subject NPs in the first conjunct of each sentence are not within the 
scope of the ob ect NPs. Therefore, the domain of the functions associated with the j 
pronoun he in each sentence must be constructed in accordance with the rule GQE-Tb. 
Regarding (15) Lappin and Francez specify the denotation of the pronoun he as follows: 
[It] is constructed in terms of the i-sum, which is an element of the 
intersective set ... 
(the set of sums of at least one man who own 
sums of at least one donkey). ( Lappin and Francez 1994, p. 417). 
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Thus, following Lappin and Francez's explanation, one can construct the pronoun he of 
(2) and (2 1) in functional terms as indicated in (2") and (2 1 "), respectively. " 
(2" ) he =a function from entities in E into the i-sum of exactly one inventor of the 
bifocals who has at least one house. 
(2 1 ") he =a function from entities in E into the set of i-sums in the intersective set of 
boys who dance with sums of at least one girl. 
As a result, different predictions for the anaphora sentences of (2) and (2 1) are obtained 
depending on which rules-Neale's or Lappin and Francez's-we choose for recovering 
the content of the pronoun he. In particular, under GQE-T rules, one ends up associating 
the value of the functions specified in (T) and (2 1 ") with the descriptions in (2 ... ) and 
(21 ... ), respectively. 
The inventor of bifocals who had a nice house. 
(21 ... ) The boy (or boys) who danced with a girl. 
Undoubtedly, the above descriptions do not coincide with the ones generated by the 
specifications of the pronouns in (2) and (21). In (2 ... ) and (21 ... ) the descriptions are 
constituted by the nominal and the VPs of the antecedent sentences present in (2) and 
(2 1). In contrast, the descriptions specified by representations (2) and (2 V) consist of the 
nominal only. Thus, if Neale's arguments mentioned in favour of these representations 
are correct, (2 .. ) and (21 ... ) must be at least inadequate. 
There is however a way of rebutting this criticism. The above explanation by Lappin and 
Francez was intended to apply to cases like sentence (15) where the pronoun is anaphoric 
on the indefinite determiner aF and not on the universal determiner every F. 
Consequently, the representations (2") and (2 1 ") and the descriptions generated by them 
In following the Russellian treatment of definite descriptions given in standard GQ theories (for instance 
in Barwise and Cooper 1981 and Cooper 1983), we also assume that in a FGQ theory, descriptions like the 
inventor qfbifocals can be quantificationally treated. 
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are not related to the E-type pronoun he in the anaphora sentence of (2) and (2 1 ); thus, 
no descriptive problem has been posed for GQE-T yet. Simple inspection of (15) reveals 
that this answer can be considered cogent because there the pronoun he is effectively 
anaphoric on an indefinite determiner. Nevertheless, the answer seems to create another 
problem. Lappin and Francez's rules specify that the range of the function is recovered 
from the intersective set determined by the N' restriction of the antecedent QNP of the 
pronoun. Since we do not want to recover the range of the function associated with he in 
(2) and (2 1) by using (2") and (2 1 "), we have to look for another intersective set distinct 
from that associated with (2") and (2 1 "). Unfortunately, rules GQE-T do not tell us how 
proceed under such circumstances. Take sentence (2 1) again. Given that the determiner 
of the subject NP of the antecedent sentence of (21) is every, Lappin and Francez must 
assign to the sentence representation (22) below. 
(22) Boy g {a: fkb: *danced(a, b) )n 1_girl :? k 
Now, according to GQE-Tb, the denotation of the pronoun he ( its corresponding set of 
i-sums) must be recovered from "the intersective set defined in terms of the N' restriction" 
of the determiner. But the M restriction of the determiner in this case is only the nominal 
and, as shown by (22), this restriction does not determine an intersective set. 
Consequently, there is no set of i-sums defined in terms of that restriction that constitutes 
the range ofj(x); at least, not according to G-QE-T rules. " 
Finally, the difficulty above may become more pervasive if we allow for scope 
interactions. However, whereas it is not entirely clear whether and how we should treat 
scope ambiguities in Lappin and Francez's theory, criticism on this particular issue 
While Prof Lappin (p. c. ) accepts this criticism, he thinks still that GQE-Tb could be saved if the 
intersective set defined in terms of the N' restriction set is obtained by substituting 'n' for the set relation 
which holds for the N' set and the other set in the antecedent clause. In that case, the substitution would be 
vacuous in (15), but it would yield the correct intersective set in (22). This move, it seems to us, appears to 
agree with the normal intuitions, although, as Prof Lappin recognizes, it implies that, in cases like (22), 'n' 
would replace %; '. Nevertheless, in our opinion a further appropriate rationale is still needed to justify such 
an important alteration in the representation of antecedent clauses containing subject 
NPs with determiners 
like every. 
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remains a mere conjecture. Let us consider (22) again- It specifies the reading of sentence 
(2 1) in which the QNP a girl has narrow scope. Now suppose a standard GQ theory that 
supplies the other possible reading of the antecedent sentence of (21), i. e. the reading 
where every boy takes narrow scope. If that reading is in place, its GQ representation 
should go as in (23) below. 
(23) ( 1_girl nIb: I a: *danced(a, b)Ig; Boy 1) : t- o 
The set Boy in (23) is part of the restriction of the QNP a girl. Nevertheless, that set does 
not determine an intersective set. Moreover, it is hardly evident now which other 
(intersective) set in the structure (23) could determine the range of the function 
associated with the pronoun her in the anaphora sentence of (2 1). This suggests therefore 
that GQE-T rules are not sensitive enough to scope interactions. 12 
" Prof Lappin (p. c. ) disagrees with the extension of this conclusion. According to him, there is no decisive 
problem about representing scope assignments in anaphoric sentences through application of GQE-T. 
Consider for instance the sentence (1) below. 
(i) Every boy danced with some 91rl2- She2was a ballerina (Neale (1990)) - 
If the QNP some girl is going to take narrow scope in the antecedent sentence, the representation of the 
donkey fimction associated with the pronoun she in the anaphora sentence can be obtained by means of GQE- 
Ta. Thus, we obtain a specification of the function associated with the pronoun she such as In (11) below. 
a function from [ the intersective set of ?I i-sums of boys who danced with girls into i-sums 
of girls ( With cardinality of at least one ) whom some boy danced with. 
Lappin also claims that if some girl is going to take wide scope then the donkey function associated withshe 
in the anaphora sentence of (1) is obtainable through GQE-Tb, The result is shown in (iii). 
a function from (the set of ) entities into the i-sum of girls (with presumably cardinality 
of 1) who every boy danced with. 
Thus, both (11) and (111) deliver the correct interpretation for each scope assignment. For, firstly, the value of 
flx) In (ii) can be associated with more than one i-sum (with cardinality of 1) of girls who danced with some 
boy. This interpretation satisfies the narrow scope reading of some girl. Secondly, (n) states that the value 
assigned to the function can only be one i-surn (with cardinality of 1) of girls who danced with every 
boy. This interpretation satisfies the wide scope reading of some girl. So, in both cases the difference in 
interpretation crucially depends on the specification of the range. The sole problem With this explanation, it 
seems to us, lies in the source that licenses the matching between scope assignments and specifications of 
the range of the functions. As, in our opinion, it is not sufficiently clear 
how Lappin and Francez deal with 
scope assignment in non-anaphoric sentences, some additional explanation of that matching is needed. In 
particular, they should explain how the information of the 
determiner of the subject NPs in the antecedent 
sentence of (1) is introduced in the range of the functions in 
(11) and (111). According to Prof Lappin, a guide 
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In order to avoid misunderstanding of our argument at this stage, we must emphasise that 
we are not using the above differences in predictions to prove that P5 rules should be the 
preferred to GQE-T rules. Our main concern here is to reconstruct P5,, not to evaluate 
GQE-T. And P5 rules can be reconstructed quite independently of whether or not GQE- 
T rules are successful in all contexts. What we needed was a clear statement of the 
advantages of P5a, b, which would be desirable to preserve in any functional approach 
to donkey anaphora. We take this goal to have been satisfied in the discussion above. 
Moreover, our examination of GQE-T suggests how implementing rules of pronominal 
content recovery within functional accounts, and we are going to work out such an 
implementation in the next section. Finally, the comparison of GQE-T with P5 helped 
us to also highlight those aspects of the fornier that , in our opinion, should be preserved 
in a functional reconstruction of the latter. 
6.2 Functional Recovery Rules With Nonspecificity 
The discussion of GQE-T rules suggests a way in which a functional version of P5 can 
be specified. In order to do that, two important considerations must be taken into account. 
First, the problems faced by GQE-T, indicate that a functional rule works more 
efficiently if the constraint required to extract the range of the functions from the 
intersective set is modified. Second, these problems do not seem to affect the key aspect 
of Lappin and Francez! s rules, namely their sensitivity to the restriction of the antecedents 
of donkey pronouns. Since these rules work well in most standard cases, we think that it 
would be desirable to retain such a sensitivity to the restriction in any functional version 
of recovery rules. Obviously, one should attempt to refine that aspect so that the new 
rules can work equally well in the problematic cases. In order to carry out this 
to answer those questions is found in the extension of GQE-Tb suggested in the previous footnote. That 
extension indicates, according to him, that when, for instance, some girl receives narrow scope, the rule Will 
yield the set of boys who danced with at least one girl in the intersective set that yields the 
denotation of the 
pronoun he. 
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refinement, we believe that a distinction between proper N' restriction and scope of the 
deten-niner should be introduced. The goal of this and other modifications should be the 
determination of the 'potential' range of the function. In other words, the modifications 
should allow us to determine the set of i-sums (the set of nonspecific or underspecified 
referents) from the antecedent clause and thereby the range of the function. 
We have already argued that there are two main reasons to stick to P5a, b rules, namely 
their simplicity and intuitiveness. It should be clear by now that these features are, for the 
most part, the common result of other: the sensitivity to the logical maximality that such 
rules incorporate. It is this key feature of Neale's rules that should, we believe, be 
preserved in any version of P5a, b. Thus, the demands that the logical maximality 
condition makes on the function representing a donkey pronoun will deten-nine which set 
in the 'potential' range of the function corresponds to the 'actual' range. In contrast, we 
think that it is posssible in a functional version of P5a, b to dispense with the 'directness' 
of the content recovery implied by Neale's version. As we saw, directness is based, on the 
one hand, on the quantificational nature of the antecedent and, on the other hand, on the 
Neale's claim that E-type pronouns have exactly the same content as their antecedents. 
This determines the descriptive material to be directly copied from the antecedent. 
Nonetheless, all problematic cases so far examined-E-readings, complex sage plant 
cases, and telescoping cases-defeat clearly directness. In all of these cases if E-type 
pronouns are directly copied from the quantified antecedent, wrong predictions will be 
generated. The source of this problem, as we have already argued in this dissertation, is 
that Neale's rules systematically fail to incorporate context when processing the content 
of donkey pronouns. Thus, surrendering directness obliges us to make our functional 
recovery rules context-sensitive enough. Such an increase in context-sensitive 
information is going to come from two sources. First, the information concerning 
domains-that is, concerning the arguments of the function-will be recovered mainly in 
accordance with background and contextual knowledge. Here information about different 
linguistic items, for instance, structure factors, linguistic rules, genders, etc., can also be 
introduced. In fact, this diversity of the information coming from domains of discourse 
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is a general trait of them when the discourse coincides with the everyday language of the 
speaker. Therefore, following some recent theories, " we take it that no principled 
definition about what qualifies as domain of a function interpreting natural language 
expressions can be offered. Second, as regards ranges of donkey pronoun functions,, in 
the normal cases the relevant information is the one directly determined by P5a, b. In 
these cases, we will build up the range by considering whether or not the determiner of 
the antecedent of the pronoun is logically maximal (in Neale's sense defined in Section 
6.1). Nevertheless , it is also possible to determine indirectly the range of the donkey 
pronouns. This occurs when the domain of the function depends upon the determination 
of the range of another donkey function. In that case, the range of the first function will 
be processed once semantic (and pragmatic) information from the second function is 
supplied. Thus, the recovery of the content of the pronoun need not be directly dependent 
on its antecedent in the sentence. " We will elaborate on the consequences of this last 
suggestion in the next section. 
We now are in a position to propose a set of rules for reconstructing P5a, b in a 
functional setting. These rules Will implement and satisfy the requirements formulated 
above. Yet we need to state a last caveat before beginning our task. In order to keep 
uniformity with our general viewpoint about the nonspecificity of donkey sentences, we 
will express our rules with nonspecificity idioms. This means that we will use the terms 
nonspecific con&vound, nonspecifIc set and nonspecific singular denotation instead of 
Lappin and Francez's intersective set, set of i-sunis and i-sum respectively. 
The rule for recovering the domain of the function, or D-Tdom, is stated first. What 
comes next is the rule for recovering the range of the function, or D-Trg, which is 
specified via three subrules. Finally, methodological issues motivating these rules are 
13 See Gauker (1997, p. 11). Gauker has also challenged the possibility of defining the Pragmatic or contextual 
determinants of a domain of discourse. He has attacked the standard theory underlying the idea of contextual 
determinants of discourse, i. e. the expressive theory of communication. 
For more on domains of discourse 
and expressivism see StaInaker (1972), Lewis 
(1979), Evans (1982) and Bach (1994). 
" See van der Does (1996) for some formal 
details on the problem of dependent domains in donkey anaphora. 
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discussed. 
(D-Tdom) The domain of thefunctionf(c) associated with a donkeypronoun P 
anaphoric on a QNP is restricted by our non-logical, background knowledge 
about the nonspecific singular denotation, nonspecific collection or nonspecific 
compound that the antecedent NP ofP denotes. 
Specifications of D-Trg will require distinguishing between a nominal restriction (NR) 
and a scopal restriction (SR) of the determiner (D). Syntactically speaking, NR 
corresponds basically to the head of the NP coindexed with the pronoun (see FuC(c) in 
Chapter Five) and SR corresponds to the sentence (the sister) to which the NP is adjoined. 
In terms of restricted quantifier schemas, like, for instance, '[Dx: Fx] (Gx), ' we can say 
that NR stands for (the set determined by the predicate) 'Fx' and SR for (the set 
determined by the predicate)'G)e. The specifications of D-Trg can now be formulated. 
(D-Trg a) Iff(x) is a singlefunction associated with a donkeypronoun P whose 
antecedent is a NP with a logically maximal determiner D, then the range of 
ffi) determined by D is equal to the cardinally maximal nonspecific set associated 
with Nk. 
(D-Trg b) If f(x) is a singlefunction associated with a donkeypronoun P whose 
antecedent is a NP with a logically nonmaximal determiner D then the 
range off(x) determined by D is equal to the nonspecific compound 
constituted by the sets associated with both NR and SR. 
(D-Trg c) If the denotation ofa donkeypronoun P depends on the denotation of 
another donkeypronoun P'then the domain of thefunctionf(x) associated 
with P depends on the determination ofthe range ofanotherfunction g(y) 
associated with Pý 
We now clarify some methodological issues behind the rules. First, some considerations 
about D-Trg. It should be clear that D-Trg a-e 
incorporate the constraints discussed 
above. D-Trg a and b express the direct recovery process of the range 
from the donkey 
function whereas D-Trg c formulates the indirect process. 
Besides, considerations of 
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cardinal maximality are not necessary in D-Trg b since, as we learnt from the cardin I a 
maximality condition, presence of logically nonmaximal determiners in the antecedent 
may or may not cancel the maximality condition. Finally, it is worth stressing that 
standard sets (sets with atomic individuals as their members) can also be part of the 
nonspecific compound determining the range of the function. However, at least one 
nonspecific set is obviously needed in order to determine such a compound. 
Second, we clarify some aspects of D-Tdom. This rule allows us to introduce 
systematically background and common knowledge. This knowledge can be understood 
as the set of presuppositions and beliefs presumably shared by all speakers and hearers 
when processing a given donkey sentence or utterances of other sentences preceding the 
donkey sentence. The notion of background knowledge or'common ground' used here 
has now become standard in semantics. It derives from work by Stalnaker (1974,1978, 
1984) and current work on the semantics of across-discourse anaphora by Roberts (1987, 
1989,1995,1997) Heim (1983,1990), Chierchia (1995) and Kratzer (1981,1989), and 
others. Furthermore, D-Tdom requires a certain minimal consistency with semantic or 
syntactic information, i. e. with characteristics of the pronouns such as gender, number 
syntactic, mood and modalities, tense, and so on. In this section the theoretical grounds 
sustaining this sort of consistency will rely intuitively on processes of accommodation of 
the contextual material in the domain,. as defined in the aforementioned literature. " In 
the following section, however, we shall give a clearer idea about how to incorporate this 
notion in a wider functional framework. Lastly, we have introduced the apparently 
arbitrary clause 'non-logical' in D-Tdom, in order to exclude irrelevant information 
concerning the bare' entities in a model or situation. For instance , information about of 
their being individuals, worlds, properties, times, events, etc. and other related notions. 
15 Accommodation was introduced as a proper topic in semantics and pragmatics by Heim (1982) and 
it has later been refined by various authors, for example, Roberts (1987,1989), Heim (1990), Kadmon (1990) 
and Chierchia (1992,1995). The first non-technical formulation of accommodation was 
due to Lewis (1979). 
Lewis tried to make sense of the idea of a presupposition based on contextual or conversational grounds. 
According to him, if a speaker presupposes something that is not explicit in the conversation or discourse, 
the hearer will behave as if such a presupposition were already in the common ground. 
Levins'notion seems 
closely related to Stainaker's idea of background 
knowledge; see Stalnaker (1978). 
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We consider that such information is non-contextual and thereby does not contribute to 
constrain the domain of the function from the speaker viewpoint. 
In what follows some initial applications of D-T rules will be introduced. First we will 
show how recovering indirectly the domain and the range of the donkey functions in most 
typical cases. In these cases, representations of the complete donkey sentence will not be 
provided; only those of the donkey pronoun. Sentence (24) below is obviously the first 
case to examine (all specifications of range and domain are supplied in an intuitive way 
for the sake of simplicity). 
(24) Every man who owns a donkey, beats it,. 
it domain: male human beings who own a donkey. 
range : the maximal nonspecific compound of donkeys 
(with cardinality of at least one) that are owned 
by anyone of those men. ( x D-Trg b) 
The explanation of the function 'f associated with the donkey pronoun it in (24) is 
straightforward. The domain of the function is obtained by tracking background 
information from the antecedent NP of the pronoun it, i. e. man who owns a donkey. We 
do so by assuming pragmatic-based information from the NP in question, in accordance 
with D-Tdom. On the other hand, since the donkey pronoun is anaphoric on the logically 
nonmaximal determiner a, the range of the function is obtained by application of D-Trg 
b. The (standard) set associated with NR is the set of donkeys. The nonspecific set 
associated with SR is the set of nonspecific singular denotations that are owned by 
someone. We obtain thus a nonspecific compound generated by NR and SR. According 
to D-Trg b, the range of the function associated with it is equal to this nonspecific 
compound. Because the function in question is subject to the maximality condition and 
there is no cardinality restriction cancelling this condition, the range must denote a 
cardinally maximal nonspecific compound of donkeys owned by men who own a donkey. 
This specification of the range provides, therefore, the correct result, namely the U- 
reading of the donkey sentence (24). 
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The sort of logical maximality affecting the determiner of the antecedent NP of the 
donkey pronoun will henceforth be indicated by a superscript. Thus, "" indicates that the 
determiner on which the pronoun is anaphoric is logically maximal, whereas" indicates 
that the determiner in question is logically nonmaximal. Finally, since the donkey 
function can now take nonspecific denotations, sets, etc. in its range, its representation 
will be modified: when necessary, the superscript " will be attached to the right-hand 
side of the function. The same practice will apply to nonspecific sets. In what follows, 
specifications of the donkey functions corresponding to a sage plant sentence and to a 
sentence where the E-reading is the preferred one are formulated. 
(25) Everyone who bought a sage plant, here bought five others along with it,. 
it domain : male or female human beings who bought sage plants 
range : the nonmaximal nonspecific compound 
of sage plants (with cardinality of at least 1) that 
were bought by those human beings. (x D-Trg b) 
(26) Every person who had a dime, in his pocket put it, into the meter. 
it domain: male human beings who have dimes in their pockets 
range : the nonmaximal nonspecific compound of dimes 
(with cardinality of at least 1) that are kept in 
the pockets of those men. ( x D-Trg b) 
The superscripts attached to the functions in (25) and (26) indicate that we have applied 
D-Trg b to both representations of the pronoun because of the determiners of each 
donkey pronoun being logical nonmaximal. The correctness of the results can be easily 
verified. 
Before analysing more complex cases let us consider a simple example handled 
adequately by Neale: unmodified donkey conditionals like sentence (15) in Section 6.1. 
Since is crucial, in our opinion, to consider scope assignments in this and other cases, we 
will henceforth use the restricted set notation introduced in 
Chapter Two, Section 2.2, 
which, given our above discussion, seems more suited than 
GQ notation to deal with 
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scope issues. The novelty in the restricted set representations below, is that they 
incorporate functional expressions to represent donkey pronouns in the same fashion as 
FGQ representations do. We here repeat the sentence (15) as (27). 
(27) If afarmer, owns a donkey2he, beats it2. 
As interaction of the quantifiers in (27) induces scope ambiguity in the antecedent 
sentence, we obtain the following two representations 
(27) ff [AF: IFIý: 1][(Ax)xcF]j ( [[AD ns : ID ns I>I] [(Ay) cD'j ]( *Ox y) 
(27") [[ [ AD ns: ID' Iýjj [(Ay)EFD ns] ]( [[AF: IF I >1][(Ax)xcFj] (*Ox y) 
Structure (27) corresponds to the narrow scope reading of a donkey. This explains why 
its formal representation '[[gD": l D"' j>1][(ý1y)cD]]' appears inside the round 
parentheses ( 'IY" stands for a nonspecific set of donkeys). Structure (27"), in its turn, 
corresponds to the narrow scope reading of a farmer. This is why the formal 
representation of the latter'[[AF: IFIý: I] [(Ax)x EF]]' appears inside the round parentheses 
(Pstands for a classical set of atomic individuals, namely farmers). Finally, we generate 
the following functional representation of the consequent sentence ( he beats it). 
(Vc)( *B (-mf"(c) , 
-M+k,, s( -Mf ns (C) )) 
Examination of (27 ... ) suffices for disclosing that, by using D-Trg c, we have simplified 
the GQ representation of (15) given in Section 6.1. The range of the function associated 
with it cannot now be directly recovered because its domain is actually the range of the 
function associated with the pronoun he, that is, the nonspecific compound (or 
intersective set) defined by the NP men who own a donkey. The simplification that at this 
point we want to suggest is to treat a donkey pronoun dependent on another one as a 
composite function. Thus, the range of the first function becomes the domain of the 
second, and thereby the range of the latter becomes constrained by information coming 
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from the former. ", " 
Since using restricted set notation allows us to capture scope ambiguities in the 
functional setting, the differences between the recovered content from the donkey 
functions of the pairs (27')-(27 ... ) and (27")-(27 ... ) will depend on the chosen scope 
assignment. This is shown in both (27'a, b), which corresponds to the interpretation of the 
pronouns under the narrow scope reading of a donkey, and in (27"a, b), which 
corresponds to the interpretation of the pronouns under the narrow scope reading of a 
farmer. 
(27'a)he= "f= domain: male farmers who own at least one donkey. 
range: the maximal nonspecific compound of farmers (with 
cardinality of at least 1) who own nonspecific individuals 
of the set of donkeys (with cardinality at least 1). 
(x D-Trg b) 
(27'b) it = -mg' = domain: the range of (27'a) 
range: the maximal nonspecific compound of donkeys (With 
cardinality of at least 1) owned by at least one of the farmers 
in the domain (x D-Trg b) 
" See van der Does (1996) for a different solution to this problem. For a general definition of both dependent 
domains and dependency between range and domain of donkey functions, see Appendix 1. 
17 It is worth stressing here that, from a formal point of view, the notational simplification in question stems, 
in fact, fi7om FGQ In order to see that, we must recall two facts related to Lappin and Francez's treatment of 
sentence (15) above. First, the two pronouns in the relational sentence'he beats iV are donkey functions of 
the form Y(x)' and 'g(y)', respectively. Consequently, an elementary representation of the sentence 
concerned is '*Rj(x), g(y)'. Second, the set-theoretical expression generated for the whole sentence (15) can 
also be represented by the schema 'JKJ -o- tKI c Jc: *R(c, g(c)))'. Thus, the representation of the 
relational sentence'he beats it' is defined to be'(K) c; fc: R(c, g(c)))', which, in its turn, can be abbreviated 
as KcG. Ký-_G is then truth-conditionally equivalent to'*RAx)&y)'. Since the argument of the function 'g(y)' 
is the first element of the ordered pair of R in'Ic: *R(c, g(c)))', it follows that'y' in'*Rj(x), g(y), is equal 
toAx)'and, therefore, thatg'is equal to the composite function 'g(/(x))'. Thus, with appropriately specified 
functions and obvious simplifications, the following equivalence holds: '(JKJ 00- KCG) =- (JKJt 0- 
(*RAx), g(/(y)))'. Given that GQ theories force severe constraints upon the representation of subject NIPs, the 
proposal of dealing with these cases as composite functions can 
be seen as a convenient but optional 
simplification for FGQ approaches. In other frameworks it, however, may 
be assumed directly. 
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(2711 a) he ns == domain: male farmers who own things. 
range : the maximal nonspecific compound of farmers (with 
cardinality of at least of 1) who own at least one value of a 
nonspecific set (with cardinality of at least 1) 
(x D-Trg b) 
(27" b) it -"'g' = domain: the range of (27" b) . 
range: the maximal nonspecific compound of donkeys (with 
cardinality at least 1) owned by at least one of the farmers 
in the domain. (x D-Trg b) 
Specifications of the ranges of (27b) and (27" b) seem distinct because the respective 
domains of the functions are at first sight different-they correspond to the ranges of 
(27'a) and (27" a). This impression is, however, mistaken. A closer examination of the 
interaction range-domain in each case reveals that the interpretations coincide. Both 
ranges state that the members of the nonspecific set of donkeys (with cardinality of at 
least 1) are owned by the members of the nonspecific set of farmers (with cardinality of 
at least 1) who own at least one member of the first nonspecific set. This matches the 
predictions made by Neale's theory at this point. Neale's theory generates logically 
equivalent representations for the consequent of (27) (he beats it) as (28) and (29) show. 
18 
(28) [whe x: man x&[ay: donkey ] (x owns y)] 
([ whe y: donkey y&x owns y] (x beats y)). 
(29) whe y: donkey y& [an x: man x] (x owns y)] 
([ whe x -. man x&x owns y](x beats y )). 
In what follows, it is explained how our proposal deals with two problematic cases 
reviewed earlier. They are the sentences (30) and (3 1) below. 
(30) The inventor, of bifocals has a nice house2- He, used to decorate 't2each year. 
18 See Neale (1990, p. 247). 
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(3 1) Every boy danced with a girl,. She, was a ballerina. 
The following are the two representations that our approach generates for the first 
sentence of (30) when it receives the normal scope assigmnents. 
(30') [[ý]B: IB I= I] [(Vx)xcB]]([[gH': I Hns j>1][(ýly)yEH']1(*Dxy)) 
(30") [ [ý]Hns: jHns j>11[(Dy)yEHn']] ([[ý]B: jBj= I] [(V x)xEB j] (*Dxy)) 
In structure (30 ... ) we specify the second sentence of (30) by using composite functions. 
In (30'a)-(30b) and (30"a)-(30'1)) we specify the range and domain of the pronouns 
involved. 
(30 ... ) (Vc) *C(-'-m+f(c), -m+g( +m'j(c) ) 
(30'a ) he domain : male human beings who invented bifocals and have nice 
houses 
range: the maximal set of inventors of 
bifocals ( with cardinality of exactly 1, i. e. the 
unique specific value of the set. ) (x D-Trg a) 
(30'b ) it = -"gn'= domain: the range of (30'a) (x D-Trg c ). 
range: the maximal nonspecific compound of houses (with cardinality 
of at least 1) owned by one member of the specific set of 
inventors of bifocals in the domain. (x D-Trg b) 
(3011 a) he domain: male human beings who invented bifocals and own 
something 
range : as in (30' a). (x D-Trg a 
(30" b) it -"g' = domain: the range of (30"a)(x D-Trg c ). 
range : the maximal nonspecific compound of houses (with 
cardinality at least 1) owned by the unique value in the 
domain who own something. (x D-Trg b) 
As in (27) above, the difference between the ranges of 
(30' b) and (30'1)) is only a 
superficial one. This is because (30') and 
(30") retain the uniqueness presupposition of 
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the definite description the inventor of bifocals in (30). Nonetheless, the non-preferred 
reading without this presupposition can still be captured if we stipulate the non- 
uniqueness condition for the narrow scope interpretation of the description. Thus if the 
cardinal condition'IH' 1>1'is substituted for'IH's 1=1'in (30"), something like a narrow 
scope interpretation of a universal determiner is obtained. 
Let us now consider the compound sentence (3 1). In (3 V) and (3 1 ") we formulate the two 
scopal representations of its first sentence together with the functional representation of 
the anaphora sentence. Finally, (3 Va) and (3 1 "a) specify the range and domain of the 
function. 
(31') ýl-'+fýt[[AB: IBIýýn][(Vx)xeB]]([[DG ns : IG" 1>1][ (ýIy)ycG"']] (*Dxy)) 
(Vc)( *B -mf(c) )I 
(3 1 ") -: 3-"f { [[ý]G 
ns: IG ns j>1][(ý]y)yeG'] AB: IBI>nl[ (VX)XEB]](*Dxy)) & 
& (Vc)( *B -"'P(c) )1 
(3 V a) she "f ' =- domain: boys who danced with some girl or girls. 
range : the maximal nonspecific compound of girls ( with a cardinality 
of at least 1) whom somebody in the domain danced with. 
(xD-Trg b) 
(31 it a) she = -m+fn-9 = domain: boys who danced with somebody 
range .- one of the values 
in the maximal nonspecific compound of 
girls ( with a cardinality of at least I) who every boy in 
the domain danced with. (x D-Trg b ). 
Representation (3 V) (where a girl takes the narrow scope reading) and the specification 
of the function associated with the pronoun in (3 Va) suggest a promising route to sort the 
problem posed by sentence (3 1) out (see Chapter Three, Section 
3.4). Those who danced 
with nonspecific singular values, with a cardinality of at 
least 1, belonging to the set of 
girls, are boys who danced with some girl or girls. 
The set of boys determines therefore 
which girls are ballerinas. Thus, this information 
is, in part at least, recovered indirectly 
from the relevant aspects constraining the domain and 
imposing particular conditions on 
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the values in the range. 
Our rules will be applied finally to the so-called donkey conditionals with adverbs of 
quantification discussed mainly by Lewis (Lewis (1975)),, Heim (Heim (1990)) and 
Kadmon (Kadmon (1990)). They are illustrated in (32), (33) and (34) below. 
(32) Usuallyif a man, owns a donkey,, he, beats it2. 
(33) Generally if a person, has a credit card2 , he, pays his bill with 
't2, 
(34) If a boy, receives a little donkeY2 he, is always so proudof 't2 - 
Here we shall only consider sentences (32) and (33). These sentences generate at least 
three different types of interpretation usually termed by semanticists the symmetric, 
subject asymmetric and object asymmetric reading. In order to capture the relevant 
differences between them,, let us suppose, by following Lewis (1975), that the adverb 
usually stands for a (binary or unary) quantificational operator 'Q which binds all free 
variables inside the if-clause or if-(ý clause. Thus, adverbial quantifier sentences will be 
of the form'[ 'Q if- 0 ](*), 'with'*' as a matrix clause on which the adverbial operator 
has scope. The important question concerning (32) and (33) is how 'Q quantifies over the 
variables in the restriction of the determiners (including the relative restrictive clauses) 
of such sentences. Consider (32) for the sake of simplicity. Since the restriction in (32) 
crucially involves sets of men and donkeys, three different interpretations are possible. 
The first is that in which the adverbial operator quantifies over each man who owns a 
particular donkey, that is, over donkey-donkey owner pairs. This interpretation 
corresponds to the symmetric reading of (32); i. e. that in which most of those pairs satisfy 
the predicate x beats y. The second interpretation is that in which the adverbial operator 
involves the quantification over a one-to-many relationship between donkey owners and 
donkeys. This is the subject asymmetric reading of (32); i. e. that in which most donkey 
owners beat their donkeys. The third interpretation is that in which the adverbial operator 
quantifies over a many-to-one relationship between donkeys and the man who owns 
them. This is the object asymmetric reading of (32); i. e. that in which most such donkeys 
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are beaten by the same man who owns them. " In the symmetric reading, the operator 
mually presupposes a uniqueness relationship between a particular man and the donkey 
that he owns. As far as the subject asymmetric reading is concerned,, the adverbial 
operator is interpreted as quantifying over each man who owns at least one donkey. In 
this case, the adverbial operator cannot presuppose uniqueness because the relation 
donkey-donkey owner does not imply any upper cardinality boundary. A similar 
conclusion applies to the object asymmetric reading. Finally, although only subject 
asymmetric readings will be investigated here from the nonspecificity point of view, our 
analysis will suffice to show that the remaining readings can also be considered a part of 
the same nonspecificity phenomenon. 
Our proposal again relies extensively on Lappin and Francez! s approach. As their solution 
to the problem of donkey quantificational adverbs strikes us as essentially correct, here 
we suggest just a sort of alternative refinement of it. Lappin and Francez's solution 
interprets adverbial operators as generalized quantifiers on sets of situations. Donkey 
pronouns are then relativized to this kind of set in the following way: each donkey 
pronoun has a denotation specified in tenns of the fanction. /(s, x) from pairs of situations 
and individuals to i-sums (in our case, to nonspecific singular denotations). How they 
obtain the correct denotation of the donkey pronouns of a sentence like (32),, is explained 
as follows: "[flor each pair <s, x> where s is a situation in which a man owns an i-sum 
of at least one donkey and xcE, As, x) = the i-sum that yields the NP denotation" (Lappin 
and Francez 1994, p. 423). In other words, the range of the function will denote the value 
of the NP man who owns in the situation s an i-sum of donkeys (with cardinality of at 
least 1) in the intersective set of donkeys and things owned in s. Their definition of 
"usually if (ý, then *" as an V operator depends on reinterpreting usually as the binary 
quantifier most. This runs as follows: 
" It has been pointed out in the literature (Heim 1990, Kadmon 1990), that the first and third readings are 
unnatural in conditional donkey sentences like (32) and (33). Moreover, symmetric readings pose persistent 
difficulties for accounts of donkey anaphora based exclusively on quantification over situations or events. 
Most serious of all is the so-called proportion problem, which affects 
directly Heims (1982) account; see 
Kadmon (1990), Berman (1986), and Larson and Segal (1995). 
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(35) 11 usually if 4), then* 119= true iff I (s: jj(ýJjgl =true) n (s': 11*119, '- true )I> 50% 
I Is: jj(ýJjg's =true 11. 
(The ftmction'e (in superscript) corresponds to an assignment function of values to free 
variables in fon-nulae andg, s'coffesponds to that assignment in a particular situation s). 
As a result, Lappin and Francez derive (36) below as the general representation of (32). 
(36) 1fs: (x: Man (s,, x) In(a: f b: *owns (s, a, b)In(y: I-donkey(s, y) I 
gE o1 ii: o1n {s': ({x: Man(s', x» n ja: {b: *owns(s', a, b) )n ly: 1- donkey(s', y» 
: gE o 1) z {c: *beats(s', c, J(s', c» 1) 1> 50% 1{s: ý x: Man (s, x) )n 
1 a: {b: *owns(s, a, b ))n ýy: 1-donkey(s, y ))9,: ol :? E o)1 
The 'generality' feature of (36) can be grasped in observing that the functionf in this 
representation has not been entirely specified yet. The maximality condition, although 
operative inf (there is no cardinality restriction constraining the VP of (32)) does not 
suffice to determine the subject asymmetric reading (or the other readings, for that 
matter). This is because there are three possible ways of characterizing the set of 
situations in (37) below, according to the three possible readings of sentence (32). 
(37) f s: ( x: Man(s, x) Infa: lb: *owns(s, a, b) In (y: I_donkey( s, y) I i, - ol : Pkol 
A emight be expected, Lappin and Francez's answer to this problem is that symmet c or 11.3 ri 
asymmetric readings can be obtained "by varying the parameter for identifying the 
situations in the set of situations" of (37) (Lappin and Francez 1994, p. 424). In our terms, 
this answer suggests interpreting adverbial donkey quantification as an expression of 
further specifications over an original nonspecific pattern, similar in nature to nssl or 
nss2 of Chapter Five. Therefore, if, as we are going to show, it is possible to make out 
a good case for this interpretation, we should conclude that all the aforementioned 
readings are in principle available in the original pattern. 
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One alternative for varying systematically the parameter of situations in (37) is to 
conceive of it as 'sensitive to the minimality' of the situations involved. " So, if the 
parameter concerned is symbolized as '+/-mid and added to 's: ' in (3 7), then we obtain 
an immediate representation of the nonspecific pattern for the set of situations and, 
whereby, for the adverbial donkey quantification, which is expressed by nss4 below. 
(nns4) {Sll-, in :(x: F (s, x) )nfa: (b: * G(s, a, b) In {y: n__, H( s, y) ) t- oI : f- oI 
Now, if, due to contextual information, the set of situations in nss4 is specified as 
ls-'O-as a set of maximal situations- then no constraint of uniqueness can be imposed 
upon the ordered pair <a, b> in the above schema. Sentence (36) represents a set that 
contains all and only the situations s in which, given an ordered pair <a, b>, b represents 
just the maximal i-surn (or nonspecific singular denotation) of donkeys that a owns. 
Furthermore,, since maximality of the donkey pronouns is operative in the consequent of 
sentence (32), fis, c) in (36) will denote the maximal i-sum of donkeys that c owns in s. 
So, in Lappin and Francez's words "it follows that [(32)] is true on this interpretation iff 
most situations s in which a man owns an i-sum of at least one donkey in s are such that 
the man beats in s every donkey he owns. " (Lappin and Francez 1994, p. 425). Coming 
back to our approach, this means that the subject asymmetric universal reading of (32) 
amounts to the specification's (determined by contextual information) of the schema 
nss4. Something similar is bound to occur with the symmetric reading, if we specify the 
set of situations in nns4 as 's"im - 
21 22 
" Heim (1990) and Kadmon (1990) have argued for this constraint. Heim defines a minimal situation as 
follows. min S=I sCS: -Ds'e S[ s': 5 s& S'O sII. 
in this point our approach seems to face 4 dfficulty. Since the nonspecific's parameter allows us to 
generate two possible specifications ('s-Min, or Is+"n'), we are left apparently with just two readings, the 
symmetric and the subject asymmetric one, and thereby the object asymmetric reading remains 
beyond our 
reach. Nevertheless, in fact the generation of the latter 
depends on additional specifications in the sets and 
the relational predicate of nns4. We can thus stipulate that 
F stands also for a set of i-sums (or nonspecific 
values) of cardinality of at least one and that *G applies in s to pairs <a, 
b> such that a is an i-sum of at least 
one F and b is an i-sum of at least one H. Therefore, 
fis, c) will correspond to an i-sum of H to which a is *G- 
related (in s). Since the other relational predicate associated with 
the functionf ('*beat'in (36)) has also to 
connect pairs of i-sums as *G does, and maximality is operative onf we obtain a reading of 
(32) according 
to which (32) is true iff most situations s in which an 
i-sum of at least one donkey owned by an i-sum of at 
2) 35 
Finally, let us show how we are going to represent the subject asymmetric reading of 
(32). If our suggestions about the representation of the consequent of (15) are applied to 
the consequent in (32) above and we operate with the definition of the adverbial operator 
in (35), we obtain the simplification shown in (38). 
(38) 1 {s: jx: Man (s,, x) )nfa: f b: *owns( s, a, b)Inty: 1-donkey( s, y)I 
o) 16 oInI s': f c: *beats( s', f "( s', c) , 
'g"( 'f s', c )) ) 11 >5 0% 
{s: jx: Man( s, x))nIa: { b: *owns( s, a, b) Iny: I_donkey( s, y) 
I, - o15, -- oII 
It is easily checked that in (38) the entire representation of the consequent sentence'he 
beats it' is reduced to the set '{s': tc: *beats(s', f`(s', c), 'g( Y"(s', c)) ), ' which is 
equivalent to the generalized quantifier representation of this sentence in (36) above. 
Although the GQ representation (38) seems theoretically attractive for approaches strictly 
based on GQ theory, we would like to offer here an alternative in terms of restricted set 
notation. The sole purpose of this alternative is to show that, in principle, we do not need 
to modify D-Trg and D-Tdom substantively in order to accommodate cases containing 
situations. Consequently, what comes next may be improved or modified in different 
least one man in s are such that the donkeys owned by at least one man are beaten by him. This interpretation 
corresponds to the object asymmetric reading. 
22 See Lappin and Francez (op. cit., p. 425) for more detail. Here another question confronts our analysis. 
Given that we argued in Chapter Three directly against an analysis of standard donkey sentences in terms of 
minimal situations and uniqueness, the present incorporation of this analysis 
for dealing with adverbial 
donkey quantification seems to clash with our previous arguments. This impression is, 
however, illusory and 
due to three reasons. First, in Chapter Three we criticised the claim that situations, or minimal situations, are 
structural semantic aspects of the representation of standard 
donkey sentences, as Heim and Kadmon 
contend. Nevertheless, our arguments were not directed against the idea that minimal situations and 
uniqueness may be constitutive of thepragmatics of such sentences. 
Second, we believe that considerations 
*in that the maximal' similar to the ones brought forward by Lappin and 
Francez in support of the clai 1 ity 
condition generates a default interpretation, apply to the condition of non-minimality or mammality 
associated with the set of situations. Thus, maximality in the context of adverbially quantified 
donkey 
sentences can be seen as the result of cancelling non-minimality via processing pragmatic 
knowledge related 
to the VPs, the nonspecific sets, or other parameters. 
Third, consequently we suggest to view minimal 
situations as instruments to explain the reading that presupposes uniqueness 
(i. e. the symmetric reading) and 
thereby as underdetermined by pragmatic constraints. 
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ways. 
Our suggestion is based on a proposal by McCawley (1993) to deal with the determiner 
most. First we introduce the definition of McCawley's for that quantifier (we modify It 
a little to suit restricted set notation). 
(39) [ AM: (M more than half of (x: x is Fl)][[ (Vx)(xeM)](Gx)] 
Definition (39) can further be simplified to sentence (40) below, where '(F)' is an 
abbreviation for'ýx: x is F)'. 
(40) [ ý]M: IMI>50%(F)][[ (Vx)(xcM)](Gx)] 
Thus, structure (38) can be formulated in terms of the restricted notation structure (41), 
where the restricted set expression '[[D S' ': I S'l >50% f S) j [(ý1s')(s'cS')]' can be translated 
as 'there is a set of (non specific) situations S' such that it is the set of more than 5 0% of 
the situations of the set S and such that s'belongs to S'. ' 
(41) [[[-: ]M: IMI>I] [(ýIx)xcM]] Q[AD ns : ID n, j>1][(9y)EDns]]([(ýls)(seS)]( *Oxy, s)) )] 
([IDS i ns :I S'l >50% 1 S) ] [(Ds')(s'cS' )]] ((Vc)( *B( Ss' f ns (So, C), +gns (f ns (St, C)))))) 
The first clause of (4 1) describes the narrow scope reading of a donkey in the antecedent 
of (32), and the second one describes the consequent of (32). According to the second 
clause, most (more than 50% of) situations s in which a man owns a member of the 
nonspecific set of donkeys with cardinality of at least one in s are such that the donkey- 
owner beats in those situations every donkey he owns. Thus, if representation (41) is 
correct,. then the domain and the range of the functions involved can be constructed on 
the basis of the specifications given for the standard function associated with sentence 
(15)-the non-adverbial version of (32ý-plus situations. 
23 
" For other applications of D-T rules to donkey and non-donkey cases see 
Appendix H, 
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6.3 Recovery Rules, Representations and Anaphoric Discourse 
In this last major section we turn to deal with a problem which affects all donkey 
anaphora approaches, namely: that of representing donkey anaphora across discourse. As 
we suggested above, this problem is closely related to the general problem of how context 
influences the interpretation of donkey sentences. The former poses thus a challenge to 
all approaches not only in terms of the representations they generate for donkey anaphora 
across discourse but also in terms of the recovery procedures to which they appeal to 
determine the content of donkey pronouns. A systematic answer to the problem of donkey 
anaphora across discourse obviously would take us beyond the limits of this essay. The 
discussion and the ensuing suggestions below must, therefore, be considered only as an 
initial and sketchy approximation to these important issues. 
ZA c we have seen in the previous sections, contextual information becomes crucial in the 
construction of semantical representations for some fragments of natural language 
containing donkey anaphora. The donkey functions introduced in this chapter, couched 
in either GQ or restricted set notation, capture an important amount of contextual 
information because they incorporate explicitly parametric information. Accordingly, 
context-sensitivity obtains just as a consequence of the functions embedded in donkey 
sentences. Thus, it is, first, the application of different constraints (cardinal maximality, 
minimality of situations and others) to donkey functions that allows us to introduce 
contextual and real world knowledge into the representations of donkey sentences. 
Second, it should be clear that GQ-ET rules do not directly introduce pragmatic or 
contextual information into representations. In fact, part of our criticism of GQ-ETb was 
related to that aspect. Unfortunately, although D-T rules (in particular D-Tdom) 
incorporate explicitly contextual information in processing donkey ftmctions, their results 
in some cases disagree with the representations that speakers associate with the utterance 
of sentences containing E-type and unbound pronouns. This can be appreciated by 
examining the following examples. 
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(42) No Hondurans, voted. They, were intimidated by the secret police. (Neale 1990)24 
(43) Not every paper , that gets submitted to aj ourrial isa good paper. If it Iis accepted, 
it, is a good paper. (Poesio and Zucchi 1992) 
We shall first discuss the problem that these cases pose Neale's rules and afterwards 
apply the result of this discussion to D-T rules. 
Examples (42) and (43) involve monotone decreasing quantifiers and hence the 
determiners of the antecedent sentence cannot be maximal. Consequently, therein the 
pronouns must be recovered through application of Neale's P5a rule (which resembles 
to our D-Trgb rule). According to that rule, the descriptive content of the pronouns in 
(42) and (43) should be recovered as in (42) and (43') below. 
(42') The Hondurans who voted were intimidated by the secret police. 
(43') If the paper submitted to ajournal which is a goodpaper is accepted, it is a good 
paper. 
In both cases, however, the recovered content conflicts with semantic intuitions of the 
speaker. As Neale has acknowledged (1990, p. 22 1), one would expect to recover in the 
first case only the nominal restriction (NR) and not the scopal restriction (SR) of the 
QNP. The same applies to (43'), where the content to be recovered should arguably be the 
paper submitted to a Journal. Also, from a pragmatic standpoint our intuitions about 
verbal communication clearly dictate the inacceptability of (42') and (43'). For instance, 
from a Gricean point of view, we would characterize the contextual inacceptability of 
(42') and (43') as a consequence of violating some conversational MaximS. 
25 Sentence 
(42') clearly infringes the Maxim of Quality, because of its incompatibility with the 
information supplied by the antecedent sentence of (42) that states that no Hondurans 
24prof Lappin disagrees about considering (42) as a standard case of E-type anaphora. Neale seems to imply 
that it is a case of D-type anaphora. (see Neale 
1990, p. 221). 
' See Chapter Two, Section 2.1. 
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voted. Sentence (43') violates the Maxim of Quantity (and presumably the Maxim of 
Relevance), because the description renders the anaphora sentence of (43) completely 
trivial and uninformative. 
There are two reasons behind the failure of P5 rules in these cases. The first is that the 
rules generating the representations are unable to capture the variability and richness 
resulting from interaction with the context. This is expressed in the impossibility to 
rightly state the restriction of the pronoun taking into account the intuitions of the 
speaker. The second reason is that while logical maximality-the basic feature of P5 and 
D-T rules-is a plausible constraint imposed on accessible domain anaphora, it is too 
rigid and coarse to deal with inaccesible domain ( or across discourse) anaphora. 
Since our primary purpose in this essay has been to show that donkey sentences are 
nonspecific in nature and, therefore, basically underdetermined by context, the 
limitations mentioned above cannot be welcome. Fortunately, at least two options are 
available to us to overcome them. One could, for instance,, modify the previous rules so 
as to introduce more contextual information into the restricted set structures and weaken, 
thereby, logical maximality. Although this looks in principle a workable idea, we will 
adopt here a more comprehensive alternative. We will abandon the GQ theory (and its 
restricted set reflection) and formulate the functional D-type analysis in a different 
representational language: that of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT; see Chapter 
One, Section 1.3). There is a good reason to think that this option is not as radical as it 
might seem, namely: the conception (although not the treatment) of the quantified NPs 
is basically the same in both DRT and GQ theory. Consideration of two aspects of this 
conception makes it clear. First, definition of quantifiers. DRT defines, as GQ theory 
does, quantifiers as expressing a particular relation between sets. 26 Second, plural nouns. 
DRT's analysis of plurals is based on Linles analysis, which, as we saw, underlies the 
See Kamp and Reyle (1993, pp. 314 ff. ). 
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FGQ account of donkey anaphora . 
27 These aspects, accordingly, allow us to retain without 
a major change the idea of nonspecific reference implemented in the previous chapter. 
On the other hand, the important difference between DRT and FGQ relates, obviously, 
to their approaches to donkey anaphora. DRT defends a binding account of donkey 
pronouns; GQ theory excludes this account in principle because of its commitment to the 
E-type analysis. Nevertheless, important as this difference might be, it does not seem to 
be a crucial one. As it has often been shown in the literature, DR structures can 
successfully be combined with E-type treatments, provided such treatments are 
implemented in functional terms and, therefore, binding mechanisms are blocked or 
dismissed. " We think that, given the sketchy character of our proposal here, the reasons 
above should suffice to justify our substitution of the present GQ language for the DRT 
language. 
One question remains to be asked, nevertheless, and that is: Why should we prefer DRT 
to any other competing theories in order for the functional conception of donkey 
anaphora to embrace intersentential cases? The motivation behind favouring DRT is 
twofold. First DRT comes, as we saw in Chapter One,, with a context-orientated notion 
of meaning. Central to that notion is the idea that the basic unit of meaning is the 
discourse rather than the sentence and that the content of a sentence is better explained 
as a function from discourse meanings to discourse meanings. This conception of 
meaning provides in its turn a basis for explaining donkey nonspecificity as the result of 
processing donkey sentences by speakers through discourse. Consequently, according to 
this explanation, the interpretation of a discourse involving donkey sentences can only 
take place once each sentence and the anaphoric linkages incorporated by them have been 
processed with respect to the previous discourse. 
27 Kamp and Reyle (OR cit., pp. 401 ff ) 
" See for example Heim (1990), and Chierchia (1992,1995). 
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Our second reason for choosing DRT is that it agrees with our conceptualist view about 
representations. On the one hand, a DR structure (or DRS) is, as Kamp and Reyle point 
out, a "partial information structure, " since it Will assert the existence of only a small 
portion of the totality of individuals we suppose exist in the domain of discourse and 
specify "only some of the properties and relations of those individuals fit] mention[s] ". '9 
Thus a DRS may leave it open whether or not two individuals in the same domain stand 
in a certain relation. Models, in contrast, as Kamp and Reyle emphasise, "leave no 
relevant information out". In this particular sense, DRSs may be characterized as "partial 
models". " 
From a mentalistic point of view, on the other hand, they may be understood as specifying 
cognitive or informational states that the discourse recipient forms when he/she 
reconstructs verbal messages. A DRS will specify, in such a case, some of the 
components of real cognitive states of recipients like, for instance, belief states and 
presuppositions. It does so by specifying that "the belief that 4ý, for instance, has a 
structure homomorphic to the DRS derived from (ý and a content that is at least as 
detailed" (Asher 1993, p. 65). This representational conception matches quite nicely with 
our cognitivist arguments in favour of referential nonspecificity. If nonspecific referents 
or denotations are conceived as a sort of cognitive entity or construct that recipients (and 
speakers) are mentally committed to when processing donkey anaphora in natural 
language, their cognitive states should reflect that commitment. The representations of 
these states should, therefore, help us to specify how such a commitment occurs in verbal 
communication. DRSs can perform this task quite successfully, which provides, it seems 
to us, a final motivation for preferring DRT to other alternatives. 
" 
" Kamp and Reyle (1993, p. 97). 
" See Asher (1993, p. 10); of course, this Interpretation of DRSs is not mandatory. 
They could also be 
considered as structures that are themselves interpreted 
by means of some mapping to sets of standard models. 
In which case, DRSs will be sets of constraints on the models 
that interpret the sentences represented by 
DRSs. 
" For detail on other philosophical motivations supporting 
DRT see Asher (1993, pp. 63-6) and Kamp and 
Reyle (1993, pp. 7-13) 
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We are in a position to discuss more technical issues. For the sake of simplicity, we will 
assume a minimal familiarity with theboxes language'of DRT. Boxes language allows 
us to graphically represent the meaning of different quantified sentences. Thus, the 
representation that DRT generates for our paradigm donkey sentence example, repeated 
here as (44), is (45). 





owns (X, Y) 
w 
beato (x, w) 
WMY 
As we know, indefinite descriptions, pronouns and names introduce discourse referents 
into the DRSs, which are variable-like entities. Thus, 'x', 'y' and W indicate discourse 
referents in the so-called minimal boxes. These referents have atomic conditions on them 
such as Donkey(y)', or Man (x)' which must be satisfied by appropriate assignments of 
values. Identities of the type "y=x" in minimal boxes represent anaphoric relations. 
Sentential operators like if ... then... or others 
introduce a complex relation between 
different minimal boxes. Also, the determiner every and the conditional operator 
introduce in DRS the same complex condition on minimal boxes. They generate therefore 
the same DRSs. Given these assumptions, the representation of (44) will contain a 
tripartite structure formed by two minimal boxes and an operator, as shown in (45). 
An important requirement about acceptability of anaphoric linkage in DRT is 
accessibility. This requeriment is specified in structures (46) and (47) below. In (46), the 
discourse referent a in the minimal box Kj is accessible to the discourse referent P. In 
243 
contrast, in (47) a is not accesible to P because a is embedded in the minimal box K". 
which is 5 in turn, subordinate to the non-minimal box Kj (in conditionals, the righthand 
box, which represents the consequent , is subordinate to the lefhand box, which represents 






The accessibility constraint allows us to explain the unacceptability of anaphoric linkage 
in sentences like (48) and (49). 
(48) * Every man who owns every Mustangi likes it.. (Asher, 1993) 
(49) * Every man who owns a Mustangi praises iti. Iti runs very well. 
Let us examine sentence (48). It generates DRS (50), where the discourse referent 'y'-the 
potential antecedent of Y-is clearly inaccessible to Y, because 'y' occurs in a minimal 
box embedded in a non-minimal box to the left of the box containingY. 
" For a formal definition of these notions, see Asher (1993). 
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likes (x, z) 
Given that the non-minimal lefthand box in (50) has the same structure as DRS (45), it 
follows that all intended antecedents of the pronoun in the righthand box of (50) will be 
inaccessible to it. This consequence entails that classical DRT is strongly committed to 
Heim's Scope Constraint, discussed in previous chapters, which states that the scope of 
quantifiers cannot extend beyond the clause in which they occur in S-structure. We will 
come back to this later. 
Sentences like (48) and (49) are unacceptable though, similar examples expressing 
inaccesibility, like sentence (5 1), are perfectly acceptable. 
(5 1) If Sophie has bought a book,, she will be home reading it 1. It, will be a spy-thriller, 
" 
Roberts (1987,1989) has labelled the accessibility problem of sentences of the form (5 1) 
(which incorporates modalities in its anaphora sentences) the modal subordination 
problem. She has offered an interesting solution to it, the "accommodation of the missing 
antecedent" approach. Her solution for interpreting the pronoun in the second sentence 
of (5 1) consists in the "pragmatic accommodation of a contextually given hypothetical 
common ground [from] the antecedent of the modally subordinated clause" (Roberts 
1987, p. 23). "To accommodate" means here to add a presupposition to the contextual 
11 Properly speaking, the pronoun in the second sentence of 
(51) is an instance of E-type but not donkey 
anaphora. 
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knowledge, or common ground, shared by all participants in the process of verbal 
communication. 34 Without the introduction of that presupposition, Roberts argues,, we 
could not make sense of the utterance of a sentence or a discourse. Technically speaking, 
Roberts' accommodation strategy consists in the following: the presence of a modality 
(will or others) implies that an anaphora sentence expressing modal subordination must 
be interpreted according to an epistemic (or causal) context. This context is created by 
updating a lefthand DRS of the sentence with the information in the lefthand DRS 
derived from the immediately antecedent sentence. " In (5 1), for instance, the auxiliar 
will in both anaphoric sentences allows us to introduce a link between our knowledge of 
Sophie and, say, her behaviour with the spy-thrillers she oWnS. 16 So, our intuitive 
understanding of the anaphora sentence seems to require the repetition or 'recopying' of 
the antecedent in the successive sentences containing the E-type pronoun and modal 
subordination- So, we generate the following DRS for the two sentences of (5 I)-where 
the epistemic or causal link is basically represented by the small box'F-]'. 
The notion of'common ground'is defined by StaInaker (1979). 
This applies only to donkey pronouns anaphoric on subject NPs in the antecedent sentence. 
Examples of modal subordination are closely related to problems of specification by hearers in verbal 
communication. Consider the following example discussed in Karttunen (1976). 
(1) Mary wants to many a rich man,. He, must be a banker 
Sentence (1) has two possible readings, a nonspecific and specific reading. That is, a reading where the hearer 
assumes that there is still no specific individual whom Mary is considering marrying, and the specific reading 
where the hearer assumes that this individual exists. The modal continuation in the anaphora sentence is 
perfectly acceptable in both cases. In particular, it is acceptable (for the hearer) to continue to elaborate 
anaphorically on the atributes of an as yet unspecified individual. This suggests that (modal or non-modal) 
intersentential donkey anaphora can be seen as a complex phenomenon 
deriving from different uses of 
descriptions and nonspecific reference. This is a phenomenon clearly underdetermined by the cognitive states 





(X) book(y) home-reading(z, w) 






bought(x, y) Z=Y 
Together with the accommodation approach, Roberts discusses another alternative to deal 
with (5 1), which she calls the "insertion approach". Therein, the semantic information 
coming from the anaphora sentence(s) is directly inserted into the righthand box 
generated by the complex condition if .. then.... The insertion approach generates 
therefore the following representation for (5 1). 
(52b) 
zwv 
xy home-reading(z, w) 
Sophic(x) Z=X 
book(y) F1 
spyZiTlcr(v) bought(x, y) V=W 
I 
Roberts concludes, based on modal considerations that need not be examined here, that 
the insertion approach is defective and that the accommodation approach should be 
preferred. It is worth noting however that, despite her criticism of the insertion solution, 
Roberts does not take a definitive stance on it or on the accommodation approach. " 
" See Roberts (1987, pp. 21-26). This vacci lation, however, affects the motivation to apply either approach 
in non-modal cases of subordination, as we shall see 
later-this fact is also noticed by Barker (1997). Since 
Roberts does not formulate any constraint to specify which approach applies to which case, one must 
conclude that such applications will 
depend on context and pragmatics. 
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Roberts and others" have argued that the accommodation (and insertion) approach could 
be extended to non-modal cases of intersentential donkey anaphora. We shall assume, 
without further discussion, that this option is basically correct. The most positive aspect 
of non-modal accommodation is that it provides us with a general account of 
intersentential E-type and donkey anaphora. According to this account, the processing of 
donkey pronouns by recipients is an activity of rational reconstruction, that is, of 
reconstructing, in a wide sense, the restriction of the pronouns, by appealing to context 
and common ground information. Thus, donkey pronouns embedded in discourse, can be 
associated, under certain constraints, with particular restrictors or restrictive DRSs. We 
can then explain in a straightforward way other cases that violate accessibility, for 
example, telescoping cases. Sentences (53)-(56) provide some examples of telescoping. 
(53) Each degree candidate I walked to the stage to receive his diploma. He I shook hands 
with the dean and left. (Roberts 1987) 
(54) Every farmer owns a gun. He keeps it in a safe place. (Ludlowl994) 
(55) Each candidate for the space mission meets all our requirements. He has a PhD in 
Astrophysics and extensive prior flight experience. (Roberts 1987) 
(56) ? Every dog, came in. It, lay down under the table. (Poesio and Zucchi 1992) 
Let us take sentences (53) and (54). Roberts's accommodation account provides the 
following DRSs for them-where the restrictive pronoun-antecedent connection is 
i1 39 
expressed by the special conditional operator :3. 
" For example, Asher (1993). 
'9 In fact, Roberts proposes to treat (53) by means of insertion; see Roberts (1987, p. 38). We follow here 
rather Asher's (1993) and Barker's (1997) treatments. 
On the other hand, these treatments do not exclude 
completely insertion, since they imply that when antecedents of unbound pronouns are in the consequent- 
DRS (the righthand box) they must be accommmodated in the 
box of the restrictor too. And this has a clear 
effect of insertion towards the lefthand box in the complex condition associated with 
the anaphora sentence. 
Sentence (54) and its DRS in (54') are a simple example of this effect. 
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It is now clear that if one accepts the non-modal accommodation solution, the problem 
of accessibility that (53)-(56) pose to DRT and other approaches endorsing the binding 
view is adequately solved. That is to say, the solution matches DRT constraints without 
violating the Scope Constraint. Nevertheless, as Poesio and Zucchi (1992) have 
convincingly argued, if we assume the accommodation approach then we are left with an 
important methodological problem. This is that accommodation does not provide any 
explanation of the contrast in acceptability between (53)-(55) and the following 
examples: 
(56) ? Every dog, came in. It, lay down under the table. 
(57) *If every cat, purrs, it, is happy. 
(58) *If John owes every man, money then Sam pays him,. 
(59) *John likes every dog, but Sam feeds it,. 
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Telescoping sentences (56)-(59) could be handled by the accommodation approach 
though, they are semantically unacceptable. Poesto and Zucchi have suggested that, while 
the basic idea behind non-modal accommodation is essentially correct (i. e. to reconstruct 
the telescoped pronouns as restrictions on discourse referents), the approach supporting 
it fails to explain the contrast in question because of the narrow pragmatic basis 
underlying the reconstruction process. They argue that in order to explain telescoping 
sentences, it is necessary to appeal to a wider conception of the pragmatic environment 
that surrounds the utterance of those sentences. According to them, the acceptability of 
sentences (53)-(55) depends on seeing them as instantiating routines or sequences of 
events , in which each member 
from a contextually-given group instantiates a certain 
property. Apparently, (56)-(59) cannot be associated with these articulated sequences of 
events or routines and, thereby, reconstruction of the restrictor yields implausible results 
for these sentences. Evidence in favour of this hypothesis, according to Poesio and 
Zucchi, comes from the fact that some initially unacceptable telescoping sentences 
become marginally acceptable, given an appropriate context. It is the case, for instance, 
of (56). The following routine, they claim, makes telescoping marginally acceptable in 
that sentence. " 
I went to the circus last night. They had a number involving 
dogs that went like this: The circus perforiners put a table 
on some supports. Then, every dog came in. It lay down under 
the table,, stood on its back paws, and lifted the table with its 
front paws. (Poesio and Zucchi 1992, p. 360) 
They proceed then to formulate a set of conditions that license restrictor reconstruction. 
These conditions should determine when telescoping becomes plausible; that is, when 
the discourse and the context allow a sentence S to be interpreted relative to a restrictor 
R. The general conditions are the following (see Poesio and Zucch, 1992, pp. 
349-50): 
(A) The discourse can make it clear that a sentence S is to be interpreted relative to a 
' They call these sequences of events 'salient scnpts', see 
Poesio and Zucch, (1992, p. 3 50). 
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restrictor R by explicitly indicating via syntactic means the presence of an operator 
which takes a restrictor and a nuclear scope. 
(B) The discourse can make it clear that a sentence S is to be interpreted relative to a 
restrictor R by providing contextual information which links S to a restrictor. 
As a consequence of (A), (B), and the discussion about routines above, Poesio and Zucchi 
formulate the following principle: 
(PZP) A context c may link S to a restrictor [a] only if [a] ---* S is a step of a routine 
salient in c. 
Finally, their theory also offers an interesting connection with Neale's E-type analysis, 
which will enable us to treat E- or D-type pronouns as restrictors across discourse. This 
is possible because Neale's theory satisfies in general conditions (A) and (B). Concerning 
condition (A), Neale's rules are clearly sensitive to restriction and scope construals, (see 
Chapter Three). Concerning (B), the nature of E-type pronouns and the Gricean 
constraints that, according to Neale, are operative in the interpretation of such pronouns, 
allow one to check whether or not an E-type pronoun is potentially available as restrictor 
in discourse. This agrees, as Poesio and Zucchi notice, with Neale's opinion that cases 
like (56)-(59) above-i. e. discourses containing pronouns anaphoric on every phrases 
that do not c-command them-can pragmatically but not semantically be ruled out (Neale 
1990, p. 232). The aforementioned connection between Neale's theory and theirs is not 
pursued further by Poesio and Zucchi- Since the study of such a connection may shed 
some interesting light on the problems with maximality discussed earlier, the last part of 
this section will be dedicated to exploring it in some detail. 
Given that Neale's theory licenses the construction of restrictors, these can, in a DRT 
scenario, be treated as restrictive DRSs satisfying (A) and (B). To begin with let us 
consider structure (60), which represents sentence (53). In (60) we 
have introduced the 
operator whe, which, as Neale explains, has the force of a universal quantifier without 
uniqueness restrictions. So it can be interpreted as a pronoun-antecedent restrictor 
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satisfying the property 'I F-G I =0 &IFI=> 1'. 
(53) Each degree candidate, walked to the stage to receive his diploma. He I shook hands 
with the dean and left. (Roberts 1987) 
xyz 
(60) degree-candidate(x) stage(y) dean(z) 
x 
degree-candidate(x) walked-to(x, y) 
xw whe shook-hands- 
degree-candidate(x) with(w, z) 
W=X left(w) 
Structure (60) assigns the right truth-conditions to (53). Finally, this theory enables us to 
show that unmodified donkey conditionals can also be treated as telescoping cases. A 
standard example is (6 1). The pronoun he in its anaphora sentence can be represented as 
in (62). Furthermore, examination of DRS (62) makes it clear that its truth-conditions are 
the same as those of DRS (45) above. 
(6 1) If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it 
(62) 
xy farm er(x) donkey(y) 
xyzw 
farmer(z) whle beats(z, w) donkey(y) 
owns(z, y) W=Y 
Z=X 
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Our proposal needs at this point to answer the following question: How could the 
functional treatment of donkey anaphora be introduced in a restrictive DRS containing 
the whe operator? (It should be noticed in any case that the answer we are going to offer 
is not necessarily a rival to the one based only on Poesio and Zucchi's principles). Let us 
introduce the first details of our view by using the simple donkey conditional in (6 1). The 
problem there concerns the anaphora sentence (the consequent sentence). Our functional 
representation of the pronouns in this sentence is specified in (63) (we do not use 
composite functions in what follows). 
(63) 
xy farmer(x) donkey(y) 
(<Z, U>) 
xyz Az) 
farmer(z) w*le beats(zj(z)) donkey(y) 
owns(z, y) J(z)=*y 
z--x 
It is clear enough that (63) parallels (62) because the former is obtained by replacing in 
the latter'W andw=y' with Y(z)' and Y(z)=*y' respectively. This implies, firstly, that Y(z)' 
should be interpreted (within the restrictor box) as an individual variable only. Secondly, 
that makes it clear that the expression Y(z)=*y' does not stand for the assignment of a 
value to Y(z)', but only for the already stipulated DRT anaphoric condition that relates a 
pronoun (the function) to its antecedent (the individual variable). In following the 
common practice in DRT, we chose to indicate the assignment of a value to a function 
outside the restrictor by means of ordered pairs of the form '{<x, u>)', where 'x' stands 
for 
the argument of the function and V for its value. Thus, the ordered pair in 
(63) is 
'f<z, u>)' because the function in question in the restrictor 
is Y(z)'. This allows us to 
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assign (outside the restrictor box) a direct refeTence (the value V) to the pronoun. " 
Putting aside other minor modifications, it is now easily checked that the truth-conditions 
that (63) assigns to the anaphora sentence of (61) coincide with the ones assigned by (62). 
That is, (63) implies that the farmers (or the farmer) who own(s) a donkey beat(s) the 
donkey or donkeys they (he) own (s). Now we check those cases where Neale's rules and 
functional rules failed, i. e. cases like (42) and (43). For example, the problem with 
sentence (42) can now be handled in an E-type functional account with whe restrictors. 
This is shown in (64), the DRS of sentence (42). 














Structure (64) shows that we deal with (42) as we did with (53). Therefore, the pronoun 
they in the anaphora sentence is interpreted in the lefthand box as a function whose 
domain is provided by the common ground, in accordance with (A), (B) and (PZP). The 
range, in its turn, is determined via accommodation. Thus, the restrictor whe specifies 
"More specifically, '(<z, W>)' in the minimal box of(63) coffespondsto what is called mDRTan external 
anchor, which describes the argument and the value of a partial 
functionfassociated with a discourse referent 
in the representation. External anchors 
DRT are mechanisms intended to supply direct reference to 
I wi i ions on proper names. Since donkey discourse referents in the minimal boxes and dispense, thus, 
ith condit' I 
functions are directly referential expressions, it is possible to treat them as external anchors as well. 
See Kamp 
and Reyle (1993, p, 246-8) and Asher 
(1993, pp. 82-4), 
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that the pronoun is limited to only the Hondurans, and ensures the acceptability of the 
translation of the pronoun as a plural definite description. In the function itself, this is 
indicated by the maximality conditionY. Furthermore, the anaphoric relation in sentence 
(43) can now be similarly treated using whe restrictors. Structure (65) yields the 
representation of the antecedent sentence of (43) from which we derive by 
accommodation the representation of the anaphora sentence of (43) in (66). The sole 
accommodated material in the restrictor of (66) is provided by the antecedent DRS in 
(65). Moreover, the function in the restrictor of (66) is a choice function, which is 
indicated by the symbol i-i . 
42 
(43) Not every paper I that gets submitted to aj oumal is a good paper. If it I is accepted, it, is a good paper. 
(65) 
-1 







x paper(x) {<Z, U>) 











'2 In order to meet the constraints imposed by Roberts on accommodation, representation of the negation in 
structures (64) and (65) will presumably need 
ftirther elaboration. See Roberts (1987, pp. 29-30) 
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Since we are now going to examine other more complex cases we need to enlarge on the 
functional account so as to incorporate some explicit constraints on restrictor 
reconstruction- These constraints will motivate, in their turn, the formulation of recovery 
rules for donkey functions in restrictive DRSs. 
On the basis of the above discussion, the following constraints on the reconstruction of 
restrictors associated with donkey pronouns can be suggested. 
(C) Considerations of consistency, plausibility and informativeness governed by Gricean 
Maxims should determine what is accommodated in the restrictor (Ludlow 1994, 
Poesio and Zucchi 1992). 
(D) The semantic structure of the preceding discourse plays a role beyond affecting 
salience in constraining accommodation (Poesio and Zucchi 1992) 
(E) The pronoun and its intuitive antecedent are formally related, but this relation is 
not necessarily realised as variable binding. The relation consists in the individuation, 
using semantic material coming from the antecedent discourse, of certain functions 
by means of appropriate recovery procedures and the application of pragmatic 
constraints (B), (C) and (D) above. 
Condition (C) is self-explanatory and, given our previous discussion about sentences 
(56)-(59), clearly acceptable. Condition (D) is formulated by Poesio and Zucchi (1992) 
in order to rule out a purely pragmatic reconstruction of the restrictors . 
4'This is what the 
explanation of the contrast between sentences (43) and (67) seems to require. 
(43) Not evety paper , that gets submitted to aj ournal 
is a good paper. If it I is accepted, 
I. tj is a good paper. 
(67) ? Not everypaper, is written in Spanish. If it , is submitted to an English journal, the 
editors do not like it,. (Poesio and Zucchi 1992) 
4-3, See Poesio and Zucchl (1992, pp. 3 51-3). 
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The pragmatic reconstruction of the pronouns works well on (43) by dismissing material 
in the VP of the antecedent sentence-i. e. IS a goodpaper. It cannot however be applied 
to (67). In Poesio and Zucchi's words "the pragmatic story predicts that we should 
understand [(67)] as saying what [(67') below] says. In fact, [(67)] cannot get reading 
[(67) below]. English speakers find [(67)] bad since the only reading available, given in 
[(67) below], doesn't make much sense" (Poesio and Zucchi 1992, p. 353) 
(67) Not every paper, is written in Spanish. If x is a paper written in Spanish and x is 
submitted to an English journal, the editors do not like it. 
(67") Not every paper, is written in Spanish. If x is a paper submitted to an English 
journal, the editors do not like it. 
Condition (E) contains our view about donkey anaphora. Since (E) involves an 
interaction between recovery rules for donkey functions and pragmatic constraints in a 
DRT setting, it is not easy to see how it could be implemented. Undoubtedly, a fully 
worked out approach to this problem should go well beyond the boundaries of this 
dissertation. However, we believe an initial version of the recovery rules can be 
adequately grounded if work is done in accordance with Poesio and Zucchi's constraints 
on accommodation of discourse markers in restrictors. Poesio and Zucchi (1992, p. 353) 
suggest the following general principle for accommodating descriptive information: 
(Pl) Accommodate descriptive material ftom the minimal box containing the 
accommodated discourse marker up to inconsistency or implausibility. 
The 'descriptive material' in P1 is determined by the same sort of knowledge that 
prompted (C) above: that is to say, knowledge yielded by the common ground. As is 
obvious, P1 is intended to impose (the most) general conditions on the interpretation of 
a pronoun associated with a discourse marker in a minimal box. Furthermore, Poesio and 
Zucchi fon-nulate a rule in order to specify which particular information can be accepted 
in a restrictor. It is the following: 
(Cl) Ifa discourse marker x is accommodated I*na restri . ctor r, only descriptive material 
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in the minimal box whose universe contains x can be accommodated in r. 
Thus, C1 has the effect of specifying the correct choice of restrictors and therefore the 
direct interpretation that the pronoun gets from the minimal box containing the discourse 
marker (anaphorically connected to the pronoun). On this basis, we would like to sketch 
a possible version of recovery rules for whe restrictors in a DRT setting. Of course, no 
one of our previous arguments hinges on the eventual success of such rules. 
The first rule allows us to specify the domain of a donkey function on the basis of an 
expansion of P1. It is the following: 
(D-TACdom) The domain of a donkey functionfix) anaphorically associated with a 
discourse referent'y'in a minimal box Kj is determined by the 
knowledge of the common ground that can be accommodated in the 
universe of the first minimal box Kj-,, containing'y', up to inconsistency 
or implausibility. 
The crucial rule to recover the range of the functions of telescoped pronouns is obtained 
on the basis of an extension of C1. It is the following: 
(D-TACrg ) The range of a donkey functionfix) anaphorically associated with a 
discourse referent 'y' in a restrictor Rj (the minimal box Kj) is only 
the semantic material accommodated in Rj coming from the first 
minimal box Kj-. whose universe contains 'y'. " 
Armed with these rules, we will examine a telescoping case that Neale's semantics cannot 
' in order to complete the functional account, something like a rule to recover the range of non-telescoped 
E-type functions supplied with whe restrictors should be formulated. The rule below is offered as a first 
is represented by a function occupy' attempt. The rule assumes that a non-telescoped E-type pronoun 
iI ing a 
position within minimal boxes, which are not restrictors themselves. 
(D-TACrg') The range of a donkey functionfix), in a minimal box 1ý that is not 
a restrictor R, anaphorically associated with a discourse referent'y' 
is only the semantic material accommodated in the 
first restrictor 1ý-n 
(the minimal box K., ) whose universe contains'y'or Y(x)=*yl. 
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handle adequately (see Section 3.4). The case is (68) below: 
(68) Every boy danced with a girl. She was a ballerina. (Neale 1990) 
Let us focus on both the representation of the restriction that accommodation attributes 
to the sentence (68) and the interpretation of the function embedded in the restrictor. The 













:: t ballerina + Az) 
Representation (69) shows how the range of the function Y(z)' in the restrictor of the 
anaphora sentence is recovered by using D-TACrg. If the first minimal box whose 
universe contains 'y' consists of the righthand box of the DRS of the antecedent sentence 
in (68), the accommodated semantic material related to 'y' is the girl(s) who danced with 
somebody. To be sure, this is not the interpretation we would expect from processing the 
anaphora sentence. As Neale points out, we would expect something like the girl(s)who 
danced with every boy. In the account presented here at least two options are available 
to solve this problem. The first consists in showing that the anaphoric linkage in the 
sentence (68) is pragmatically unacceptable. This involves demonstrating that (68) does 
not satisfy the PZP principle. We think that this alternative is attractive and likely to 
match the intuitions of many speakers. It might be useful however to consider how the 
functional account of whe restrictors would work if (68) turned out to be acceptable as 
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we believe it is. Our suggestion to carry out the last is as follows. Let us look at 
conditions (C) and (D) above. It can be argued, for example, that since the antecedent 
sentence has been already processed, the description the girl(s) who danced with 
somebody Violates at least Grice's Maxim of Quantity. This description is not informative 
enough because we know already who the girl danced with. Nevertheless, according to 
condition (D), this additional information can be derived from the antecedent sentence, 
since the semantic material therein indicates that every individual in the domain 
satisfying the condition 'boy(x)' danced with the individual satisfying the condition 
fgirl(/(z))' in the restrictor. What we get, as a result, is not just the accommodation but 
rather the full insertion of the semantic material of the antecedent sentence in the 
restrictor, as shown in (70). Structure (70) assigns the correct truth-conditions to the 
anaphora sentence of (68). 
(70) 
y girl(y) (<Z, U>) 
xy Az) 
girl +f(z) 




Finally, what about nonspecificity in this new picture? Generally speaking, all our 
remarks about donkey functions and restrictors apply to nonspecific values 
(the values 
assigned to such functions) because of the semantic framework supporting 
DRT, as we 
saw at the beginning of this section. Accordingly, a general theory of whe restrictors can 
provide a basis for a more systematic fonnulation of the nature of the 
donkey functions 
and their nonspecific values. We will suggest 
here how this could be done with a quite 
simple example, the sentence 
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(71) Everyfarmer, owns two guns,. He, keeps theM2in a safe place. 
Following Kamp and Reyle's (1993) treatment of plurals, we will introduce sets as 
discourse referents and represent all sets containing i-sums (or nonspecific values) with 
the symbol'*', as usual. All i-sums or nonspecific individuals will be associated with the 
symbol "'. Moreover, we stipulate, following Lappin and Francez, that the second 
argument (the object NP) of the two-place predicate '*R(x, y)' is a nonspecific value (or 
i-sum if you like). Finally, Kamp and Reyle's 'duplex condition' notation for representing 
generalized quantifiers is incorporated here; " they are represented by diamond-shaped 
boxes. Thus, under the collective reading of the pronoun them in (7 1), the functional whe 
restrictors theory generates the following representation for the anaphora sentence of 
(71). 
(72) 
X farmer(X) IXIý--n Y *gun(Y) lY12: 2 
Xy ll «X"p » 
Y *gun(Y)IYI 3P n X YO Zr 
(x) 
zex 
whe f ns(x) y YO ey x x keep(xjns(x» 




Application of the particular constraints on plurals implemented by Kamp and Reyle's 
account and careful examination of the righthand box associated with the 'whe Y 
'A duplex condition is a DRS with a general tripartite 
form constituted by two standard DRSs linked by a 
diamond-shaped box. The left DRS is the restrictor of the duplex condition, the right one is its nuclear scope 
and the diamond-shaped box is its quantifier. 
For more detail on duplex conditions see Kamp and Reyle 
(1993). 
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restrictor show that there may be two ways of interpreting the function f nTx), depending 
on which box we choose in the complex condition corresponding to the restrictor'whe 
f'(x)'. We can choose the box containing f '(x)GY' and thus the function will be 
interpreted according to what D-TACrg stipulates. But also Kamp and Reyle's constraints 
allow us to choose in the complex condition the box containing the expression 
f'(x)=*yED'. In such a case, the interpretation will presumably go along the lines 
stipulated by the rule D-TACrg' in footnote 44 above. In both cases however the first 
minimal box containing 'ye' in its universe and determining the range of f '(x)'will be 
the lefthand one associated with the 'whe Yrestrictor. We obtain therefore in both cases 
the description the nonspecific value or i-sum ofat least two guns owned by a man, just 
as it should be. 
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Appendix I 
A definition of dependent domains for a FGQ approach of E-type anaphora. 
The basic idea is to represent storage of E-type information across discourse by using a 
particular function ff is a partial function from contextual variables of the fon-n '[ :Fx 
& 
... 
& FkX]'-in short [x]-to formulae of the form '[Du: (ý ](*)'. General dependency 
between two contextual variables is then defined as follows (see van der Does 1996): 
a. For [x], [y] eDom(f), [x] depends on Ly] (in f) iff there are variables z,..., z "c 
Dom(F) 
with z, =x, y=z ,, and [zi, I] cRg(f (z)). 
Dependency between range and domain of donkey functions can then be defined as 
follows: 
b. For [/(x)], [g(y)] EDom(f), Lg(y)] depends on V(x)] iff [y] depends on [x], [zi, l] EFRg 
(f(/(z ))) and Rg( f(/(z 1))) c: Dom( f(g(x))). 
0 Appendix 11 
Union of functions 
Example: 
(1) Every boy who has a dog, and every gIrl who has a catwIll beat t,,, (Ch, erchia 1995) 
1) ý] -/+ C([[[ ý]B: IBI ýýn] [(Vx)x EBI ]([[ ADns: ID 
ns j->11[(ý]y)ycDnj] ( *Hxy) )]- 
((Vc)(*B(c, _m+( ns(C) ) )) 
]&[ [[ IG: IGI >n] [(Vx)xcG]l 
ns. I Cns j? j][(ý]y)ycC"s]j ( *Iixy)) ((Vc)(*B( c, -m'C"(c) ([[DC . 
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We interpret'('in (F) as a functional meta-variable which represents the union of two 
donkey functions. Each function will map the argument c from one of the two possible 
domains into one of the two possible ranges. The speciftcation of' C' and its eventual 
domain and range is given below. ' 
(1 11) 
(I'a) -'+fs = domain: boys who have dogs 
range : the maximal nonspecific compound of dogs ( with cardinality of 
at least I) that boys in the domain have. ( x D-Trg b) 
(I'b g"' = domain: girls who have cats 
range: the maximal nonspecific compound of dogs (with cardinality of 
at least 1) that girls in the domain have. (x D-Trg b) 
E- and subject asymmetric readings 
Example: 
(2) Usually if a person, has a credit card, he, pays his bill with it,. 
We state first the FGQ simplification of (2) and then its restricted set version. It should 
be clear from both versions that the pronoun it in the anaphora sentence of (2) denotes 
a choice function g. (2"a) and (2"b) specify the domain and the range of each function. 
{s: {x: Person (s, x) In{a: { b: *has( s, a, b))n ly: I_credit_card( s, y)I 
I+I+ 
oonf s': { c: *has( s, 
Xns( s 1, C) , -g'( s 
Xns St, C >50% 
{s: f x: Person( s, x))nIa: f b: *has( S, a, b) n y: 1-credit-card( s, y) 
t- oIý, - oI 
(2") D+'f ý]+'-g [[AP: IP>I] [(ý]X)X EP]l ( [[:: ]C': I Cns > [(ý]Y) CCns 
([pS)(SCSns)]( *IlXy, S)) )) , ([[ASt ns: I S'j>50%fSj][(ý]s')(s'cS' 
((VC)( *p( Si, + ns (Si, C -gns( f ns ( St, C f 
'This solution builds on a proposal by Chierchia 
(1995, pp. 116-7). 
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(2"a) he = If ns = domain: male human beings who have at least one credit 
card in a situation s. 
range: the maximal nonspecific compound of male human 
beings (with cardinality of at least 1) who have 
nonspecific values of credit cards (with cardinality 
at least 1) in s'. (x D-Trg b) 
(2" b) it = -g' = domain: the range of (2" a )(x D-Trg c ). 
range: the nonmaximal nonspecific compound of credit 
cards (with cardinality of at least 1) that the members 
of the domain have in s'. (x D-Trg b) 
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